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To the question many people asked me during all those years (especially those who were astonished by the fact that an 
institution could actually pay for my work…), here is a nice answer: 
“ What is all that for?” 
 
«  On  the  most  basic  level,  what  we  are  trying  to  do  in  science  is  to  understand  our  world. 
Predictions  are  an  excellent  means  of  testing  our  comprehension,  and  once  we  have  the 
comprehension, applications are inevitable; but the basic aim of scientific activity remains the 
comprehension itself. » 
 
From Robert Aumann – What is game theory trying to accomplish?  
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SUMMARY 
Cooperation  between  unrelated  partners  has  long  been  an  evolutionary  paradox:  why  would 
organisms sustain severe costs in order to increase the fitness of a prefect stranger? Many models 
tried to tackle the issue. Some focused on the fact that cooperation would not evolve if partners do 
not control each other (reciprocal altruism model by Trivers, parcelling model by Connor, and so 
forth). Other models switched the emphasis from partner control to partner choice as an effective 
tool to enforce cooperation. It is the case of the biological market theory (BMT) developed by 
Noë & Hammerstein, in which cooperative interactions between organisms are similar to market 
exchanges.  Individuals  compete  to  get  the  best  bargain  possible  and  switch  partners  if  the 
interaction does not yield sufficient benefits. In this project we extensively tested the predictions 
derived from BMT and showed how they provide insights into the social interactions in two 
different primate species. We worked with one group of sooty mangabeys (Cercocebys atys) from 
the Taï National Park in Ivory Coast and two groups of vervet monkeys (Chlorocebus aethiops) 
from  the  Loskop  Dam  Reserve  in  South  Africa.  We  first  investigated  naturally  occurring 
exchanges: grooming-grooming, grooming-infants and grooming-sex exchanges. For each set of 
exchanges, we tested predictions derived from the law of supply and demand and predicted that 
grooming investments would follow the fluctuating availabilities of the sought commodities. We 
also investigated how outbidding competition and effects such as sexual receptivity or infants 
maturity could affect the value of the commodity. We demonstrated that individuals tended to 
choose partners who had little leverage on them and they differentiated between partners they 
often interacted with and the rest of the group. They also invested large amount of grooming to 
obtain rare commodities. We secondly investigated grooming exchanges in an artificial setup. The 
field experiments demonstrated that monkeys quickly understood new market situations and easily 
adapted to it. They did so by modifying grooming ratios in very few trials and also by reducing 
their aggressive behaviours. We showed that their self-control was acquired through a queuing-to-
learn system and that it seemed to be socially enhanced.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Since  Darwin’s  natural  selection  theory,  evolution,  or  the  structural  and  behavioural  changes 
observed throughout generations, was assumed to be based on competition and the survival of the 
fittest. The subsequent arising conflicts explained most traits, ranging from diets variations to the 
development of secondary sexual characters. Competition was, in turn, assumed to be based on 
adaptations the modalities of which constitute one of the main purposes of modern studies in 
biology. All living individuals show adaptations to their environment: most of their actual genetic 
and  behavioural  traits  were  kept  and  transmitted  throughout  generations  since  they  usually 
enhanced  their  owner’s  survival  in  response  to  new  or  modified  surroundings.  A  textbook 
example, now controversial, was the case of the birch moths in Great Britain (Kettlewell’s work 
reviewed in Ridley 2004, and see Brakefield 1987). The moths usually rest on the white birch 
bark during the day and are less conspicuous when they are brightly coloured with small black 
dots. Prior to the industrial period, this clear phenotype constituted about 98% of the population. 
However, when increasing pollution made their resting substrates darker, blacker moths became 
less susceptible to predation and had greater chances to survive and reproduce. Therefore, the dark 
trait  was  passed  on  and  in  polluted  areas  the  dark  phenotype  is  now  the  most  represented. 
Experiments also showed that moths carefully chose the substrate on which they would rest, clear 
moths selecting clear barks and dark moths resting on dark ones. Obviously moths’ survival is 
defined by both their colour and their behaviour. 
Behaviours can either be adapted, i.e. they are genetically coded, selected and expressed, 
or  result  from  individual  plasticity,  i.e.  they  are  expressed  through  learning,  temporary 
physiological adjustments or maturation. On the ultimate level, behaviours are selected in the 
sense that they benefit their owner’s fitness. In behavioural ecology, the fitness of an individual 
“having an array x of phenotypes”, is described as “the probability s(x) that the individual will be 
included among the group selected as parents of the next generation” (definition from Wikipedia).  
  10 
It is important to understand how behaviours can enhance individuals’ survival and reproductive 
efforts on a proximal or mechanistic level. It is also important to understand how they evolved 
from a completely different historical function to become what they are nowadays. For example, 
the human smile as well as the mandrill grin are a bizarre exception in primates. Indeed, most 
non-human  primates  would  see  this  bared  teeth  display  as  an  expression  of  either  fear  or 
submission (but see Petit & Thierry 1992 for an example of affiliative function). Both the smile 
and the grin are thought to have derived from their submissive original function to act as an 
appeasing  behaviour  enhancing  one-shot  cooperation  among  strangers  (see  for  example 
Scharlemann et al. 2001, Schmidt & Cohn 2001, Balliet 2010). 
In this context in which competition seems to drive organisms’ structural and behavioural 
changes, the emergence and maintenance of cooperative behaviour may prove difficult to explain. 
Indeed for many authors (e.g. Trivers 1971, De Waal 2000) cooperation would be described as a 
succession of exchanges in which individuals take turns in receiving beneficial services (and/or 
commodities) but also in losing some fitness (except if they succeed in taking turns) for the 
benefit of another individual. The costly actions would then be called altruistic episodes. The 
losses would theoretically be more easily explained when cooperation takes place among related 
partners.  Hamilton  (Kin  Selection  Theory  1964,  see  Clutton-Brock  2002  for  a  review) 
demonstrated that the degree of genetic relatedness influenced cooperative interactions between 
closely related individuals. His theory also allowed making predictions on how selection operates 
in this case: the genetic information coding for ‘altruistic behaviour’ can be selected for if this 
altruistic behavior is directed at individuals that carry the same genetic information with a high 
probability (which is the case for close relatives of the altruist). However, cooperation and its 
associated losses are more difficult to explain when they occur between unrelated partners. As 
Noë (2006) writes: “the art of cooperation consists of investing the right amount in the right 
partner at the right moment”. When individuals choose the wrong partner, they can sustain severe 
losses. When they invest in the relation and bet on the hypothetical beneficial returns, they may  
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never receive them. Why would they take such risks when partners are not even affiliated? How 
could selection possibly favour cooperation among unrelated partners? 
 
Cooperation among unrelated individuals 
Trivers’ idea to tackle cooperation occurring between unrelated partners is quite simple: it may be 
beneficial to help another if one can expect to be helped in return in the future. In his Reciprocal 
Altruism Theory (1971), the cost of helping would be compensated by the expected return benefit 
and the behaviour would evolve by natural selection. He designed a model in which a population 
of  N  individuals  is  composed  of  cooperative  members  displaying  genetically  coded  altruistic 
behaviours (a2a2 genotype) and of egoist members presenting the alternative unaltruistic allele 
(a1a1 genotype). He also implemented the notion that altruistic reciprocation is enhanced by the 
exchange itself and not by the fact that one allele directly benefits its equivalent duplicate in 
another individual: the reciprocation can take place between conspecifics as well as individuals 
belonging  to  different  species.  He  found  that  reciprocal  altruism  is  more  likely  to  appear  in 
species with 1- an extended life span and a high degree of mutual dependence that can provide 
many  altruistic  situations,  2-  a  low  dispersal  rate  and  3-  an  egalitarian  hierarchical  system 
allowing  more  symmetrical  relations.  Furthermore,  the  best  answer  to  non-reciprocation  is  to 
curtail  any  further  altruistic  interaction  with  this  partner  (i.e.  ‘defect’).  Based  on  the  dyadic 
relationships  between  individuals  that  are  repeatedly  and  symmetrically  interacting  with  each 
other, reciprocal altruism is often compared to the Tit-for-Tat strategy emerging from the iterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game (Trivers 1971, Axelrod & Hamilton 1981, Box 1).  
Currently viewed as one of the many mechanisms that could enhance the emergence of 
cooperation between unrelated partners (Sachs et al. 2004, Lehmann & Keller 2006, West et al. 
2007 a), reciprocal altruism is unlikely to occur in species other than humans (West et al. 2007) 
because the conditions that are required are extremely restrictive (e.g. Hammerstein 2003, Stevens 
et al. 2005 a). Reciprocal altruism theory inspired a large body of theoretical and empirical work  
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on cooperation among unrelated partners, however. Many authors (see Sachs et al. 2004 for a 
review)  have  attempted  to  design  models  that  could  explain  various  examples  of  cooperative 
behaviours. 
 
For instance, Dugatkin and Wilson (1991) as well as Enquist and Leimar (1993) tried to 
tackle the mobility issue and presented models in which the change of partner was made possible. 
They found that mobility seriously affects the evolution of cooperation as a single mobile free 
riding cheater can easily exploit a population of cooperators. Most other models focussed on how 
players could exert control over their partners through immediate sanctions in case of defection. 
Box 1. Supergames and Prisoner’s Dilemma rules. 
Supergames are characterised by a series of interactions of the same game played between the same partners 
who can pick from the same set of strategies. The latter is not necessary. After each interaction, the game is 
repeated with a certain probability. When it is difficult to obtain a stable cooperation in just one round and 
when the number of rounds is large enough, complex strategies can arise as solutions for the supergame. A 
usual game chosen for predicting cooperation and altruism is the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Its rules are quite 
simple:  two  players,  playing  simultaneously  and  without  knowing  what  the  other  chose  to  do,  can  either 
cooperate C or defect D. The payoffs are such that if the players are rational, each should think that whatever 
the choice of the other is, he/she should defect: 
 
Table 1. Prisoner’s Dilemma payoffs. 
Player B 
  D  C 










C  D, T  R, R 
 
In single round games and independently from any partner’s playing decision, the rational option to get a payoff 
is defection. In iterated versions however, evolutionary stable cooperation can emerge from various strategies 
such as “Tit-for-Tat” (the first player cooperates on its first move and then reproduces whatever its partner is 
playing;  see  Dugatkin  1997  for  a  review  on  ESS).  When  such  an  evolutionary  stable  cooperation  arises, 
defecting players cannot invade the population anymore, which makes the game robust to defection. 
For this game to be a dilemma, the payoff for 
the Temptation T (I defect, the other 
cooperates) should be higher than for the 
Reward for mutual cooperation R (we both 
cooperate), that should also be higher than the 
Punishment P (we both defect), that should in 
turn be higher than the Defection D (I 
cooperate, the other defects): 
T > R > P > D   
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For  example  Connor  developed  the  parcelling  model  (1995)  in  which  defection  is  not  a 
advantageous option. Dyads of individuals, still caught in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma, reduce 
the  risk  of  exploitation b y  delivering  their  goods  and  services  in  small  packages.  The  goods 
parcelling ensure that partners benefit more from reciprocation than from defecting and look for 
another partner. Hence parcelling changes the payoff matrix of each round of the game in such a 
way that it is no longer a prisoner’s dilemma. The model seemed to work well for egg trading in 
simultaneous hermaphrodites fish (Connor 1992) and for allogrooming in impalas (Connor 1995) 
but only when the animals are not in a two-player game. When it is the case, they cannot switch 
partners and parcelling make no sense (see also Friedman & Hammerstein 1991). The major 
technical  problem  of  parcelling  model  however  resides  in  the  difficulty  for  predicting  the 
proportion  of  parcelling  that  would  fulfil  the  requirements  of  the  payoff  matrix.  Roberts  and 
Sherratt (1998) developed the idea of the parcelling model further and proposed the “raising-the-
stakes” (RTS) model in which animals can arrive at taking greater risk of exploitation by first 
building trust with their partners. This strategy can by definition only be applied by individuals 
that never met their partner before. They would start with delivering small packages, and then 
increase the costs of the portion delivered in each round, as long as the partner matches the 
investment (see Milinski 1987 for an example of Tit-for-Tat allowing cooperation in fish, but see 
Noë 2006 for a critique). 
Some other models (e.g. Batali & Kitcher 1995, Bull & Rice 1991, Noë 1990, Noë et al. 
1991,  Noë  &  Hammerstein  1994)  switched  from  the  dyadic,  ‘partner  control’  aspect  of 
cooperation to the dynamics of cooperation in which partners have the option to choose and 
switch partner (see Bshary & Noë 2003). Such ‘partner choice’ models emphasize the fact that 
most  individuals  would  risk  some  investments  to  initiate  interactions  because  these  costs  are 
reduced  if  cooperation  with  a  partner  is  better  than  defecting  and  not  cooperate  at  all. 
Furthermore,  individuals  can  terminate  cooperative  interactions  whenever  the  selected  partner 
does  not  produce  the  expected  benefits.  Hence,  these  models  contemplate  the  fear  of  partner  
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switching as a potent component for partner control and they consider partner choice as a likely 
mechanism  for  the  evolution  of  cooperation.  The  emphasis  is  not  on  keeping  track  of  past 
interactions but is rather on choosing the best partner possible at a precise moment. 
 
Cooperation and markets 
In  the  rest  of  this  manuscript  I  use  the  following  definition  to  describe  cooperation:  “all 
interactions or series of interactions that, as a rule (or ‘on average’), result in net gain for all 
participants” (Noë 2006). The overall net gain can be immediate or reached over long-term 
periods.  In  this  context,  I  view  cooperative  behaviour  as  an  investment  with  a  risk  of  no  or 
insufficient returns. 
 
Studies  based  on  sexual  selection  theory  reveal  that  animal  reproductive  strategies  are 
characterized  by  asymmetric  relationships  between  genders  essentially  due  to  different 
reproductive  potentials  (see  Andersson  1994  for  a  review).  The  operational  sex  ratio  (OSR; 
Emlen, and Oring 1977) is almost always skewed in favor of the females. This implies that male 
reproductive success is likely to be limited by the access to receptive females and that there will 
be  competition  among  males  over  access  to  such  females.  Males  are  often  seen  to  display 
structural traits and/or behaviours that potentially affect their survival and are not directly linked 
to their reproductive apparatus (sexual secondary characters). It is for example the well-known 
case of the peacock tail that conveys huge energetic and survival costs for males. According to 
Zahavi and Zahavi’s handicap principle (Zahavi 1975, Zahavi & Zahavi 1997), these handicaps 
constitute an honest signal for females to evaluate males’ abilities to survive and to choose among 
many potential partners. 
The analogy between animal reproductive strategies and human trading systems led to the 
oldest market paradigm in biology: the mating market. Probably because of the extreme attention 
given  to  partner  control  in  reciprocal  altruism,  the  importance  of  partner  choice  as  well  as  
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outbidding competition outside the mating market has long been put aside. Yet, many exchanges 
are observed within and between species and seem to fit the economic law of supply and demand. 
It is almost impossible to predict the exact exchange rates when the supply and demand ratios 
vary. However, it is often possible to predict in which direction the exchange rate will move: the 
fewer commodities are available, the higher are the respective offers. For example, pied kingfisher 
breeders and their related helpers accept unrelated helpers more readily if these potential mate 
competitors  provide  enough  food  to  alleviate  the  costs  for  accepting  them  in  the  group.  The 
amount of food brought to the nest by each of the secondary helpers increases with the number of 
secondary helpers attending the nest (Reyer 1986). Similarly, the quantity of nectar provided by 
lycaenid butterfly larvae varies according to the species and the number of ants that can protect 
them (Leimar & Axén 1993, Axén 2000, Pierce et al. 2002). It is sometimes tricky to assess the 
real amount or availability of a commodity. It is the case for example in exchanges occurring in 
mycorrhiza and rhizobia associations. West and collaborators (2002) showed that the exchanges 
were altered by the presence of abiotic resources brought via fertilizers. Hence, the difficulty in 
studying predictions derived from the law of supply and demand is to properly define the actors of 
each trader class and estimate the amount of commodity they really hold. When such estimations 
are erroneous, results can wrongly assumed that an exchange does not follow market rules (see 
Colmenares et al. 2002, Schino et al. 2003, Gumert 2007b for further discussion). 
Confronted with the evidence that many biological systems were characterised by two 
distinct classes of traders controlling different commodities and that partner choice influenced 
many animals’ traits of life, Noë and Hammerstein (1994, 1995, see also Chiang 2010) proposed 
that  basic  human  market  theory  becomes  a  general  framework  for  explaining  cooperation. 
Biological markets is formalised as follows (adapted from Noë 2001): 
1- Each class is composed with either conspecifics or individuals belonging to different species 
but offering the same commodity, the value of which leads to outbidding or contest competition 
among its members.  
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2- Behavioural mechanisms such as partner choice, competition or audience effects determine 
how the association between trading pairs is settled. 
The model predicts that 1- partner choice depends on expectations of better profits one can get 
with a partner rather than with another, that 2 - members of the more common trading class 
compete over access to the rare partners, that 3 - competition increases the value of the exchanged 
commodity,  that  4-  the  supply  and  demand  market  law  determines  the  flexible  values  of 
exchanged commodities: when a commodity is scarce, it is pricy and that 4- commodities can be 
advertised. 
 
In biological markets, Noë and Hammerstein (1994) abandoned the dyadic structure that 
was often used to characterize cooperative interactions. By means of the fictive tale of the “boa 
constructor” and the “shadow birds” (see the payoffs matrixes in Box 2), they summarized how 
the number of players could affect the outcome resulting from evolution: 
In an open desert area, a female boa constructs a nest mound in which she lays her eggs. 
Although she can protect them from predation, she can do nothing against solar radiations. She 
therefore needs to cooperate with a shadow bird female that can provide shade to the eggs thanks 
to her fan-like tail. In turn, the shadow bird benefits from the cooperation as she can lay her own 
eggs in the nest and have them protected from predation. Without this active protection from the 
snake, the bird cannot reproduce. It is assumed that the bird benefits the boa better at shading the 
eggs than at providing a meal. The amount of shade the bird can provide is morphologically 
selected and the size of the tail - either short or long – cannot change throughout the nesting 
period. The snake always benefits from the cooperation but her fitness is positively correlated 
with the tail length, as more eggs can be shaded. The bird invests in the size of her tail prior to the 
beginning of the nesting period and a short tail is enough to shade her own eggs. The tail length is 
negatively correlated with the energy she can allocate to her eggs production. 
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In the case of a two-player game in which only one boa and one bird are interacting, the 
bird is scarce since she is the only candidate for shading the snake’s nest. Furthermore, her choice 
prevails on the boa’s preferences as she invests in her tail length prior to the nesting period. The 
ultimate game predicts that the boa will have to cope with what is available and the bird will 
invest in a short tail. However, in the case of a three-player game in which only one boa but two 
shadow birds are playing, the previous predictions can be seriously altered. With two candidates, 
Box 2. Payoff matrixes with two and three players (adapted from Noë & Hammerstein 1994). 




Payoffs of the game with three players (in two steps): 
 
1
st step: game among shadow birds 
(“if the boa is choosy”) 
 
 
where α is the boa’s basic payoff without cooperation, R is the reward for accepting a bird, C is the bird’s cost 
for her tail and β is the reward the bird gains if she is allowed to cooperate (otherwise her basic payoff is zero). 
2
nd step: boa’s choice 
(he either chooses one bird 
or rejects both)  
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the boa can exert choice and will prefer the bird with the longer tail. She therefore creates a 
pressure for the selection of longer tails and birds need to outbid each other in order to be invited 
to cooperate with the snake. The prediction is then in favor of the birds investing in long tails 
(under the assumption that growing such a long tail is not too costly). 
 
 
This theoretical example introduced the concept of market selection by which traits are 
enhanced by the formation of mutually beneficial associations. Empirical examples proved that 
such market selection exists in nature (e.g. birds: Greene et al. 2000; plant/insect associations: 
Box 3) and I did not focus on that point in the following study. However, it also introduced the 
Box 3. Obligate pollination mutualisms. 











Photo credits: tamuk.edu, rice.edu & cals.ncsu.edu 
Even in the presence of other potential pollinators, 
the evolution of the obligate mutualism was made 
possible thanks to a greater temporal reliability 
between the nocturnal opening of the senita flowers 
and the breeding system of the senita moths. 
Moth females oviposit their eggs in the yucca ovaries 
and actively deposit some pollen on the stigmas to 
ensure that the lack of pollen will not limit the 
number of developing seeds, their progenies’ food. 
To control both moths’ over-exploitation and lack of 
pollinating investment, yuccas use a mechanism of 
selected abortion of the overloaded fruits as well as the 
least loaded fruits on which not enough pollen had been 
brought. The abortion did not evolve under selection by 
yucca moth. It is a very general mechanism plants use to 
get rid of unproductive tissue. At best it has been fine-
tuned under selection by the moths.  
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effects of the law of supply and demand with more than two players and the effects of outbidding
1 
competition  among  players  of  the  same  trader  class,  aspects  I  extensively  investigate  in  the 
following chapters.  
 
The aims, subjects and outlines of this project 
The purpose of this study is to show how the theory of biological markets provides insights into 
the social interactions in two different primate species. I was particularly interested in grooming 
exchanges as they held many advantages: 1- In the two studied species they occur on a very 
regular basis between all members of the group. 2- Grooming interactions are easily recognisable 
and cannot be mistaken for something else by any observer. 3- Grooming can be easily and 
objectively measured in terms of time units. However, grooming investments in terms of length 
cannot directly be translated into values and supply and demand ratios. To estimate the values, it 
is important to compare grooming investments in various setups. To estimate the supply and 
demand ratios, it is necessary to add up all the grooming bouts delivered by all group members 
over a certain period. In the following manuscript I define a grooming session as a series of bouts 
in  which  each  partner  of  the  grooming  dyad  take  turns.  The  session  ends  when  there  is  an 
interruption of grooming superior to 20 seconds or if the partners move apart. 
 
In most of the following chapters I test predictions derived from biological market theory 
and mostly find evidence that they can explain exchanges in both species. More particularly, I test 
predictions derived from the law of supply and demand in different market contexts. I study these 
markets separately in order to more easily assess the proper trader classes and commodities. I 
expect  that  rare  commodities  hold  more  value  than  common  commodities.  To  access  such 
commodities,  I  expect  that  individuals  would  increase  their  grooming  investment  in  terms  of 
length. Following previous studies (e.g. Barret et al. 1999, Bshary et al. 2008) I also study the 
                                                 
1 This term of outbidding competition is to contrast with the agonistic competition of Darwin’s sexual selection 
theory.  
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effects of outbidding competition and power asymmetries between partners. I expect competition 
to remain at the core of cooperation itself, and subsequently, the identification of any power 
asymmetries (valuable knowledge, status in the group, etc.) between partners should allow to 
predict the way payoffs are distributed or fluctuate among partners. I study naturally occurring 
interactions that would take place daily, during ordinary as well as socially stressful periods such 
as  the  mating  and  birth  seasons.  I  also  specifically  test  the  law  of  supply  and  demand  by 
performing field experiments. 
I worked with two different primate species (Box 4). The sooty mangabeys (Cercocebus 
atys) were observed in the Taï National Park in Ivory Coast. The group was rather large with 
about 130 members in which I mainly recorded the daily activities of the 35 adult females. Mostly 
terrestrial, mangabeys can spread over hundreds of square meters while foraging and very low-
ranking  females  have  little  interactions  with  the  higher-ranking  females.  During  the  mating 
season, many non-resident adult males entered the group for various periods of time. The vervet 
monkeys (Chlorocebus aethiops) were observed in the Loskop Dam Nature Reserve in South 
Africa. The two groups were rather small compared to the size of the mangabey group, with no 
more than 15 members, seven adult females in the Donga Group and only four in the Picnic 
Group. Due to the small size of the groups, most adult females were seen to regularly interact with 
each other throughout the day. During the study period, no new male entered the groups. 
 
 
Box 4. Studied species. 
Sooty mangabeys (Cercocebus atys)              Vervet monkeys (Chlorocebus aethiops) 
                    Photo credits: F. Range & S. Aubel    
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In the first study (Chapter 2) I investigate how adult females distribute reciprocal grooming 
bouts during periods (1) in which we did not perform any experiments and (2) the females did not 
go through stressful periods of the reproductive cycle (sexual receptivity; carrying and suckling 
infants of less than three months). Reciprocal grooming sessions have been thought to reinforce 
the  social  bonds  between  females  (Seyfarth  &  Cheney  1984,  Hemelrijk  1994)  and  usually 
constitute the major part of their social activity budget. Practically, even if grooming bouts are 
rather short in time and probably low-cost (Silk 2003), they help reducing fur ectoparasite loads 
on body parts that one cannot reach by the groomee (Mooring et al. 1996, Zamma 2002) and they 
enhance  the  production  of  beta-endorphins  (Keverne  et  al.  1989)  known  to  cause  ‘pleasant’ 
feelings. Therefore, they have also been described by Barrett and Henzi (2001) as useful trading 
means in biological market contexts. 
In a first step, I investigate how females of both species are exchanging grooming bouts. I 
look  at  the  identity  of  each  partner  of  the  grooming  dyad  to  determine  whether  hierarchy 
influences  grooming  investments  and  whether  females  privilege  particular  partners.  I  expect 
females to maximise their benefits. They can do so by time matching their grooming investments 
and choosing to mainly interact with closely ranked partners as a difference of social status should 
bias  the  investment  towards  the  lowest-ranking  partner  of  each  dyad.  Indeed,  higher-ranking 
females  may  have  more  to  offer  (support  during  conflicts,  tolerance  at  food  sites)  than  just 
grooming and this leverage should advantage them in the grooming exchange. In a second step, I 
focus on the reciprocated bouts only. I investigate the way they are distributed within a grooming 
session. I check for partner control via parcelling (Connor 1995) and trust building (Roberts & 
Sherrat 1998), respectively expecting the duration of bouts to remain relatively short constant or 
to increase step by step. I also study whether regular or irregular partners influence the bout 
distribution and I investigate the significance of the initial bout of each session. I expect this bout 
reflects its initiator’s eagerness in investing in the interaction.  
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In this study my purpose is to offer background information on neutral sessions in which 
grooming  seems  only  exchanged  for  grooming.  As  expected,  reciprocal  bouts  are  not  given 
randomly  and  females  tend  to  maximize  their  benefits  by  mostly  interacting  with  females  of 
adjacent ranks, which are normally family members in primates. But more interestingly, I show 
that females distinguish between social partners with whom they interact frequently from partners 
with  whom  they  interact  infrequently  and  this  study  can  provide  the  missing  link  between 
grooming as a currency when viewed through the scope of biological market theory and grooming 
as a mechanism in the formation and maintenance of social bonds when viewed through the scope 
of behavioural ecology. 
 
In the second study (Chapter 3) I investigate the relationship between grooming and obtaining 
access to infants in both mangabeys and vervets in the context of biological market theory (Noë & 
Hammerstein  1994,1995).  In  primates,  young  infants  are  very  costly  to  rear  and  females  are 
usually limited in their reproductive potential because of the parental investment’s costs they need 
to provide their offspring before being able to have a new one (Andersson 1994). Therefore, 
alloparental support may help them to increase their fitness as shown by Fairbanks (1990) in 
vervet monkeys. However, in species in which the hierarchy steepness is strong between females, 
many studies reported alloparenting situations in which females would end up harming other 
females’ infants (e.g. Maestripieri 1994) because low-ranking females were not able to retrieve 
their infants in time to nurse them. It is quite commonly assumed that mothers are reticent to 
allow other females to interact with their infants.  
In both mangabeys and vervets, females are intensely attracted by newly-born infants and 
mothers  are  shown  to  allow  infant  handling  after  grooming  sessions.  Following  Henzi  and 
Barrett’s (2002) idea about grooming being exchanged for infant handling in a biological market 
context, I first check whether infant access is really a commodity worth trading for. Hence, I 
expect that the amount of reciprocation within a grooming session really drops with regard to  
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grooming sessions in which grooming is exchanged for itself and that grooming interactions are 
immediately followed by infant handling. Secondly, I estimate the value attributed to a newborn. 
According to females’ general attraction for infants I predict that this value is superior to the value 
attributed to reciprocal grooming and requires longer grooming bouts. Furthermore, I expect that 
basic  market  rules  such  as  the  supply  and  demand  principle  as  well  as  power  asymmetries 
between females affect infant values throughout time. This scenario would be validated if the 
amount of grooming non-mothers have to give prior to handling infants is influenced by the 
amount of infants present in the group, by both mothers and non-mothers hierarchical status and 
even by the infants’ age. Indeed, older infants may not be as attractive as newborns. Eventually, I 
focus on the way non-mothers are allowed to interact with infants. I expect that the time devoted 
to infant handling is related to the amount of grooming mothers received. It seems difficult to 
make  any  predictions  about  the  influence  of  the  infants’  age  as  two  contradictory  effects 
simultaneously occur when they are getting older: mothers are less protective but at the same 
time, infants become less attractive to interact with since their black baby coat is progressively 
turning into the typical adult coat (grey for mangabeys, beige for vervets). Unfortunately, the 
reward study can only be performed on vervets. 
I  find  that  similarly  to  previous  studies,  the  mangabey  and  vervet  infant  markets  are 
influenced by the number of available infants as well as their value in terms of age and their 
mother’s rank. Contrary to other studies however, I work with a large data set allowing the use of 
linear mixed effects models. This particular choice of analysis really ascertains the complexity of 
the market and its many fluctuations. Furthermore, I am the first to study infant handling and find 
that females also tend to act differently with frequent and infrequent social partners. 
 
In  the  third  study  (Chapters  4  and  5)  I  investigate  the  mating  market  in  mangabeys.  In 
primates,  competition  has  long  been  seen  as  the  major  force  driving  their  social  structure 
evolution and the reproduction is not exempt of it. In many species, males do not provide much  
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infant caring and are usually seen as the competitive gender while females are solely exerting 
mate choice. In female-bonded species however, this reduction of both genders’ roles seems to 
overlook  a  whole  part  of  the  sexual  market.  The  presence  of  certain  males  seems  to  benefit 
females: in the case of high infanticide risks, putative fathers may protect females and infants 
from aggressive males (Palombit 1999). Therefore, females’ competition over males may be an 
aspect worth investigating. It is worth noting than in mangabeys, infanticide risk is quite high, 
despite a multi-male/multi-female social system (van Schaik 2000), with numerous non-resident 
males entering groups prior to and during the mating season. Females are expected to develop 
anti-infanticide strategies and I assumed that mothers of young infants would seek the protection 
of putative fathers. In a first chapter (Chapter 4), I then focus on infanticide risks and how the 
presence of non-resident males changes many spatial organisations and behaviours among the 
group members such as the mothers of newborn infants clustering together with no regard to their 
rank status and the effective protection against infanticide risks from resident males. 
In a second chapter (Chapter 5) I study males and females competing for mate access and 
more  particularly,  I  investigate  the  way  the  fluctuating  supplies  of  adult  males  and  receptive 
females (OSR) influence grooming interactions. During the mating season, mangabey females 
display exaggerated sexual swellings that give a convenient graded signal to estimate the period 
when  they  are  sexually  receptive  (Noë  &  Sluijter  1995,  Nunn  1999)  and  they  are  shown  to 
multiply mating, which is thought to confuse paternity (Wolff & Macdonald 2004). I investigate 
the way receptive females groom resident and non-resident males in order to mate with them. I 
suspect that such grooming sessions are reciprocated but directly followed by mating and that 
females’ grooming investment varies according to their fluctuating “receptive” value. I also check 
whether the basic market law of supply and demand influences the grooming duration. 
Interestingly, I find that contrary to most other species, mangabey females are the gender 
seeking for sexual opportunities (see Gomes & Boesch 2009 and Gilby et al. 2010 for another  
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such  exception  in  chimpanzees).  They  groom  males  in  order  to  secure  mates.  Both  males’ 
availability and the number of receptive females influence the market. 
 
In the fourth study (Chapter 6) I test a specific market law in vervet monkeys. By running a 
market experiment in the field, I investigate the effects of variable ratios of supply and demand on 
grooming behaviours. To do so, I artificially induce changes in the supply and demand ratio in 
two wild vervet groups. In the view of some results I found in the first study, a) I chose to work 
with subordinate females as grooming investment is usually not benefiting them and b) I assumed 
that my experiments would influence the total amount of grooming sessions very little. In fact, 
both vervet groups spend about 15% of their daily budget grooming each other and Henzi & 
Barrett (1999) showed that such a considerable budget would hardly fluctuate across the year even 
in the face of increased other demands: even when food is scarce, necessarily longer foraging 
sessions would preferentially be taken on the resting budget rather than on the grooming budget. 
To create an artificial market in both groups, I chose first a single and then two low-
ranking females as food providers by allowing them to supply apples contained in wooden framed 
boxes to other group members. I expected that such a setup influences the way grooming is 
exchanged between these providers and the other group members. Notably, I predicted that the 
grooming distribution differs in terms of time each partners invests in a grooming bout, i.e. the 
ratio “grooming time invested by provider – grooming time invested by non provider” eventually 
benefits the former. More precisely, I predict that the changes in the grooming ratios especially 
affects the first providers when they are the only one in their respective groups (phase1) and 
seriously differs from the values recorded during the observational period (non-test phase) that I 
used as a control phase. I also expect the effect to drop with the appearance of a simultaneous 
competitive provider (phase2). 
In this very first field experiment specifically testing the law of supply and demand in 
primates, I show that the grooming ratios benefit females as soon as they become providers. The  
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benefits drop when the second providers are introduced, demonstrating the effect of the law of 
supply and demand. 
 
In the fifth study (Chapter 7) I investigate the effects of high-ranking individuals’ learning to 
control themselves on the emergence of cooperative interactions. Indeed, in the early stages of my 
field experiments, high-ranking individuals monopolised the closed containers and prevented the 
providers from opening them. After a few trials, the time required for providers to open their 
respective  containers  significantly  dropped  along  with  aggression  rates  while  the  distances 
between each container and the high-ranking partner increased above 10 meters. Hence, I expect 
that the time required for each provider to open a container is explained by the rates of aggression 
as well as the duration of the container monopolisation. In a second step, I study the time required 
for each high-ranking individual to actively leave the close vicinity of the container and wait at 
more  than  10  meters  from  it.  Displayed  in  chronological  order,  these  timings  form  temporal 
curves that convey information about the mechanisms at stake in self-control learning. I expect 
monkeys to learn individually and in a sequence, i.e. the highest-ranking subject learns first, then 
the next highest-ranking learns, then the next one until most obstacles for providers to access the 
container are lifted. This chapter may be the first study to show self-control in wild animals and to 
give supportive evidence of how queuing-to-learn system may alleviate the social pressures that 
lay upon complex behaviours such as cooperative interactions. 
I show that there is indeed a queuing-to-learn system. Random behaviours at the beginning 
of the experiment suggest trial-and-error learning mechanisms. However, the acceleration of the 
pace required for one individual to learn after the previous one had learnt, suggests that social 
enhancement may play a role as well. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
We  tested  predictions  following  from  the  biological  market  paradigm  using  reciprocated 
grooming sessions among the adult females in a sooty mangabey group with 35 females (Ivory 
Coast)  and  in  two  groups  of  vervet  monkeys  (South-Africa)  with  four  and  seven  females, 
respectively. As expected, females optimized their benefits by frequently grooming closely ranked 
partners and time matching their exchanges. Such dyads were characterized as frequent grooming 
partners. Power asymmetry such as female’s status in the hierarchy altered their exchanges, the 
subordinate female of a dyad having to groom longer than her partner. Moreover, the dyadic 
structure of the grooming sessions allowed us to investigate ‘partner control’ strategies such as 
“parcelling” and “raising the stakes”. Females of both species neither parcelled nor gradually 
invested more grooming within sessions. Rather, the longer bouts of a grooming session were 
usually given at the beginning of the session and we found that the length of the first bout a 
frequent grooming partner gave her partner at the beginning of a session, predicted the length of 
the  whole  session.  Furthermore,  we  investigated  the  trust  building  in  frequent  and  infrequent 
grooming partners. We found that infrequent groomers of both species did not build trust and the 
first bout they invested in a grooming session could not predict the session length. We conclude 
that each female has a good knowledge of her value as a grooming partner within each dyad and 
knows how much she should invest in order to receive grooming within the same session.  
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Altruistic behaviours, i.e. behaviours that are costly to their donator but beneficial to their receiver 
at least in the short term, have long been considered as paradoxical in evolutionary terms until 
Hamilton (1964) and Trivers (1971) provided explanations for their occurrence in related (kin 
selection theory) and non-related (reciprocal altruism theory) individuals, respectively. However, 
Trivers’ theory, which focuses on partner control within an iterated prisoner’s dilemma IPD has 
proved  difficult  to  demonstrate  in  nature  (e.g.  Roberts  1998;  Hammerstein  2003;  Bshary  & 
Bronstein 2004; Sachs et al. 2004; Bergmüller et al. 2007; Silk 2007; West et al. 2007a; West et 
al. 2007b but see Bshary et al. 2008 for an illustration of a natural occurrence of IPD) and results 
of experiments with primates are mixed (e.g. Melis et al. 2008; Brosnan et al. 2009). Biological 
market theory (Noë & Hammerstein 1994; 1995) proposed another explanation that stresses the 
importance of partner choice. Following this theory, two partners exchange low cost commodities 
to their mutual benefit, which switches the interest from demonstrating reciprocated altruistic 
behaviours to understanding which process rule them. The price invested to obtain the commodity 
as  well  as  the  choice  of  the  best  possible  partner  follow  economic  rules  based  mainly  on 
outbidding  competition  and  supply-demand  ratios.  While  many  studies  in  plant/insect, 
plant/microorganisms systems (e.g. Schwartz & Hoeksema 1998; West et al. 2002) and cleaner 
fish trades (e.g. Bshary 2001) have shown the importance of the biological market theory in 
predicting how cooperative behaviours are done, conclusions are still controversial in primates 
(e.g. Barrett et al. 1999; but see Schino et al. 2003). 
In  primates,  adult  allogrooming  (grooming,  hereafter)  has  long  been  considered  as  an 
indicator of the quality of the long-term bonds between individuals (Hinde 1976; Schino et al. 
2007). More recently and under the scope of the biological market, grooming has been considered 
as a low-cost positive social currency (Barrett et al. 1999; 2000) whose reciprocation time frame 
is short-term and whose value is merely functional; i.e. hygienic with the removal of ectoparasites 
(Hutchins  &  Barash,  1976;  Zamma  2002)  and  hedonistic  with  the  release  of  beta-endorphins 
(Keverne et al. 1989). Hence, given grooming is either immediately reciprocated by the partner  
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(Barrett et al. 1999; 2000; Manson et al. 2004; but see Schino et al. 2003 for results on long time 
frame reciprocation) or exchanged for agonistic support (Hemelrijk & Ek 1991; Schino 2007), 
food (deWaal 1997), access to an infant (Henzi & Barrett 2002; Gumert 2007a; Fruteau et al. 
accepted) and mate compliance (Gumert 2007b). 
In this paper we investigated grooming sessions (hereafter, neutral sessions) that were not 
exchanged  for  obvious  commodities  such  as  food,  infant  and  mate  accesses  in  two  primates 
species, the sooty mangabeys (Cercocebus atys) and the vervet monkeys (Chlorocebus aethiops). 
We defined a grooming session as a sequence of exchanged bouts between two partners. We used 
the framework of the biological market theory (Noë & Hammerstein 1994, 1995) to investigate 
how grooming bouts were traded among females. We first checked whether supply/demand ratios 
or  power  asymmetries  between  partners  would  influence  the  grooming  bout  lengths.  When 
grooming is exchanged for grooming, the 1
st minute of a bout is worth more than the last in longer 
bouts. Hence grooming bouts of equal length would be of equivalent value to the receiver. We 
expected that if females optimise their benefits they would prefer grooming sessions with partners 
of similar value (see also Seyfarth 1977). We therefore predicted that females of neighbouring 
rank would time-match their investments in term of grooming duration (e.g. Henzi et al. 2003). 
We also predicted that power asymmetries such as rank distance between females would influence 
the grooming lengths. Indeed, dominants have additional commodities (tolerance at food patches, 
restraint  in  dyadic  conflicts  with  the  subordinate,  agonistic  support  in  conflicts)  to  trade  that 
subordinates cannot offer. Hence we expected the length of time a female grooms another female 
to  be  influenced  by  the  power  differential,  estimated  by  the  rank  distance  between  the  two 
females, i.e. partners rank distances would be correlated to grooming investment discrepancies.  
One  of  the  pivotal  elements  of  biological  market  models  is  ‘partner  choice’  (Noë  & 
Hammerstein 1994, 1995; Bshary & Noë 2003). According to this vision the dyads within a group 
are not seen as independent entities, but rather the group is seen as a single ‘market’ on which the 
partner behaviour is controlled by partner switching, or the threat of partner switching, rather than  
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by breaking off the relationship, or the threat of such a ‘defection’. However, biological market 
does not exclude the use of ‘partner control’ strategies. One such partner control model that would 
apply  to  grooming  is  Connor’s  parcelling  model  (1995),  which  assumes  that  cooperating 
individuals are initially caught in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma. By delivering their goods and 
services in small packages they de facto change the payoff matrix of each round of the game in 
such  a  way,  however,  that  it  is  no  longer  a  prisoner’s  dilemma,  and  thus  reduce  the  risk  of 
exploitation. The model applies especially well to grooming, since the service can be delivered in 
packages of almost any size and would predict that grooming bouts remain short within grooming 
sessions. Here the problem is that we can hardly predict how short a bout should be to fulfil the 
requirements of the payoff matrix. We therefore reduced our test of this model to testing the 
simple prediction that grooming partners should take turns within grooming sessions and that the 
grooming bouts should be roughly equal in length within and between partners. 
Roberts  &  Sherratt  (1998)  developed  the  idea  of  the  parcelling  strategy  further  and 
proposed the ‘raising-the-stakes’ (RTS) strategy according to which animals can limit the risk of 
being exploited by starting with delivering small packages, but then increasing the costs of the 
portion delivered in each round, as long as the partner continues matching the investment. The 
dyadic structure of grooming sessions makes them likely interactions in which RTS could be used 
(Keller & Reeve 1998). We looked therefore for the use of RTS within grooming sessions but not 
over longer series of grooming sessions as Barrett and Henzi (2000), after attempting to compare 
investments  between  grooming  sessions  chronologically  dispersed  over  time  in  baboons, 
concluded that one has little chance to record the real starting point of a relationship. If RTS is 
used, then we expect firstly that partners invest little at the beginning of the session and gradually 
increase  their  investment  if  their  partner  at  least  matches  the  last  bout  of  grooming  given. 
Secondly,  we  made  a  distinction  between  dyads  grooming  frequently  and  those  grooming 
infrequently, assuming that trust building would still be necessary in the grooming sessions of the 
latter. Females are philopatric in both sooty mangabeys and vervets, so we assumed frequent  
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groomers to be close kin or at least familiar enough with each other at a level that would make 
trust building superfluous. Hence we predicted frequent grooming partners to groom longer at the 
start of the session than infrequent groomers do. Thirdly, the first bout of a session may reflect the 
willingness of the individual to invest in this grooming session. Thus, we predicted that the first 
grooming bout within a session is longer for frequent partners than for infrequent ones. 
 
METHODS 
Research areas, subjects and data collection 
Sooty mangabeys 
We conducted the study in the Taï National Park, Ivory Coast between November 1, 2001 and 
August 20, 2002. The park is one of the last remaining blocks of West African primary forest and 
covers about 454,000 ha. The forest is classified as “tropical moist forest” (Whitmore 1990), with 
a mean annual rainfall of 1875 mm, a mean annual temperature of 24°C (Taï Monkey Project 
data, 1991-1999) and a distinct dry season from December to March. 
Our group of mangabeys was well habituated to human observers prior to the start of the 
study and we could recognise all adult, sub-adult and infant members by facial features. Its home 
range covered about 7 km
2 near the western border of the park. The group was not provisioned. 
During the study we observed 7-14 adult males, 35 adult females, about 70 juveniles and sub-
adults. Seven infants were born between December 10, 2001 and March 10, 2002. One died on 
February 2, 2002. 
We  focused  the  data  collection  on  adult  females.  We  used  unidirectional 
“approach/retreat” and “threat/retreat” interactions to determine the female dominance hierarchy. 
It remained stable throughout the study period (linearity of the female rank order: MatMan test: 
χ
2
41 = 447.89, p < 0.0001, h = 0.97, K = 0.97). We used both ad libitum and focal sampling 
observation techniques (Altmann 1974) to collect data on grooming sessions occurring between 
all females. When grooming sessions occurred between females and mothers of newborns less  
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than 3 months old, we recorded whether the female gained access to the infant. Grooming bouts 
were timed to the nearest 30 seconds. A bout was considered to have ended when either the 
direction of grooming changed or when there was a break of > 30 sec. We used 15-min focal 
sampling with at least 60 min between consecutive samples of the same individual and 3 min 
between  samples  of  different  individuals.  However,  for  the  analyses  we  also  used  the  focal 
samples that were at least 9-min long (89 out of 2272 samples) if they were truncated because the 
subject moved out of the observer's sight. For each focal animal, we recorded each minute on the 
minute (instantaneous sampling, Altmann 1974): the infant’s presence / absence, distance from 
the mother and the nearest adult female and adult male within 5 meters. Social interactions were 
recorded continuously (detailed ethogram in Range & Noë 2002). Due to limited visibility in the 
early evening, we opted for a sampling schedule from 7:00 to 16:00. We collected a total of 568 
hours of focal samples for all of the 35 adult females (ranging from 63 to 65 per female). All 
females were followed at least once every three days and we randomized each female’s sampling 
to account for the time of day. Ad libitum data were recorded all day long (even while doing focal 
sampling on a subject) as soon as a social interaction (aggression, grooming, mount, etc.) between 
two identified individuals was observed. 
 
Vervet monkeys 
We conducted the study in the Loskop Dam Nature Reserve, Mpumalanga province, South Africa. 
The Loskop reserve is characterized by a ‘bushveld’ (tall grasses, thick acacia bushes) type of 
habitat. The reserve covers approximately 25000 ha, on average 1000 m above sea level. The area 
has dry and cold winters (temperatures below 5°C at night and 25°C during the day) from May to 
October and hot and humid summers (rainfalls of about 500mm; temperatures ranging from 25°C 
to 40°C) from November to April. 
Both study groups had home ranges of approximately 3 km
2 each that were about 3 km 
apart. The home range of the Donga group was following narrow dried river beds and mainly  
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contained tall trees such as fig trees while the home range of the Picnic group was situated in a 
plain essentially composed of tall grasses and acacia bushes. An artificial lake provided water to 
the group the whole year round. The Donga group did not have contacts with tourists and was not 
provisioned outside the context of experiments (see Fruteau et al. 2009). The Picnic group was 
provisioned by tourists, almost exclusively on Sundays, and regularly ate from the dustbins of the 
picnic site. The group also obtained food awards during experiments (see Fruteau et al. 2009). The 
Donga group was habituated to the presence of human observers at the beginning of the study 
(from May to mid-October 2004) and the Picnic group was habituated before the second field 
session (from February to July 2005). The Donga group had three to five adult males, seven adult 
females, one to two sub adult males and one to two infants at a time. The female dominance 
hierarchy changed between the first and the second field period after the death of the beta female 
(linearity of the female rank order: MatMan test: first period: χ
2
23 = 48, p = 0.0017, h = 1, K = 1; 
second and third periods: χ
2
20 = 60.67, p < 0.0001, h = 1, K = 1). The Picnic group had two to 
three adult males, four adult females, one juvenile male and two to six infants at a time. The 
female hierarchy stayed stable throughout the two field periods (linearity of the female rank order: 
MatMan test: χ
2
undef = undefined, p = 0.373, h = 1, K = 1). 
During the first field period, we followed the Donga group on a regular basis from mid 
October to mid December 2004. Thereafter, we followed each group every second day during the 
second field period from September 2005 to the end of April 2006 and two days in a row every 
four days during the last field period from May 2006 to the end of September 2006. Observations 
were distributed throughout the day but the majority of the data was taken from 06:00 – 13:00 and 
from 14:00 – 18:00. Data were collected by focal group sampling of the adult animals (Altmann 
1974), i.e. when all adults were visible simultaneously, or by ad libitum sampling when only one 
observer was in the field or when one adult animal was out-of-sight or missing from the group. 
The data represent for the Donga and Picnic groups 605 and 422 hours of group focal and 100 and 
70 hours of ad libitum sampling, respectively. Grooming bouts were timed to the nearest second.  
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A bout was considered to have ended when either the direction of grooming changed or when 
there was a break of > 20 sec. 
 
Data analysis and statistics 
For this study, we excluded all grooming sessions including juveniles, males, mothers of infants 
of less than three months old and receptive females. In vervets we also discarded the grooming 
sessions  taking  place  during  our  experimental  periods.  As  we  observed  two  vervet  groups, 
whenever the same effects were found in both groups we gave combined probabilities following 
the formula χ
2
df = - 2 Σ ln P with 4 degrees of freedom (Sokal & Rohlf 1995). Tests were 
performed using SPSS (version 17.0) and R (version 2.10.1). The alpha-level was set to 0.05. 
We first studied general descriptive statistics of these reciprocated grooming sessions for 
both species: daily budget, average grooming session length, time lag between a bout and its 
reciprocation. We used a two-tailed G test to compare the proportion of initiations performed by 
the lower-ranking females of a dyad with the expected value assuming no effect of status. 
We then tested whether females tended to time-match their exchanges or were influenced 
by their partner’s status, using simple linear regressions. We transformed the data following the 
method proposed by Manson and collaborators (2004): we weighted the contribution of all data 
points and standardized them by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. This 
allowed  the  use  of  all  grooming  sessions  while  ensuring  that  they  could  be  considered  as 
independent and that each cluster equally contributed to the test. We regressed the time invested 
by receivers on time invested by initiators to test whether females time-matched their grooming 
bouts in the course of a session and we regressed the rank distances on time discrepancies to test 
whether their respective status influenced their investment. 
Finally,  to  test  whether  females  would  use  either  parcelling  or  RTS,  we  followed  the 
method proposed by Barrett & Henzi (2000). We used all grooming sessions containing at least 
three bouts. We assigned a minus sign to bouts that were shorter than the previous bout and a plus  
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sign to bouts that were either longer or equivalent. Using Sign tests we tested: (a) whether bout 
lengths  increased,  or  remained  constant,  over  the  whole  grooming  session  irrespective  of  the 
groomer (between partner test) and (b) whether they increased, or remained constant, for each of 
the  partners  separately  (within  partner  test).  We  used  a  non-parametric  two-way  Friedman 
ANOVA to test whether the grooming bout lengths would change over the full study period. To 
compare frequent grooming partners with infrequent ones, we used the criterion proposed by 
Barrett & Henzi (2000): groomers were frequent partners if they spent more than 5% of their total 
active (when the individual does groom) + passive (when the individual is groomed) grooming 
time grooming each other. We used two-tailed Mann-Whitney-U tests and Spearman correlations 
to test the predicted differences between frequent and infrequent partners. 
 
RESULTS 
Pattern of grooming sessions 
The  daily  budget  and  the  average  session  length  data  are  summarized  in  Table  1.  In  the 
mangabeys 355 sessions out of 363 (97.8 %) showed grooming in both directions suggesting 
reciprocation  over  short  time  frames.  The  lower-ranking  female  initiated  199  of  these  355 
sessions, which is not a significant deviation from the null-hypothesis of balanced initiative taking 
(two-tailed G test G1 = 2.374, p = 0.1933). 
Groups  Mangabey  Vervet Donga  Vervet Picnic 
Size  ≈130  ≈15  ≈11 
Nb of females  35  7  4 
Nb of grooming sessions  363  323 
Nb of non-reciprocated sessions  8  31 
Dailey budget  15.61±1.03 %  15.30±1.08 % 
Average session length  343±129 s  323±325 s 
 
Table 1 - Grooming pattern in mangabeys and vervets 
 
A comparably high proportion of grooming session in the vervets (292 out of 323; 90.4 %) 
also  showed  two-way  grooming.  However,  the  lower-ranking  females  initiated  262  sessions,  
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which was significantly more often than the number initiated by their higher-ranking partners 
(two-tailed G test combined probabilities χ
2
4 = 15.436, p < 0.01). 
 
Time matching and influence of hierarchy 
Both species showed time matching of grooming bouts within sessions, as revealed by linear 




Figure 1. Linear regression plots and equations for Time matching (A in mangabeys, B in vervet Donga 
group, C in vervet Picnic group) and Influence of status (C in mangabeys, D in vervet Donga group, E in 
vervet  Picnic  group).  Time  discrepancies:  Td  =  time  invested  by  the  receiver  –  time  invested  by  the 
initiator. Rank distances: Rd = rank of the receiver – rank of the initiator. The data set was transformed in 
order to perform the regression (weighted and standardized). Therefore axes such as Time Receptor, Time 
Initiator and Time discrepancy do not have units. The standardization also led to some numbers being 
negative. 
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The mangabeys matched the bout length of their partners only to a low degree (r
2 = 0.22; 
Fig. 1A), while the bout length in vervets could be explained much better (almost 90% and almost 
95 % respectively; r
2
Donga = 0.896 and r
2
Picnic = 0.945; Fig. 1B,C) by time matching Hence, time 
matching did not seem to play a major role in mangabeys. Note, however, that this result, as well 
as the next one, is partially explained by the fact that we a priori excluded sessions with a single 
groomer. 
For both species, linear regressions showed a significant and positive rank distance effect 
on time discrepancy within sessions (mangabeys: F = 1020.877, p < 0.0001; vervets combined 
probabilities: χ
2
4 = 30.774, p < 0.0001), which meant that the lower ranking female of a grooming 
dyad invested more grooming time than her partner. Rank distances explained up to 74% of the 
variation observed in time investments (r
2 = 0.739; Fig. 1D) in mangabeys and up to 89% and 
87% in vervets (respectively, Donga group: r
2 = 0.893 and Picnic group: r
2 = 0.871; Fig. 1E,F). 
 
Partner control strategies 
Nb of  Increase  Decrease  Sign test  Friedman ANOVA test 
bouts  across  across  P          Group 
(nb dyads)  session  session     χ
2  df  P 
3 (105)  25  80  < 0.0001  67.126  2  < 0.0001 
4 (74)  26  48  < 0.0001  95.967  3  < 0.0001 
5 (82)  16  66  < 0.0001  204.248  4  < 0.0001 
Mangabey 
6 (43)  11  32  < 0.0001  113.744  5  < 0.0001 
Vervet  3 (111)  17  94  < 0.0001  50.213  2  < 0.0001 
   4 (44)  19  25  0.30  64.377  3  < 0.0001 
combined  5 (101)  28  73  < 0.0001  199.453  4  < 0.0001 
probabilities  6 (15)  8  7  > 0.9999  24.066  5  < 0.0001 
 
Table 2
2 - Parcelling and raising the stakes strategies: evolution of the length of grooming bouts within 
sessions (Sign test) and across grooming sessions (Friedman ANOVA test) 
 
                                                 
2 Are only represented the categories of grooming sessions that contained at least three bouts and five pairs. 
For the vervet monkeys, the given probabilities are combined probabilities for the two groups. All tests are 
two-tailed.  
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For both species the only significant results for the development of the length of grooming bouts 
found  within  sessions  (analysed  using  Sign  tests)  showed  a  decrease  of  the  grooming  bouts 
lengths within the grooming sessions (Table 2). This is in contradiction with the parcelling model 
according to which bouts should have remained of similar length throughout the session and 
opposite  to  the  predictions  of  the  RTS  model  according  to  which  females  should  gradually 
increase their investment in grooming time in answer to their partners' actions. Furthermore, the 
Friedman tests revealed that there were significant bout length differences across sessions (Table 
2), which was also in contradiction to both models. 
For both species, the significant results for the evolution of within partner’s bout length 
within grooming sessions (Sign tests for initiators and receivers) showed a decrease of the lengths 
for both partners (Table 3), which meant that females, contrary to predictions, neither kept the 
length of their own bouts constant (parcelling) nor increased their length (RTS) within sessions. 
 
Nb of  Increase  Decrease   Sign test  Increase   Decrease  Sign test 
bouts   initiator  initiator  P  receptor  receptor  P  Group 
(nb dyads)                   
3 (105)  19  86  < 0.0001  0  105  < 0.0001 
4 (74)  11  63  < 0.0001  6  68  < 0.0001 
5 (82)  9  73  < 0.0001   11  71  < 0.0001  
Mangabey 
6 (43)  0  43  < 0.0001  0  43  < 0.0001 
Vervet  3 (111)  15  96  < 0.0001  0  105  < 0.0001 
   4 (44)  3  41  < 0.0001  1  43  < 0.0001  
combined  5 (101)  10  91  < 0.0001  12  89  < 0.0001  
probabilities  6 (15)  3  12  0.03  1  14  < 0.001 
 
Table 3
1 – Parcelling and raising the stakes strategies: evolution of the grooming length for each partner’s 
contribution within grooming sessions (Sign tests for initiators and receivers) 
 
Frequent and infrequent grooming partners 
In both species, females frequently groomed from two to four females (mangabeys: N = 3.79 ± 
1.09 frequent partners; vervets: Donga: N = 3.75 ± 1.04 frequent partners and Picnic: N = 2.04 ± 
0.54 frequent partners). The relation was not always symmetric in mangabeys (a partner A could  
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be frequent for B but B could be infrequent for A) even though it happened for only 4 females. 
The relation was symmetric in vervet. Frequent partners were significantly closer in rank than 
infrequent partners were (mangabeys: two tailed Mann-Whitney-U test: U = 4084.5, N1 = 83, N2 
= 221, p < 0.01; vervets combined probabilities: χ
2
4 = 32.236, p < 0.01, N1 = 211, N2 = 112; 
Fig.2A). For both species and contrary to our predictions a) frequent and infrequent grooming 
partners invested similar grooming durations for their first bout (mangabeys: two tailed Mann-
Whitney-U test: U = 8125.5, N1 = 83, N2 = 221, p = 0.113; vervets combined probabilities: χ
2
4 = 
1.719,  p  >  0.750,  N1  =  211,  N2  =  112;  Fig.2B)  and  b)  infrequent  groomers  did  invest  in 
significantly longer grooming session than frequent groomers did (mangabeys: two tailed Mann-
Whitney-U test: U = 5799.5, N1 = 83, N2 = 221, p = 0.018; vervets combined probabilities: χ
2
4 = 
13.152, p < 0.01, N1 = 211, N2 = 112; Fig. 2C). 
 
 
Figure 2. A- Comparison of frequent and infrequent partners’ average rank distances. Comparison of first 
bout length and total session length between frequent and infrequent grooming partners B- in mangabeys 
and C- in vervets. Mann-Whitney tests are two-tailed; * represents p < 0.01 and ** p < 0.001. 
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The  Spearman  correlations  revealed  that  in  both  species  the  initial  bout  of  frequent 
groomers  was  significantly  and  positively  correlated  to  the  length  of  the  rest  of  the  session 
(mangabey frequent groomers: rs
2 = 0.887, p < 0.0001; vervets: rs
2 = 0.920, p < 0.0001). This 
contrasted with the lack of significance of the first bout initiated by infrequent groomers of both 
species (mangabeys infrequent groomers: rs
2 = 0.009, p = 0.938; vervets: rs




Figure 3. Spearman correlation plots for mangabeys and vervets. 
 
It is to note that the genetic results we gathered in vervets revealed that none of the females 
from the Picnic group were affiliated. In the Donga group, we singularized two matrilines whose 
females were of adjacent ranks (first matriline: rank 1, 2, 3 and 4; second matriline: rank 5, 6 and  
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7).  However,  the  genetic  relatedness  would  not  really  follow  the  variable  frequent-infrequent 
groomer (Mann-Whitney-U test: 5 = 15.0, p = 0.055). 
 
DISCUSSION 
Both mangabey and vervet females allotted about 15% of their daily budget to grooming with an 
average  session  length  above  five  minutes.  These  first  results  seemed  both  surprising  and 
expected; surprising because mangabey females have so many partners to choose from compared 
to vervet females; and expected because both species have limited time available for grooming in 
face of other needs such as foraging or vigilance towards predators. A closer look at how females 
exchanged grooming revealed that most of them had preferred partners with which they spent a 
disproportional amount of their grooming time. On average, for both species, each female had 
about two to four frequent partners. In accordance with the biological market predictions and in 
order to minimize the power asymmetries, these frequent partners were significantly closer in rank 
than infrequent ones and generally tended to time match their grooming bouts within sessions. 
Indeed, when we used all grooming sessions occurring in each group, regressions revealed a 
stronger  time  matching  effect  in  small  vervet  groups  than  in  large  mangabey  groups:  in 
mangabeys  frequent  groomers  were  diluted  among  infrequent  groomers,  which  led  to  a  poor 
coefficient of regression (0.22) while in vervets, most females were frequent groomers. While we 
did not have the genetic relatedness of the mangabey females, we found that in the Donga group, 
vervet females of adjacent rank belonged to the same matriline, while in the Picnic group, none of 
the  females  were  affiliated.  In  the  Donga  group  however,  affiliation  could  not  really  predict 
whether females were frequent or infrequent groomers. 
If females usually tended to optimize their benefits by interacting with closely ranked 
partners, their status in the group significantly affected their respective investments as predicted 
by the biological market theory. Regressions analyses showed that females’ rank distances were 
correlated with their investment discrepancies: in both species the subordinate female of a dyad  
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groomed her partner significantly longer than she was groomed in return. However, we would 
have expected the effect to be stronger in large mangabey groups than in small vervet groups as in 
mangabeys the power asymmetries in term of rank distances are larger (± 34) than in vervets (± 6 
or  ±  3).  We  can  only  guess  that  the  dominance  relationship  between  two  females  does  not 
necessarily say much about the value of tolerance and support in a group. In fact, the value of 
tolerance may depend on the possibilities of monopolizing food patches and may even vary with 
the personalities (bold, shy, aggressive, tolerant, etc.) of the dominant individuals (e.g. Itoh 2002) 
and support may vary according to the rate of conflicts occurring within the group. As for power 
differentials, they may depend on the steepness of the rank order in each species. In this sense, it 
is interesting that in mangabeys both low and high-ranking partners initiated grooming sessions, 
suggesting a more egalitarian social system, while in vervets most of the interactions were started 
by the lower-ranking partner /member of the dyad. 
Our search for possible partner control strategies revealed that both sooty mangabeys and 
vervet monkeys either failed to parcel (in the sense of the parcelling model) or to raise the stakes 
either  in  answer  to  their  partners’  grooming  investment  or  to  their  own  previous  investment. 
Instead, our results, as far as statistically significant, showed that females invested in longer bouts 
at  the  beginning  of  the  sessions,  which  is  in  contradiction  to  exploitation  prevention  or  trust 
building.  In  species  such  as  mangabeys  and  vervets,  in  which  females  have  well-established 
relationships, trust building may not be apparent over short time frames such as single grooming 
sessions. As it also seemed trivial to to test trust building on longer time frames since it was 
impossible to appraise when a relationship did start (see Barrett and Henzi 2000), we conclude 
that even such an easy notion like the establishment of trust may be rather difficult to record in 
nature  and  that  the  mechanisms  motivating  dyadic  relationships  such  as  grooming  are  hardly 
explained by simple notions. 
We therefore chose another approach by analysing the difference between frequent and 
infrequent grooming partners. Contrary to predictions, infrequent groomers, between whom trust  
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building may not have been already completed, did not invest in initial grooming bouts that were 
shorter than frequent groomers. However, the first bout they gave at the beginning of a session 
could not predict the length of the session. In contrast, the first invested bout in frequent groomers 
predicted the length of the session. Its length was directly correlated to the length of the rest of the 
grooming session and long first bouts predicting long sessions. If this finding does not directly 
demonstrate trust building, it still shows that females have a good knowledge of the quality of 
their relationships with others and may give some cues on how females choose between partners. 
Biological market main control mechanism is to switch partner and the ‘playing off partners’ 
predicts that animals base their preferences on past experiences with multiple partners that reach 
back deeper in the past than either parcelling or RTS (see Schino & Pellegrini 2009 for attitudinal 
bookkeeping or Fruteau et al. 2009 for attitudinal partner choice). This very first bout seems to 
give both partners an indication of the quality of the interaction that follows. It may also be a 
means to quickly negotiate the terms of the interaction by making a first bid. It would have been 
interesting to investigate this further by testing whether the length of the first bout also predicts 
whether the partner would reciprocate at all. Unfortunately, for both species, we had too few non-
reciprocated bouts to run the necessary logistic regressions. 
To  summarize,  in  both  mangabeys  and  vervets  neutral  dyadic  grooming  sessions 
exchanged between females showed that grooming was mainly traded for itself on a short time 
frame,  which  supports  the  ‘low  cost  positive  social  currency  based  on  short  term  causal 
relationships’  introduced  by  Barrett  and  collaborators  (1999).  However,  grooming  was  also 
strongly  affected  by  dominance,  partner  choice  and  whether  individuals  were  frequent  or 
infrequent partners, which supports the idea of the knowledge of long-term relationships between 
partners  (Seyfarth  &  Cheney  1984).  We  can  conclude  that  grooming  is  an  exchangeable 
commodity whose value can fluctuate according to both short term and long term relationships 
existing among all the partners composing the market. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Access to one's newborn infant is a commodity that can be traded for other benefits such as 
grooming in nonhuman primates. According to the biological market paradigm, the price paid 
should  fluctuate  with  the  number  of  newborns  in  the  group.  We  investigated  the  grooming 
sessions between mothers with infants less than 3 months old and other adult females in free-
ranging primates: one group of sooty mangabeys, Cercocebus atys, with 35 adult females (Ivory 
Coast) and two groups of vervet monkeys, Chlorocebus aethiops, with four and seven females, 
respectively  (South  Africa).  Although  many  more  infants  were  born  per  birth  season  in  the 
mangabey group than in the vervet groups, interaction patterns involving infants showed many 
similarities: mothers did not reciprocate grooming received from nonmothers, but exchanged it 
directly for the opportunity to handle their infants, whereby obtaining access to infants required 
longer grooming bouts than reciprocating grooming in grooming sessions not involving infants. 
Low-ranking handlers needed to groom mothers for longer than their higher-ranking counterparts. 
The ‘value’ of an infant, in terms of grooming time received by the mother, decreased when 
infants grew older or when many infants were simultaneously present in the group. In vervets, 
infant availability affected handling times: females handled infants for longer when there were 
fewer infants. Furthermore, only frequent grooming partners of the mother could handle infants 
for longer and this familiarity was not kin related. This suggests that if the value of an infant 
varies with dominance, infant handling time may be determined by the quality of the females’ 
relationships. 
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Newborn infants attract a lot of attention from other members of primate groups and notably from 
females. Mothers carrying newborns are often approached by females that try to touch, handle and 
inspect their infants. Before gaining access to the infant, would-be handlers often have to groom 
the mother (Muroyama 1994). There has been considerable discussion about the function of infant 
handling (Lancaster 1971; Hrdy 1976; Manson 1999; Silk 1999), but what interests us in this 
study is the amount of grooming that has to be 'paid' before the mother grants access to her infant. 
This question has gained attention after Barrett & Henzi (2002) characterized the exchange of 
access to infants for grooming as a trade of commodities in the framework of biological market 
theory  (Noë  &  Hammerstein  1994,  1995).  'Baby  markets'  have  all  the  characteristics  of  a 
biological market with two classes of traders exchanging commodities that cannot be appropriated 
by force and a fluctuating supply–demand ratio owing to variation in the number of newborns that 
attract the attention of their group members. Barrett & Henzi (2002) showed that mothers were 
groomed  for  longer  when  there  are  fewer  newborns  in  the  group,  a  finding  subsequently 
confirmed in some subsequent studies (Gumert 2007a; Slater et al. 2007), but not others (Frank & 
Silk 2009; Tiddi et al. 2010). 
The baby market studies form part of a much larger set of studies that used biological 
market  theory  (henceforth  referred  to  as  BMT)  to  explain  grooming  patterns  in  nonhuman 
primates (Barrett et al. 1999; Payne et al. 2003; Lazaro-Perea et al. 2004; Barrett & Henzi 2006; 
Gumert 2007b; Löttker et al. 2007; Slater et al. 2007; Chancellor & Isbell 2009; Fruteau et al. 
2009; Ginther & Snowdon 2009; Norscia et al. 2009; Port et al. 2009) and other species (Stopka & 
Macdonald  1999;  Radford  &  Du  Plessis  2006;  Kutsukake  &  Clutton-Brock  2010).  Other 
successful applications of BMT to explain intraspecific cooperation patterns include, for example, 
mating markets in humans (Pawlowski & Dunbar 1999; Pollet & Nettle 2008, 2009) and birds 
(Greene et al. 2000; Metz et al. 2007; Holveck & Riebel 2010), cooperative breeding and coalition 
formation in carnivores (Smith et al. 2007; Kutsukake & Clutton-Brock 2008) and labour markets 
in humans (Macfarlan 2010). Valid examples of biological markets are also found in mutualistic  
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interactions between members of different species, such as cleaner fish and shrimps and their 
clients (Bshary 2001; Bshary & Noë 2003; Soares et al. 2008; Adam 2010; Chapuis & Bshary 
2010), ants providing protection in exchange for food (Leimar & Axén 1993; Bronstein 1998; 
Edwards et al. 2006), interspecific nutrient exchanges (Schwartz & Hoeksema 1998; Kummel & 
Salant 2006; Simms 2006; Heath & Tiffin 2009; Gubry-Rangin et al. 2010) and nursery pollinator 
mutualisms (Holland 2002; Segraves et al. 2005). 
The question why females are so eager to handle infants has been discussed for decades 
without arriving at a generally accepted conclusion. The interest in handling infants has been 
explained as 'learning to mother' (Lancaster 1971), reproductive competition through negative 
consequences for the infant (Hrdy 1976, 1978; Silk 1980; Thierry & Anderson 1986; Maestripieri 
1994), a reward for support in agonistic interactions (Manson 1999) as well as a by-product of 
selection for maternal behaviour (Thierry & Anderson 1986; Clarke et al. 1998; Silk 1999). The 
opposite question is why females allow others to handle their infants. Primate infants ask for a 
considerable investment in food, transport and protection (Altmann 1980). Other females can be 
of considerable help to mothers in this respect (Goldizen 1987; Garber 1997; Silk et al. 2003) and 
even  cause  a  shortening  of  the  female's  interbirth  interval  in  vervet  monkeys,  Chlorocebus 
aethiops (Fairbanks 1990). 
Similarly, there is no consensus about why primates groom each other. There is little doubt 
that the original function of grooming lies in the removal of ectoparasites and debris in the fur 
(Hutchins & Barash 1976; Dunbar 1991; Zamma 2002). Primates tend to groom body parts that 
their partners cannot easily reach themselves (Barton 1985; Borries 1992). However, it looks as if 
the mechanisms that evolved to make the animals enjoy being groomed, such as the release of 
certain  neurotransmitters  (Keverne  1989),  became  rewarding  by  themselves  and  its  hygienic 
function only partially explains grooming patterns (Perez & Baro 1999; Perez & Vea 2000). In 
any  case,  primates  devote  up  to  20%  of  their  daily  time  budget  to  allogrooming  sessions, 
conserving grooming time even during times of food scarcity (Dunbar 1988, 1992; Dunbar &  
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Dunbar 1988; Henzi & Barrett 1999) and do not necessarily restrict themselves to those body 
parts that their partners cannot groom themselves (Perez & Vea 2000; Lewis 2010). 
Nonmothers  were  seen  to  groom  mothers  intensely  prior  to  being  allowed  any  direct 
interactions with their infants in our study groups of sooty mangabeys, Cercocebus atys, in Ivory 
Coast and vervet monkeys in South Africa, which presented a perfect set-up for investigating the 
'infant market' in these two species. In a first step, we were interested in knowing whether access 
to infants was really a commodity with fluctuating value. Keeping in mind that rank usually plays 
a role in grooming markets as dominants have additional commodities (e.g. tolerance at food 
patches, restraint in dyadic conflicts with the subordinate or even agonistic support in conflicts) to 
trade that subordinates cannot offer, we expected the length of time a female groomed another 
female to be influenced by (1) the fact that this female was a mother, (2) the power differential, 
estimated by the rank distance between the two females, (3) the number of infants in the group 
and (4) the infant’s age. We tested the following hypotheses.  
H1: Mothers are more attractive than nonmothers. Hence, females groom mothers for longer than 
nonmothers. 
H2: The subordinate of a dyad grooms more than the dominant as long as their ‘motherhood’ 
status is the same, that is, if they have no infants or infants of approximately the same age. 
H3: Females groom mothers for longer when infants are scarcer. 
H4: Females groom mothers for longer when their infants are younger. 
In a second step we investigated infant handling time. We expected the time that females 
spent handling infants to be directly related to the time they spent grooming their mothers. Our 
hypotheses were the following. 
H5: Handling length is positively correlated with grooming length. 
H6: Females are allowed to handle infants for longer when they dominate mothers.  
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It  was  difficult  to  make  any  predictions  about  the  influence  of  the  infant’s  age  as  two 
contradictory effects could simultaneously occur: when infants get older (1) they may be less 
attractive and (2) their mothers may be less protective. 
 
METHODS 
Research areas, subjects and data collection 
Sooty mangabeys 
We conducted the study in the Taï National Park, Ivory Coast between 1 November 2001 and 20 
August 2002. The park is one of the last remaining blocks of West African primary forest and 
covers about 454 000 ha. The forest is classified as ‘tropical moist forest’ (Whitmore 1990), with 
a mean annual rainfall of 1875 mm, a mean annual temperature of 24 °C (Taï Monkey Project 
data, 1991–1999) and a distinct dry season from December to March. 
Our group of mangabeys was well habituated to human observers before the study and we 
could recognize all adult, subadult and infant members by facial features. Its home range covered 
about 7 km
2 near the western border of the park and was essentially composed of marshes with 
thick bushes and forest. The group was not provisioned. During the study we observed 7–14 adult 
males, 35 adult females, about 70 juveniles and subadults. Seven infants were born between 10 
December 2001 and 10 March 2002. One died on 2 February 2002. The six surviving infants 
started to interact directly with group members other than their mothers when they were 3 months 
old.  At  least  21  juveniles  born  during  the  previous  years  were  still  regularly  suckling  at  the 
beginning of the study: 13 of them stopped when they were about 12 months old and the rest 
carried on until after they were 18 months old. 
We focused the data collection on adult females. We used unidirectional ‘approach/retreat’ 
and ‘threat/retreat’ interactions to determine the female dominance hierarchy. It remained stable 
throughout the study period (linearity of the female rank order: MatMan test: χ
2
41 = 447.89, P < 
0.0001, h = 0.97, K = 0.97). We used both ad libitum and focal sampling observation techniques  
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(Altmann  1974)  to  collect  data  on  grooming  sessions  occurring  between  all  females.  When 
grooming sessions occurred between females and mothers of newborns less than 3 months old, we 
recorded  whether  the  female  gained  access  to  the  infant.  Grooming  bouts  were  timed  to  the 
nearest 30 s. A bout was considered to have ended when either the direction of grooming changed 
or when there was a break of > 30 s. We used 15 min focal sampling with at least 60 min between 
consecutive samples of the same individual and 3 min between samples of different individuals. 
However, for the analyses we also used the focal samples that were at least 9 min long (89 of 
2272 samples) if they were truncated because the subject moved out of the observer's sight. For 
each focal animal, we recorded each minute on the minute (instantaneous sampling, Altmann 
1974): the infant’s presence/absence, distance from the mother and the nearest adult female and 
adult  male  within  5  m.  Social  interactions  were  recorded  continuously  (detailed  ethogram  in 
Range & Noë 2002). Owing to limited visibility in the early evening, we opted for a sampling 
schedule from 0700 to 1600 hours. We collected a total of 568 h of focal samples for all of the 35 
adult females (range 63 - 65 per female). All females were followed at least once every 3 days and 
we randomized each female’s sampling to account for the time of day. Ad libitum data were 
recorded  all  day  long  (even  while  doing  focal  sampling  on  a  subject)  as  soon  as  a  social 
interaction (aggression, grooming, mount, etc.) between two identified individuals was observed. 
 
Vervet monkeys 
We conducted the study in the Loskop Dam Nature Reserve, Mpumalanga province, South Africa. 
The Loskop reserve is characterized by a ‘bushveld’ (tall grasses, thick acacia bushes) type of 
habitat. The reserve covers approximately 25 000 ha, on average 1000 m above sea level. The area 
has dry and cold winters (temperatures below 5 °C at night and 25 °C during the day) from May 
to October and hot and humid summers (rainfall about 500 mm; temperature 25 – 40 °C) from 
November to April.  
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Both study groups had home ranges of approximately 3 km
2 each that were about 3 km 
apart. The home range of the Donga group followed narrow rifts and mainly contained tall trees 
such as fig trees, while the home range of the Picnic group was situated in a plain essentially 
composed of tall grasses and acacia bushes. An artificial lake provided water to the group the 
whole year round. The Donga group did not have contact with tourists and was not provisioned 
outside the context of experiments (see Fruteau et al. 2009). The Picnic group was provisioned by 
tourists, almost exclusively on Sundays, and regularly ate from the dustbins of the picnic site. The 
group also obtained food rewards during experiments (see Fruteau et al. 2009). The Donga group 
was habituated to the presence of human observers at the beginning of the study (from May to 
mid-October 2004) and the Picnic group was habituated before the second field session (from 
February to July 2005). The Donga group had three to five adult males, seven adult females, one 
to two subadult males and one to two infants at a time. The female dominance hierarchy changed 
between the first and the second field period after the death of the beta female (linearity of the 
female rank order: MatMan test: first period: χ
2
23 = 48, P = 0.002, h = 1, K = 1; second and third 
periods: χ
2
20 = 60.67, P < 0.0001, h = 1, K = 1). The Picnic group had two to three adult males, 
four adult females, one juvenile male and two to six infants at a time. The female hierarchy stayed 
stable throughout the two field periods (linearity of the female rank order: MatMan test: χ
2
undef = 
undefined, P = 0.373, h = 1, K = 1). The genetic relatedness between most members of the groups 
was known (R. Pansini & R. Noë, unpublished data) and was not correlated with the fact that 
females were of adjacent ranks or frequent/infrequent grooming partners (C. Fruteau, S. Lemoine, 
E. Hellard, E. vanDamme & R. Noë, unpublished data). 
During the first field period, we followed the Donga group on a regular basis from mid-
October to mid-December 2004. Thereafter, we followed each group every second day during the 
second field period from September 2005 to the end of April 2006 and 2 days in a row every 4 
days during the last field period from May 2006 to the end of September 2006. Observations were 
distributed throughout the day but most data were obtained during 0600 – 1300 and 1400 – 1800  
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hours. Data were collected by focal group sampling of the adult animals (Altmann 1974), that is, 
when all adults were visible simultaneously, or by ad libitum sampling when only one observer 
was in the field or when one adult animal was out of sight or missing from the group. The data 
represent 605 and 422 h of group focal and 100 and 70 h of ad libitum sampling for the Donga 
and Picnic groups, respectively. Grooming bouts were timed to the nearest second. A bout was 
considered to have ended when either the direction of grooming changed or when there was a 
break of > 20 s. 
 
Data analysis and statistics 
For this study, we extracted all grooming sessions in which females interacted. We sorted these 
sessions into three classes: the sessions occurring between nonmothers and mothers within the 3 
months  after  an  infant’s  birth  (Dependant  Infant  DI  period),  the  sessions  occurring  between 
nonmothers and mothers after the 3 months after an infant’s birth and the sessions occurring 
between adult females outside any mating or infant period (hereafter, neutral sessions). Past the 3-
month period after their birth, infants were independent enough to interact directly with other 
members  of  the  group  without  any  interference  from  their  mother  (Fruteau  et  al.  2010).  As 
previous  analyses  showed  that  both  vervet  groups  did  not  show  any  obvious  differences  in 
grooming interactions (C. Fruteau, S. Lemoine, E. Hellard, E. van Damme & R. Noë, unpublished 
data), we pooled both groups’ data to perform the analyses. Tests were performed using R version 
2.10.1 (R Core Development Team, Vienna, Austria). The alpha level was set to 0.05. 
First, we calculated the occurrence of immediately interchanged grooming during infant 
handling sessions. We used a G test to compare the proportion of reciprocal grooming sessions 
occurring during and outside the DI period. We excluded from our analysis grooming sessions 
directly linked to sexual interactions and grooming sessions that occurred during experiments we 
performed with the vervets (Fruteau et al. 2009). Finally, we used a binomial test to investigate 
the proportion of grooming sessions initiated by handlers during the DI period and a G test to  
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compare the occurrences of grooming–handling during the DI period with the occurrences during 
the neutral sessions. In the first case, we considered the null hypothesis to be that mothers would 
initiate half of the grooming sessions. 
Second, to test H1 we compared the amount of grooming the mothers of the first newborns 
received during the 15 days prior to the birth with the amount they received during the 15 days 
after the birth. We also compared, using two-tailed Mann–Whitney U tests, the average grooming 
bout length females gave to mothers and nonmothers during the DI period as well as the average 
grooming bout length given to mothers during the presence and absence of the infant after the DI 
period. 
Third, to test H2, H3 and H4, we used a linear mixed-effect beyond-optimal model. This 
model calculates the values of all the fixed effects and their interactions. We used the duration of 
grooming (s) given by the handlers as the dependent variable. For each grooming point, we used 
as fixed effects the species (mangabey or vervet), the rank distance between the mother and the 
handler (this could range from negative to positive numbers), the number of newborn infants (< 3 
months  of  age)  per  female  at  this  time  and  the  age  of  the  infant  (days)  when  the  grooming 
occurred. We inserted the identity of the handlers as a random effect on the intercept to prevent 
pseudoreplication. To compare both species we had to log transform the data set. Furthermore, to 
compare the respective impact of each effect we standardized the data set. To do so, for each data 
point we subtracted the mean and we divided by the standard deviation. 
Finally, to test H5 and H6, we used a linear mixed-effect beyond-optimal model. This 
analysis could only be done on the vervets, as we did not collect the handling times for the 
mangabeys. We used the duration of infant handling (s) as the dependent variable. Again, we 
inserted  the  identity  of  the  handlers  as  a  random  effect  on  the  intercept  to  prevent 
pseudoreplication. We log transformed the vervet data set so it was normally distributed and we 
standardized it to compare the impact of each effect. In a first step, for each handling point, we 
used as fixed effects the duration of the handler’s grooming, the rank distance between the mother  
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and the handler, the number of infants per female at this time, the age of the infant when the 
grooming occurred and the genetic relatedness between mothers and handlers. We realized that 
the genetic relatedness did not have a significant effect on handling time. We found a similar 
result for the rank distance. However, when the rank distance was in interaction with infant’s age 
and number, it indirectly showed that mothers tended to allow longer handling times to some 
females only. In a second step, and using the fact that previous analyses performed on neutral 
grooming sessions (C. Fruteau, S. Lemoine, E. Hellard, E. vanDamme & R. Noë, unpublished 
data) revealed that even if females could choose from six partners in the Donga group and three in 
the Picnic group, they were mainly interacting with about four and two closely ranked females 
(hereafter, frequent groomers), respectively. We used the definition cited in Barrett et al. (2000), 
which considered that groomers were frequent partners if they spent more than 5% of their total 
active and passive grooming time grooming. Hence, we changed the effect ‘rank distance’ into the 
effect ‘frequent groomer or not’. To do so, we looked at the identity of both mother and handler 
and we used a dichotomous variable to characterize the dyad: ‘Yes’ when the females had been 
identified as frequent groomers during neutral grooming sessions (C. Fruteau, S. Lemoine, E. 
Hellard, E. vanDamme & R. Noë, unpublished data), and ‘No’ otherwise, for all handling times. 
This change ameliorated the Akaike’s information criterion of the model from 819 to 482. 
For both linear models and as generalized linear mixed models (GLMM) are robust to an 
‘almost’ normal distribution, we visually assessed the normality of all the residuals using the R 
function Quantile–Quantile plot (Q–Q plot). 
 
RESULTS 
Infants as a commodity in both mangabeys and vervets 
In  grooming  sessions  that  involved  mothers  with  small  infants  there  was  significantly  less 
reciprocation than in neutral grooming sessions (Table 1): handlers groomed mothers significantly 
more  than  vice  versa.  Furthermore,  significantly  more  grooming  sessions  were  initiated  by  
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handlers (mangabeys: N = 415; observed proportion: 1; theoretical proportion: 0.5; P < 0.0001; 
vervets: N = 142; observed proportion: 0.96; theoretical proportion: 0.5; P < 0.0001). 
Grooming in infant context (GrInf)  Grooming in neutral context (GrGr) 
Gro














G  test 
(df=1) 
between 
GrInf  and 
GrGr 
M  75  340  18.1  355  8  97.8  p  =  2.2e
-16 
(599.6401) 




Table 1. Grooming patterns in mangabeys (M) and vervets (V) 
 
In mangabeys, 408 of 415 grooming sessions where the mother was holding an infant were 
immediately followed by infant handling, which is significantly different from the 363 neutral 
sessions that were not followed by any infant handling (two-tailed G test: G1 = 503.225, P < 
0.001). We found a similar effect in vervets as 135 of 142 sessions resulted in access to the infant 
while none of the 323 neutral sessions did (G1 = 447.773, P < 0.001). Some infant handling 
occurred immediately prior to the grooming sessions, but as this represented less than 1% of the 
total of infant handling in both species, we integrated it with the infant handling occurring after 
the grooming sessions. In mangabeys, over the 74 cases in which we recorded mothers handling 
each other’s infants, none were preceded or followed by grooming. 
 
Infant market in mangabeys and vervets: multi effects on grooming time 
In the 2 weeks after the birth of the first newborn, nonmothers of both species groomed mothers 
significantly longer than during the 2 weeks before the birth of the infants (two-tailed Mann–
Whitney U tests: mangabeys: before birth: average ± SD = 147.39 ± 87.66 s; after birth: 600 ± 
64.14 s; U = 0, N1= 17, N2= 28, P < 0.001; vervets: before birth: average ± SD = 145.46 ± 70.40 s; 
after birth: 342.18 ± 171.56 s; U = 127.5, N1=55, N2= 46, P < 0.001). Similarly, they groomed 
mothers for significantly longer than other females during neutral grooming sessions (two-tailed  
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Mann–Whitney  U  tests:  mangabeys:  U  =  6,  N1=363,  N2=22,  P  <  0.001;  vervets:  U  =  3313, 
N1=323, N2= 83, P < 0.001; Fig. 1), which confirmed H1. 
 
Figure 1. Evolution of non-mothers’ grooming investment according to the number of available infants in 
the group throughout the study period. A- In mangabeys. B- In vervets. Grooming sessions occurring 
between  females  during  neutral  grooming  sessions  are  represented  in  the  FF  bars.  Grooming  sessions 
occurring  between  non-mothers  and  mothers  are  represented  with  the  black  bars.  In  mangabeys,  the 
number of infants varies quite frequently throughout the study as some of them reached 3 months old 
before others and one infant also died. This does not happen so much in vervets as the number of infants 
remains quite low and the lag between two births is short. *** represents p < 0.001 (two-tailed Mann-
Whitney-U tests to compare the FF investment with the investment handlers gave the mother of the very 
first new-born). The way grooming investment fluctuate is explained by the GLMM model. 
 
Analyses  of  the  grooming  exchanged  between  nonmothers  and  mothers  after  the  DI  period 
showed that this effect remained even after infants were starting to be independent: mothers of 
both species received significantly longer grooming sessions when their infant was clinging on  
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their fur than when it was not (two-tailed Mann–Whitney U tests: mangabeys: U = 226.5, N1=415, 
N2=79 , P < 0.001; vervets: U = 27.5, N1 = 142, N2 = 83, P < 0.001; Fig. 2a). 
 
 
Figure 2. A- Non-mothers’ grooming investment toward mothers after the DI period. ‘Mother with infants’ 
represents situations when females groomed mothers with suckling infants. *** represents p < 0.001 (two-
tailed Mann-Whitney-U tests). B- Evolution of non-mothers’ grooming investment towards each mother 
throughout time in mangabeys. In this graph some factors influencing non-mothers’ investment (number of 
available infants as well as the infants’ average age) are represented. We did not represented vervets data 
as we compiled data from two different seasons to run the analysis. 
 
The  linear  mixed-effect  beyond-optimal  model  (summarized  in  Table  2)  showed 
significant effects up to the third level of interactions, that is, three effects interacting together. 
This demonstrates the complexity of the infant market. On the first level of interactions, all four 
effects (rank distance, number of infants per female, age of infants and species) had a significant 
impact on the duration of grooming given by handlers. The species effect was the strongest and  
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showed that vervet handlers groomed mothers significantly less long than mangabey handlers 
(Table 2). The duration of grooming decreased significantly both when the number of available 
infants per female in the group increased and when infants grew older (Table 2). Finally, rank 
distances negatively influenced grooming (Table 2, Fig. 2b). These findings supported hypotheses 
H3, H4 and H2, respectively. 
Effects  Value  Std Error  DF  t-value  p-value 
Intercept (Residual: 0.04347578 
                 StdDev: 0.2263636)  5.566336  0.0394879  494  5.479329  0.0000 
Rank distance  -0.135249  0.0320832  494  -4.215550  0.0000 
Number infants  -0.605086  0.0371257  494  -16.298293  0.0000 
Age infants  -0.560262  0.0283301  494  -19.776247  0.0000 
Species vervet  -3.483899  0.4699516  47  -7.413315  0.0000 
Rank distance & Number infants  -0.038010  0.0325616  494  -1.167321  0.2428 
Rank distance & Age infants  0.051597  0.0246696  494  2.091510  0.0370 
Number infants & Age infants  0.168124  0.0301330  494  5.579392  0.0000 
Rank distance & Species vervet  -5.217925  1.1455553  494  -4.554930  0.0000 
Number infants & Species vervet  -1.527756  0.4635674  494  -3.295651  0.0011 
Age infants & Species vervet  -2.372648  0.5232095  494  -4.534796  0.0000 
Rank distance & Number infants & 
Age infants 
-0.043465  0.0250295  494  -1.736558  0.0831 
Rank distance & Number.infants & 
Species vervet 
-2.899367  1.0671696  494  -2.716876  0.0068 
Rank distance & Age.infants & 
Species vervet 
-1.157426  1.2902073  494  -0.897085  0.3701 
Number infants & Age infants & 
Species vervet 
-1.377600  0.5551832  494  -2.481343  0.0134 
Rank distance & Number infants & 
Age infants & Species vervet 
0.164969  1.2768802  494  0.129197  0.8973 
 
Table 2. Summary of the linear mixed-effect beyond optimal model for mangabeys and vervets – the 
mangabey species is comprised in the intercept and significant effects are double-cycled and in bold. 
Fixed effects: log (grooming time) ~ Rank distance * Number infants per female* Age infants * Species | 
random effect on the intercept: Identity of Handler – AIC: 1059.667  
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Effects  Value  Std Error  DF  t-value  p-value 
Intercept (Residual: 1.164931 
                 StdDev: 0.4557484)  -0.8759489  0.4444397  104  -1.970906  0.0514 
Time grooming  0.2956275  0.3672734  104  0.804925  0.4227 
Frequent groomers or not  1.0638304  0.5505812  104  2.032195  0.0461 
Number infants  -1.6566649  0.5377561  104  -3.080700  0.0026 
Age infants  0.2466319  0.3087754  104  0.798742  0.4263 
Time grooming & Frequent groomers 
or not 
-0.1810560  0.4479063  104  -0.404227  0.6869 
Time grooming & Number infants  1.5855022  0.4604884  104  0.4604884  0.0008 
Time grooming & Age infants  -0.3077380  0.1844882  104  -1.668063  0.0983 
Number infants & Age infants  0.6506699  0.3700390  104  1.758382  0.0816 
Number infants & Frequent 
groomers or not 
2.0150947  0.6484209  104  3.107695  0.0024 
Age infants & Frequent groomer or 
not 
-0.6112179  0.4360560  104  -1.401696  0.1640 
Time grooming & Frequent 
groomers or not & Number infants 
-1.2962133  0.4972428  104  -2.606801  0.0105 
Time grooming & Frequent groomers 
or not & Age infants 
0.2366608  0.2342527  104  1.010280  0.3147 
Time grooming & Number infants & 
Age infants 
-0.2750999  0.2486308  104  -1.106459  0.2711 
Frequent groomers or not & Number 
infants & Age infants 
0.4571652  0.4845990  104  0.943389  0.3477 
Time grooming & Frequent 
groomers or not & Number infants 
& Age infants 
0.6402653  0.2847838  104  2.248250  0.0267 
 
Table 3. Summary of the linear mixed-effect beyond optimal model for handling in vervets – the 
infrequent groomers value is comprised in the intercept and significant effects are double-cycled and in 
bold. Fixed effects: log (Handling time) ~ Grooming time * Frequent groomers or not * Number infants 
per female * Age infants | random effect on the intercept: Identity of Handler – AIC: 481.9241. 
 
The second level of interactions showed that the rank distance had a stronger influence in 
vervets than in mangabeys (Table 2) meaning that vervets were more despotic than mangabeys. It 
also  showed  that  the  effects  of  both  infant’s  age  and  number  per  female  had  a  stronger  and 
negative impact on the duration of grooming in vervets (Table 2). Finally, the interaction between  
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rank distance and infant’s age had a significant impact on grooming time (Table 2): when infants 
were very young, handlers were more closely ranked with the mothers than when infants grew 
older. 
 
Infant handling in vervets 
The  linear  mixed-effect  beyond-optimal  model  (summarized  in  Table  3)  showed 
significant effects up to the fourth level of interactions, that is, four effects interacting together. 
On the first level of interactions the number of infants per female as well as the fact that females 
were frequent groomers significantly predicted the duration of handling. The duration of handling 
decreased significantly when the number of available infants increased and when females were 
not frequent groomers (Table 3). This last finding invalidated H6. 
The second level of interactions showed that grooming times only influenced handling 
times when they were combined with the number of infants per female (Table 3) meaning that 
longer grooming bouts only gave longer access to infants when their availability increased. This 
partially invalidated H5. It also showed that whatever the number of infants, frequent groomers 
could handle them for significantly longer than infrequent groomers (Table 3). Except in the 
fourth level of interactions, the age of infants did not statistically influence handling times. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Grooming - Infant exchanges 
In both sooty mangabeys and vervet monkeys, grooming patterns of females changed drastically 
after giving birth. During the 3-month period in which females needed to interact with a mother 
prior to gaining access to her infant, they essentially initiated grooming sessions and hardly ever 
received any grooming in return. Rather, in most cases, they were granted access to the infant 
immediately after grooming its mother. In the weeks following the birth of the first newborn and 
when still very few infants were available in the group, females groomed mothers for significantly  
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longer than they groomed other females during neutral grooming sessions. This suggests that they 
valued handling an infant more than they valued being groomed. As observed by Matsumura 
(1997) in moor macaques, Macaca maura, infants remained attractive even after they became 
more  independent,  as  nonmothers  kept  grooming  mothers  for  longer  when  their  infant  was 
suckling than when it was away from the mother. 
Analyses revealed that the duration of grooming given by nonmothers was significantly 
influenced by the infants’ availability, their age and the rank distance between the handler and the 
mother. The number of infants in the group had the strongest effect: when infants were rare, 
grooming bouts were longer. This suggests that grooming/infant exchanges follow the market law 
of supply and demand and that the value of infants can vary through time according to their 
availability. However, supply and demand ratios only partially determined the infants’ value. The 
second major effect was the age of the infant. Nonmothers invested in longer bouts when infants 
were younger, that is, they groomed a younger infant longer than an older one, everything else 
being equal. The third effect was the rank distance between handlers and mothers. Basically, to be 
able to handle infants, higher-ranking females groomed mothers a lot less than did lower-ranking 
females. 
When comparing the grooming durations given by the handlers of both species, we found a 
very strong species effect on most studied factors. First, for similar rank distances, numbers and 
ages of infants, mangabey females groomed mothers for significantly longer than vervet females. 
However, when we compared the lengths of grooming bouts females gave to be groomed in 
return, we found similar durations for both species (mangabeys: 171.5 ± 64.5 s; vervets: 161.5 ± 
162.5 s; C. Fruteau, S. Lemoine, E. Hellard, E. vanDamme & R. Noë, unpublished data). Hence, 
this significant species effect may point at more competition among nonmothers to obtain access 
to infants. In fact, the number of infants per female is bigger in vervets than in mangabeys and as 
soon as more than two infants are born in the group, vervet females groom mothers as long as they  
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would groom any other female. This finding is not surprising as vervet groups are rather small: 
few infants are needed to reach the ‘infant/handler’ carrying capacity of the group. 
In the light of our results, we can assume that in mangabeys and vervets, the length of 
grooming gives an accurate price for each available infant, as its range of variation seems large 
enough to reflect many small changes. Indeed, the market value of infants depends on multiple 
factors (relationships of dominance, outbidding competition, supply and demand ratios, etc.) and 
fluctuates with time. The market almost changes from one interaction to the next and females 
need to adjust their grooming behaviours constantly, which they seem to accomplish accurately 
too. The mechanisms that lead to these quick and accurate adaptations deserve further study. 
 
Infant handling 
Recent studies (Henzi & Barrett 2002; Schaffner & Aureli 2005; Gumert 2007a; Slater et al. 
2007) have considered infants as exchangeable commodities whose value can be assessed thanks 
to grooming or embraces by nonmothers, but little has been said about the other side of the 
market: the quality of the infant handling obtained by the groomer. ‘Infant handling’ is a tricky 
parameter, however, that can be described on either a quantitative level (duration or rate of 
handling) or a qualitative level (intensities of interaction such as ‘smell the infant’, ‘touch it’, 
‘groom it’, ‘carry it’). In this paper we only investigated the quantitative effects in terms of 
handling duration for a small number of adult females in vervets and further studies would be 
needed to refine our results. A first result showed that handling time increased when infants were 
rare or when females and mothers were frequent grooming partners. Whatever the number of 
infants, frequent groomers could handle them for significantly longer than infrequent groomers. 
Contrary to expectations based on contingent reciprocity models, grooming and handling times 
were not directly correlated. Longer grooming bouts did not necessarily secure longer handling, 
especially when infants were rare. Grooming durations were correlated with handling time only 
when infant ratios were above one infant per female.  
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Without additional information, our findings on infant handling could provide evidence for 
all four hypotheses concerning females’ attraction to newborns. However, even though females 
sometimes pulled infants’ arms or legs, they handled them with care and low-ranking mothers 
could easily retrieve their infants from higher-ranked females in both species, which contradicts 
the reproductive competition hypothesis (Hrdy 1976). Similarly, females who had had infants in 
previous years were as interested in handling infants as nulliparous ones were, which invalidates 
the allomothering hypothesis (Lancaster 1971; see also Fairbanks 1990). Furthermore, handling 
times were not directly affected by infants’ maturity, which seems to contradict the by-product 
hypothesis (Silk 1999). Thus, our results seem to follow the alliance formation hypothesis that 
Manson (1999) suggested in the light of his results on capuchins, Cebus capucinus, in which 
mothers of infants less than 3 months old allowed longer handling times to females they had 
frequently interacted with prior to giving birth. 
So far, handling time has been the only investigated reward parameter and may not be the 
best measure to illustrate what is at stake when females handle infants. It would be interesting to 
have  results  on  the  qualitative  aspects  of  the  handling:  maybe  longer  grooming  would  allow 
females to carry or groom infants even for a short while, while shorter grooming would only allow 
them to touch or smell an infant. However, from a situation in which females competed to gain 
access to young infants, grooming bouts seemed to secure cooperation from the mother. Indeed, 
although mothers did not easily give access to their infants, they tolerated handling as soon as they 
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ABSTRACT 
 
For years, infanticide by males was thought to be unlikely in multi-male primate species. Recent 
studies have, however, presented evidence of infanticide in such species and a recent model by 
Broom and colleagues predicts that males’ age and rank influence the occurrence of infanticide: 
youngest and highest ranking immigrant males are more likely to commit infanticide than their 
older and lower ranking counterparts if putative fathers fail to protect infants. I collected data on 
adult free-ranging sooty mangabey females in the Taï National Park, Ivory Coast, over eleven 
months  including  a  birth  and  a  mating  season.  Infanticide  had  been  previously  reported  in 
captivity for this species, but not in the wild. Several males entered the group prior to and during 
the mating season. As predicted by the model, only the more dominant immigrant ones attacked 
mother-infant pairs significantly more often than did other males. Mothers often reacted with 
counter-attacks.  Potential  fathers  guarded  and  supported  infants  and  mothers  throughout  the 
period of infant vulnerability. Furthermore, as only one of seven infants died despite 136 observed 
attacks  on  mother-infant  pairs  and  unattended  infants  by  immigrant  males,  we  conclude  that 
cooperation  between  putative  fathers  and  mothers  represents  an  effective  protection  against 
infanticide.  
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Deliberate killing of infants by adult males has been reported for many mammal species and is 
frequent in primates (e.g. Hrdy 1974, Angst & Thommen 1977, Janson & van Schaik 2000, van 
Schaik 2000). No less than five explanations have been proposed, including, among others, the 
social pathology hypothesis (Dolhinov 1977, Boggess 1984) that predicts infanticide in primates 
living in unnatural environments and the by-product hypothesis (e.g. Sussman et al. 1995) in 
which  infanticide  is  a  side  effect  of  males’  general  aggression.  The  most  widely  accepted 
explanation for infanticide in non-human primates however, is the sexually selected infanticide 
hypothesis (Hrdy 1974, 1979, Hrdy & Hausfater 1984). It states that an adult male may increase 
his  fitness  by  killing  unrelated  and  unweaned  infants  if  he  can  easily  mate  with  the  mother 
afterwards:  the  female  victim  of  infanticide  immediately  resumes  her  sexual  cycle  and  after 
having defeated the former resident male, the infanticidal male gain an earlier opportunity for 
siring the next offspring (e.g. Borries et al. 1999a, Pussey & Packer 1994, contributions in van 
Schaik & Janson 2000). Hence, in its original formulation, this adaptive scenario was restricting 
infanticide  to  non-seasonal  breeders  characterised  by  a  single-male  mating  system.  However, 
many studies reported infant killing by males in both multi-male (e.g. Collins et al. 1984, Borries 
et al. 1999a, Soltis et al. 2000, Weingrill 2000) and seasonal breeders (e.g. Wright 1995, Borries 
1997) and this new range of infanticide occurrences led to new predictions about the way males 
may gain reproductive benefits. In multi-male breeders, newcomer males are then expected to use 
infanticide if they reach a status in the male hierarchy that allows them to mate with females 
(Broom et al. 2004). In seasonal breeders, males are expected to commit infanticide quite early 
after the infant’s birth so that females can resume ovulation either before the end of the mating 
season or right at the very beginning of the next one (see Wright 1995). 
In species in which males tend to commit infanticide, females are expected to develop 
counter-strategies to minimize the risk of infant loss (Hrdy 1979; Smuts & Smuts 1993). A first 
strategy involves behavioural changes during the period after birth when infants are vulnerable to 
infanticide. This can include avoiding unfamiliar males or constraining infants in their presence  
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(e.g. Collins et al. 1984, Fairbanks & Mc Guire 1987, Hauser 1988, Sommer 1994, Wright 1995), 
counter-attacking infanticidal males (e.g. Mohnot 1971, Hrdy 1977), and finding allies such as 
related females or potential fathers to help them protect infants (e.g. Smuts & Smuts 1993, Treves 
1998, 2000, Borries et al. 1999b, Palombit et al. 2000). A second strategy involves behavioural 
and physiological changes prior to conception. Since most male primates are thought to be unable 
to recognise their offspring as such (e.g. König 1989, but see Alberts 1999, Buchan et al. 2003), 
they probably restrain their aggressive behaviours towards infants of females they mated with 
(Noë & Sluijter 1990, van Schaik & Kappeler 1997). Thus, females can mate promiscuously in 
order to induce paternity confusion (Hrdy 1979, Hrdy & Whitten 1987, Nunn 1999, van Schaik et 
al. 1999) or display sexual swellings at times it is unlikely for them to be ovulating (Gordon et al. 
1991, Zinner & Deschner 2000). In this paper we only focus on the first option, i.e. behavioural 
changes during infant vulnerability. 
Mangabeys (Cercocebus spp.) are both promiscuous and seasonal breeders and infanticide 
occurrences have been reported in both captive sooty mangabeys (C. torquatus atys, Busse & 
Gordon 1983, Gust et al. 1995) and free ranging crested mangabeys (C. galeritus galeritus, Gust 
1994). Preliminary observations of several non-resident males attacking mothers and infants in 
our  study  group  gave  us  reason  to  suspect  infanticide  to  occur  in  wild  sooty  mangabeys  (C. 
torquatus atys) as well. In our group the average inter-birth interval was 29 ± 7 months (N = 28 
females) and females who lost their infants during the six-months period after birth immediately 
resumed menstrual cycles while females whose infants remained alive or lived longer than six 
months did not. Thus, non-resident males could gain an earlier opportunity to mate with mothers 
(at  least  a  whole  year)  by  committing  infanticide  at  an  early  stage  after  infants’  births.  We 
therefore investigated the potential risks for infanticide and their likely consequences. We first 
hypothesised that if infanticide may occur, it would essentially be performed by non-resident 
males. Hence, we expected (1) these males to mainly target mothers and infants rather than other 
members of the group. More precisely and as suggested by the recent model from Broom and  
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colleagues  (2004),  we  expected  (2)  these  aggressive  males  to  be  young  and  to  sufficiently 
integrate  the  group  to  quickly  rise  in  the  male  hierarchy.  Secondly  we  hypothesised  that  if 
infanticide risks were real, some adult members of the group would develop counter-strategies. 
More particularly, we expected (3) potential fathers to actively protect mothers and infants and (4) 
females to seek the proximity of these males. Eventually and still following the model by Broom 




Research areas and subjects 
This  study  was  conducted  in  the  Taï  National  Park  in  south-western  Ivory  Coast  (6°20'N  to 
5°10'N  and  4°20'W  to  6°50’W).  The  park  is  the  last  remaining  major  block  of  West  Africa 
primary forest. It covers approximately 454,000 ha. With a mean annual rainfall of 1875 mm, a 
mean annual temperature of 24°C (Taï Monkey Project data, 1991-1999) and a distinct dry season 
from December to March, the forest is classified as “tropical moist forest” (Whitmore 1990). At 
least twelve primate species, including sooty mangabeys (Cercocebus atys), live in the park. 
The group was well habituated to human observers prior to the start of this study and was 
followed  from  dawn  to  dusk  by  at  least  one  observer  during  the  entire  study  period  from 
November 2001 to August 2002. During this period, 7-14 adult males, 35 adult females, about 70 
sub-adults and juveniles were observed in the group. Seven infants were born between December 
10, 2001 and March 10, 2002. Seven of the adult males (“residents”) were present in the group 
over the entire study period. Altogether, seven other adult males (“non-residents”) joined the 
group for various periods of time during this period. Five of those (“immigrants” males) entered 
the group in February, stayed until the end of the study and integrated the male hierarchy. The two 
other non-resident males remained in the group for very short periods (from a couple of hours to a 
couple of days at a time). We therefore focused the analyses on the five immigrant males only.  
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On average, mangabeys (Cercocebus spp.) have a gestation period of about six months 
(Deputte 1991) and a lactation that can vary between four/five months (wild Cercocebus albigena 
johnstonii: Rowell & Chalmers 1970) and six/ten months (C. galeritus in Groves 1978). In our 
study species (C. torquatus atys) the lactation period seemed to last longer (from 12 up to 18 
months). However, this difference may result from the fact that no accurate terminology defines 
when a lactation period really ends. In our group, the six surviving infants of the year started to 
eat diverse food around five/six months but were still suckling regularly. At least 21 juveniles 
born the previous years were still regularly suckling at the beginning of the study: 13 of them 
stopped when they were about 12 months old and the rest carried on to regularly suckle and cling 
on mothers till after they were 18 months old. The birth season was comprised between December 
and March with a peak around February (Range & Noë 2002). The mating season usually started 
in May and lasted up to the end of September with a mating activity peak in July-August. 
 
Data collection 
The analyses presented in this paper are based on conflicts and proximity data recorded during 
focal  animal  and  ad  libitum  sampling  (Altmann  1974).  Conflicts  were  recorded  when  one 
individual threatened, darted at and potentially chased over few meters, pushed on the ground or 
bit another individual. Proximity was considered when two individuals were less than 5 meters 
apart. 
We conducted 15-min focal samples on adult females with at least 60 minutes between 
consecutive  samples  of  the  same  individual  and  three  minutes  between  samples  of  different 
individuals. However, for the analyses we also used the focal samples that were at least nine 
minutes long (89 samples over 2272) if they were truncated because of the observer loosing the 
subject  after  an  obstacle.  For  each  focal  animal,  we  recorded  each  minute  on  the  minute 
(instantaneous sampling, Altmann 1974): the infant’s presence / absence and distance and the 
nearest adult female and male within 5 meters. Social interactions were recorded continuously  
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(detailed ethogram in Range & Noë 2002). Due to limited visibility in the early evening, we opted 
for an opportunistic sampling schedule conducting focal samples only between 7 a.m. and 4 p.m. 
Between November 1, 2001 and August 20, 2002 we collected 1360 hours worth of ad 
libitum data and a total of 568 hours of focal samples for all of the 35 adult females (ranging from 
63 to 65 per female). 
 
Data Analysis and statistics 
Each  time  we  performed  analyses  between  categories  of  individuals,  we  corrected  for  their 
respective numbers: resident males: N = 7, immigrant males: N = 5, mothers: N = 7, non-mothers: 
N = 28, juveniles between one and two years old: N = 21 and unattended infants: N = 6. 
 
Dominance 
We compiled two socio-matrices (one for adult males, one for adult females) in which we used the 
recorded  approach/retreat  and  threat/retreat  unidirectional  interactions  to  determine  the 
subordinate individual of each dyad. For both males and females, the rank-order among adults 
was strictly linear (Matman with 10000 randomisations: Kendall’s coefficient of linearity: K = 
0.967 for both gender, χ
2 = 48, p = 0.0017, df = 25.12 for males, χ
2 = 447.89, p < 0.0001, df = 
40.86 for females). 
 
Infants’ vulnerable period to infanticide 
As  females  whose  infants  died  within  the  six  months  after  birth  were  observed  to  resume 
menstrual cycles, we assumed these six months to be a good estimate of the period during which 
males would benefit more from infanticide. Hence, we defined these six months as the period 
during which infants may be vulnerable to infanticide (vulnerable period VP hereafter). 
During the vulnerable period, infants grew more and more independent and could be left 
unattended for short periods of time. We defined infants as being unattended when they were at  
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more than three meters from their mothers for more than one minute. One infant died while he 




Non-parametric statistical tests (Siegel & Castellan 1988) were conducted using Statview (version 
5.0.1). Analyses of conflicts and male-female proximities were conducted using Chi-square (χ
2), 
Mann-Whitney-U tests and Spearman correlations. Results were considered as being significant 
when p ≤ 0.05. If multiple n tests were conducted on the same data set, we set the total experiment 
wise error rate α at 0.05 and the corrected α' were taken from Narum reference table with critical 
values for the Bonferroni correction method (2006). 
 
RESULTS 
Pattern of aggression of adult males towards females and infants 
We summarized the males’ attacks in Table 1. 
 
Table  1:  Attacks  of  males  to  other  classes  of  individuals.  NR-M:  non-resident  males;  R-M: 
resident males. 
 
In order to test the hypothesis of infanticidal risk, we analysed the pattern of aggression of adult 
males toward adult females, juveniles and unattended infants. During the study, we observed 154 
conflicts between adult males and adult females, 117 of which were conducted by immigrant 
males (attacks against mothers: N = 92, attacks against non-mothers: N = 25) and 37 by resident 
  Mothers  Non-mothers  Infants  Juveniles  NR-M  R-M 
NR-M  92  25  36  2  9  11 
R-M  8  29  0  4  138  21  
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males  (mothers:  N  =  8,  non-mothers:  N  =  29).  Immigrant  males  were  significantly  more 
aggressive towards mothers than towards non-mothers (two-tailed Chi-square test χ
2 = 81.408, p < 
0.001, df = 10). Resident males, in contrast, attacked mothers at similar rates than they attacked 
non-mothers (two-tailed Chi-square test χ
2 = 0.084, p = 0.999, df = 1) (Fig. 1). On average, over 
the whole 1360 hours we spent observing the study group, an immigrant male would be likely to 




Figure  1:  Number  of  attacks  performed  by  immigrant  and  resident  males  towards  females  with  and 
without infants. Males of each category are ordered by rank. 1 represents the highest-ranking male of the 
category. 
 
The attacks from both male categories were very distinct. Attacks from immigrant males 
started as soon as they entered the study group. Usually they would dart at mothers, coming 
quickly on their back and would grab their fur or a part of their infant’s body, push them on the 
ground and quickly try to bite. Females would loudly scream and look around for support. In 
contrast, resident males mainly tended to slap females during the reproductive season. Usually a 
female at the beginning of her menstrual cycle would start to present her sexual parts to males. 
Old resident males would inspect them once or twice before turning around. Then the female 
would leave. However, some would insist and present again and again leading the male to threaten 
and slap them. 
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Immigrant  males  conducted  36  attacks  against  unattended  infants  and  only  2  against 
juveniles between one and two years of age. In contrast resident males never attacked unattended 
infants  and  attacked  juveniles  four  times.  Immigrant  males  significantly  targeted  unattended 
infants more than juveniles of less than two years (two-tailed Chi-square test χ
2 = 42.318, p < 
0.0001, df = 1). Due to the small sample size for resident males, we did not perform any statistical 
analysis. 
 
Among  the  immigrant  males,  we  found  a  negative  correlation  between  the  rate  of 
aggressive behaviours and their respective rank-order in the group (spearman correlation: r = -1, p 
= 0.0455). As suggested by Broom and colleagues (2004), higher-ranking immigrant males were 
more aggressive toward mothers and infants than their lower-ranking counterparts. Furthermore, 
we also found a positive correlation between the number of mounts they could perform and their 
respective rank-order (spearman correlation: r = 0.98, p = 0.0456). In fact, two of the immigrant 
males reached the male alpha position during the mating season. During their tenure, they could 
form consort and mate with receptive females without being displaced by other adult males. 
Unfortunately, as immigrant males were coming from non-habituated groups, we could 
only have a rough estimation of their age. Hence, we did not try to correlate their age with their 
level of aggression. 
 
Pattern of aggression among adult males 
In order to test the hypothesis of infant protection by resident males, we analysed conflicts among 
adult males. We observed 178 conflicts among the five immigrant and seven resident adult males. 
Immigrant males attacked another adult male (resident or immigrant) 20 times while resident 
males attacked 158 times. A resident male was significantly more likely than an immigrant male 
to attack another adult male (two-tailed Chi-square test χ
2 = 38.398, p < 0.0001, df = 1). Among 
these resident males, two males showed significantly higher rates of aggression towards other  
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males (150 attacks; two-tailed Chi-square test χ
2 = 90.455, p < 0.0001, df = 1
  and Chi-square test 
χ
2 = 15.828, p < 0.0001, df = 1) (Fig. 2). Of these 150 attacks, 129 (86%) were directed towards 
immigrant males after they had first attacked mother/infant pairs or unattended infants (Fig. 3). 
 
 
Figure 2: Number of attacks performed by immigrant and resident males towards another male (either 
immigrant or resident). Males of each category are ordered by rank. 1 represents the highest-ranking male 
of the category. 
 
To summarize: immigrant males attacked mother/infant pairs and unattended infants 128 
times. The two resident males protected females and infants by themselves on 116 occasions and 
simultaneously on 13 occasions. We henceforth categorised them as “protective” (PR) males. The 
protection could vary from a simple threat (opened mouth with visible teeth) with a slight forward 
movement of the body to chases, slaps and bites. The threat mainly happened when females had 
counter-attacked with other females (five times) or when infants were already more than three 
months old and clinging on their mothers (47 times). Chases and slaps occurred when a PR male 
darted at an immigrant male: when this male remained close to the females or infants (20 times), 
the PR male slapped him on the face and shoulders; when he jumped and fled (44 times), the PR 
male chased him over long distances (> 50 meters) for few minutes. Eventually, the PR males’ 
simultaneous actions were the most intense. One PR male would first dart at the immigrant male 
and the second PR male would follow few seconds afterwards. The three males would end up 
rolling on the ground with many grunt vocalisations and biting each other. All 13 actions occurred 
after immigrant males tried to grab and bite unattended infants.  
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Figure 3: Number of attacks performed by immigrant and resident males towards another male (either 
immigrant  or  resident).  In  white  is  represented  the  proportion  (86%)  of  attacks  given  in  support  of 
aggressed  mothers  while  in  black  is  represented  the  proportion  of  attacks  that  were  not  performed  in 
support of aggressed mothers. 
 
It is to note that outside the infant context, males hardly fought each other. Indeed we 
recorded only 49 fights and all occurred during the mating season. One immigrant male performed 
9 of these fights in order to gain access to the alpha female that was precociously receptive, hence, 
reaching the alpha position on the 07/02/02. His tenure lasted until the 30/07/02 when a second 
immigrant male challenged him in four fights and won the access to the only female that was 
receptive this week. 
 
Among the resident males, we found that the two PR males were the highest-ranking 
males, which corroborates the predictions by Broom and colleagues (2004). In the general male 
hierarchy, they were second and third higher-ranking males. Based on previous observations of 
the group we assume that they were also among the three oldest males of the group. Furthermore, 
during the previous mating season these two males were seen to form consortships and mate with 
the seven mothers when they were receptive (Benetton et al. master manuscript). 
 
Aggression by females 
During our study, we observed 392 agonistic interactions of females towards other adult members 
of the group. The following tests (N = 4) required a Bonferroni correction with α' = 0.01250.  
  79 
Adult females attacked other adult females 283 times and adult males 109 times, a difference that 
is not statistically significant when taking the number of females and males into account (34 
females, 12 males; two-tailed Chi-square test χ
2 = 0.318, p = 0.5730, df = 1). The 28 females 
without infants directed attacks significantly more often at adult females than at adult males (225 
attacks against females and 25 against males; two-tailed Chi-square test χ
2 = 21.680, p < 0.0001, 
df = 1). However, 5 of the 25 attacks against adult males were in support of attacked mothers. 
Furthermore, females without infants directed aggression less often against mothers than against 
other adult females (23 attacks against mothers and 202 against females corrected for number of 
mothers and non-mothers; two-tailed Chi-square test χ
2 = 9.180, p < 0.0023, df = 1). The seven 
mothers were significantly more aggressive against adult males than against adult females (58 
attacks against females and 84 against males; two-tailed Chi-square test χ
2 = 31.808, p < 0.0001, 
df = 1). Almost all of the attacks of mothers directed against adult males (82 out of 84) were 
counter-attacks in response to one of the 128 attacks by an immigrant male, i.e. the mothers 
counter-attacked in 64% of cases (Fig. 4). 
 
 
Figure 4: Number of attacks performed by immigrant and resident males towards mothers or unattended 
infants. In white is represented the proportion (64%) of attacks countered by mothers while in black is 
represented the proportion of attacks that were not countered by mothers. 
 
Each time immigrant male’s attacks aimed unattended infant, mothers would roughly grab 
their infant and turn around the male to try to bite him. In other cases, females would try to slap 
the male or would even chase him along with the PR male.  
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Proximity between males and females 
In order to test the hypothesis of bonding between mothers and putative fathers as a counter-
strategy for infanticidal risk, we analyzed the pattern of proximity between mothers and adult 
males. The following tests (N = 4) were corrected by Bonferroni with α' = 0.01250. Per 100 
minutes of observation, mothers were close to resident males 72.35 minutes (ranging from 65 to 
79 minutes) during the vulnerable period (VP) of their infants, and 33 minutes (ranging from 24 
and 54 minutes) when their infants were more than six months old (not vulnerable period NVP). 
 
Figure 5: Number of minutes per 100 minutes of observation during which mothers were observed at close 
proximity  (less  than  5  meters)  from  resident  and  immigrant  males.  The  first  graph  represents  the 
proximities during the six months after infants were born and were considered particularly vulnerable to 
infanticide (VP). The second graph represents the proximities after infants were more than six months old 
(NVP). 
 
Hence, mothers were significantly closer to the resident males during VP than during NVP (two-
tailed Mann-Whitney-U test: U = 0.00, p = 0.0017). In contrast, mothers were close to immigrant 
males only 8 minutes (ranging from 5.35 and 12.5 minutes) during the vulnerable period of their 
infants, and 33 minutes (ranging from 18 and 47 minutes) when their infants were more than six  
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months old, which shows that mothers were closer to immigrant males during NVP than during 
VP. 
Hence, if mothers were recorded at a comparable distance to resident and immigrant males 
when their infants were more than six months old (two-tailed Mann-Whitney-U test: U = 15.5, p = 
0.2502), they were significantly more often registered near resident males than near immigrant 
males during VP (two-tailed Mann-Whitney-U test: U = 49, p = 0.0017) (Fig. 5). Furthermore, PR 
males were observed to actively gather mothers and infants after attacks by immigrant males. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Infanticidal  risks  in  mangabeys:  aggression  by-product  or  behavioural  strategy  under 
sexual selection? 
In the by-product hypothesis, infanticide is not a selected behaviour. Infants are not injured or 
killed intentionally but because they are the most vulnerable individuals of the group. Hence, 
infants’ killing could happen during any males’ intense enough conflicts. In this case, infants 
would have the same probability to be injured by resident or immigrant males and males would 
not target mothers and infants more than any other member of the group. Rather, infants’ injuries 
would happen when males are fighting each other and mothers either interfere in the conflict or 
remain close-by. Furthermore, as the killing behaviour is accidental, females would not develop 
any particular behavioural counter-strategies to prevent it. Conversely, in the sexually selected 
hypothesis,  infanticide  is  a  behavioural  strategy  and  concerns  males  that  did  not  mate  with 
mothers the previous year. More precisely, the model developed by Broom and colleagues (2004) 
predicts the occurrence of infanticide in multi-male primate species, if (1) male attackers’ costs 
are negligible and/or if (2) their status in the group allows them to get almost exclusive access to 
the receptive females. Under this hypothesis, only some males would benefit from infanticide and 
would  target  mothers  and  infants  more  than  other  member  of  the  group.  Furthermore,  as 
infanticide would be a selected behaviour, females would develop some counter-strategies.  
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In our study group, males did not fight each other very often and conflicts always arose 
when the access for a receptive female was at stake. These conflicts did not last over long periods 
and mainly involved the two protagonist males. Indeed, we recorded only four coalitions and 
neither mothers nor females without infants were seen to intervene. Furthermore, no juveniles or 
infants  were  involved  in  these  conflicts,  either  intentionally  or  accidentally.  In  contrast,  and 
mainly outside the mating season, some of the immigrant males seized every opportunity to attack 
mother/infant pairs or unweaned and unattended infants without any provocation from the females 
(pers. obs.). None of these males had been seen mating with any of the group’s females the 
previous  year  (Benetton  et  al.  in  prep.).  These  same  males  hardly  ever  targeted  juveniles  or 
females without infants. Resident males, in contrast, were more likely to attack females without 
infants than mothers of dependent infants. Hence, the pattern of conflicts performed by the males 
in our group tends to validate the sexually selected hypothesis rather than the by-product one. 
Resident males’ frequent counter-attacks probably made the infanticidal costs particularly 
high for immigrant male attackers. Beside the risks of getting injured, the intensive chases they 
had to flee from were likely to be energetically costly. However, if the costs were not negligible, 
at times, the menstrual cycles of up to four females were synchronised. It allowed up to four high-
ranking  males  to  form  consortships  simultaneously.  As  predicted  by  the  sexually  selected 
hypothesis, most of the immigrating male attackers rose in the male hierarchy quickly after they 
entered the group. Two of them even reached the alpha position during the course of the study and 
increased their chances of siring the females’ next offspring, as male ranks and mounting success 
tend to be correlated. 
During our study, one infant died before reaching one month old. A few days before the 
infant’s death, the mother was seen with a large and infected wound on her leg. At the same time, 
the infant held its head on a strange angle and showed a general weakening which started with an 
abnormal lethargy (indifference to surrounding group members). As we did not witness how the 
mother and her infant were injured, we cannot give any evidence that this was the consequence of  
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a direct attack by a male. However, the mother had been attacked regularly before her infant died 
(8 attacks in 12 days) but was rarely attacked thereafter (4 attacks in the remaining 179 days). She 
displayed a large sexual swelling within a month after the loss of her infant while mothers with 
surviving  infants  did  not.  During  the  mating  period,  she  was  also  seen  mating  with  the  two 
immigrant male attackers that reached the alpha position. In this respect immigrant males that rose 
in the male hierarchy were able to gain sexual access to a receptive mother and our results are in 
agreement with many other studies supporting the sexual selection-hypothesis of infanticide. 
 
Mothers’ counter-strategies: counter-attacks and cooperation with potential fathers 
As expected with the sexually selected hypothesis, mothers developed strategies that seemed to 
reduce infanticidal risks. First, they regularly counter-attacked immigrant male attackers during 
the  infant's  vulnerable  period  despite  a  sexual  dimorphism  that  largely  favours  males  during 
aggression. Indeed males are larger, heavier and have longer canines and mangabey females, as 
many other primate females (Hrdy 1977, Palombit 1999), seem to fail to form effective coalitions 
against males. We recorded only five occurrences during which some females helped mothers. 
However, if these mutual supports were rare, they involved at least from two to six other females 
and did not seem correlated to matrilineal affiliations. Counter-attacks by females can probably 
only partially reduce the risk of infanticide. 
Resident adult males, however, that mated with the female and therefore were potential 
sires, can provide considerable support for a mother against a potential infanticidal male (Hrdy 
1979).  Resident  males  who  had  been  observed  mating  with  the  females  the  previous  year 
(Benetton et al. in prep.), strongly supported both infant/mother pairs and stray infants, and were 
sometimes seen to groom the aggressed mothers after they had been attacked by immigrant males 
(24.3% of the cases). These protective males were among the oldest and the highest-ranking males 
of the group. Furthermore, mothers were recorded in close proximity of at least one resident male 
during  the  period  of  infant  vulnerability,  while  they  avoided  immigrant  males.  Our  findings  
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therefore corroborate the results of some other studies on infanticide (e.g. Palombit et al. 1997, 
Borries et al. 1999b, Palombit 1999, 2000, Janson 2000), the mother/resident male cooperation is 
therefore likely to be the key to reducing infanticide risk in sooty mangabeys. 
 
Conclusions 
Infanticide in mangabeys really follows model’s predictions step-by-step. Firstly, male 
attackers  were  usually  immigrant  males.  They  had  no  history  of  mating  with  the  mothers  of 
unweaned infant they targeted and they managed to reach a position in the male hierarchy that 
allowed them to have privileged accesses to receptive females. Secondly, protective males were 
resident and old males. The previous mating season, they were seen to mate with the mothers of 
unweaned infants. Thirdly, after the birth of their infants and to reduce infanticidal risks, mothers 
used  behavioural  counter-strategies  such  as  staying  in  the  close  vicinity  of  protective  males. 
Eventually,  it  would  be  interesting  to  investigate  whether  mangabey  females  also  developed 
counter-strategies prior to the conception of the infants. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Sooty mangabeys have a clear mating season during which males are expected to compete over 
receptive  females,  both  by  fighting  over  access  to  females  as  well  as  by  gaining  favours  of 
females  through  affiliative  behaviours.  In  this  study,  we  investigated  the  relations  between 
grooming sessions and sexual activities in a group of sooty mangabeys from the Taï forest, Ivory 
Coast. We compared the length of grooming bouts adult males and females exchanged with each 
other according to the receptive state of the female. In contrast to most species, we found that 
females were the active gender seeking for sexual opportunities while males only concentrated 
their sexual effort towards females displaying maximal tumescence. Most of grooming sessions 
were not reciprocated by males but directly followed or preceded by mating. Females tended to 
groom low-ranking males before they mate, while high-ranking males were groomed after the 
mount. Furthermore, females gave longer grooming bouts to males when they were receptive than 
when they were not. However while they were receptive, the length of the bouts decreased when 
they were close to ovulation (stage 4 sexual swelling) and when more males were available in the 
group. These findings demonstrate that grooming-sex exchanges in mangabeys follow biological 
market  predictions  as  supply  and  demand  as  well  as  partners’  intrinsic  value  influence  the 
grooming durations. Hence in mangabeys, females compete for access to certain males, probably 
because  resident  males  function  as  a  protective  shield  against  infanticidal  males  and  because 
multi-male mating is thought to deter infanticide through paternity confusion.  
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In primates with multi-male - multi-female groups and clear reproductive seasons, the operational 
sex ratio (OSR; Emlen & Oring 1977) is almost always skewed in favour of the females. This 
implies that male reproductive success is likely to be limited by the access to receptive females 
and that there will thus be heavy competition among males over access to such females. This can 
either take the form of contest competition whereby females passively accept the winner of the 
competition, or a competition for the favours of females, with females playing a more active role 
by choosing their preferred partners. However, some males may use one or more forms of sexual 
coercion, such as mate guarding, forced copulation and infanticide (Niemeyer & Anderson 1983, 
Smuts & Smuts 1993, Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995, van Schaik & Janson 2000). This, in turn, 
may make the access to certain males that can offer protection an important source of competition 
among  females.  Some  authors  (Rubenstein  1986;  Wrangham  &  Rubenstein  1986;  Wrangham 
1987) formulated the “hired gun” hypothesis in which they predicted that some males would 
indirectly  enhance  their  chance  of  mating  by  choosing  to  actively  defend  resources  during 
intergroup  encounters:  receptive  females  would  preferentially  mate  with  males  that  defend 
resources  (Fashing  2001).  Other  authors  (Palombit  1999,  2000;  Palombit  et  al.  2001) 
demonstrated that male - female bonding considerably reduced infanticidal risk in some species: 
potential fathers helped mothers to protect infants against aggressive males (see also Fruteau et al. 
2010). 
Hence, sexual relationships can be seen as a form of cooperative exchange between two 
individuals driven by conflicting interests. Under this scope, biological market theory (Noë & 
Hammerstein 1994, 1995) may be an interesting framework to investigate how economic rules 
can influence both social and sexual interactions occurring among and between trader classes. 
Males would constitute one trader class and females would form the other class. The dynamic of 
exchanges between the two classes would follow basic market laws such as: a) partner choice 
depends on expectations of better profits an individual can get with a partner rather than with 
another  and  b)  the  supply  and  demand  market  law  determines  the  values  of  the  exchanged  
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commodities (Noë 2001). Furthermore, competition over access to the rare partners would be 
expected among the members of the more common trading class and would increase the value of 
the exchanged commodity (Noë 2001). 
Recent studies produced contradictory results on how well biological market may explain 
exchanges in primates (e.g. Barrett et al. 1999; Henzi & Barrett 2002; Payne et al. 2003; Schino et 
al. 2003; Manson et al. 2004; Gumert 2007a; Schino et al. 2007; Gumert & Ho 2008; Frank & 
Silk 2009; Fruteau et al. 2009; Tiddi et al. 2010). However, many of them demonstrated that 
grooming could be traded against grooming (e.g. Barrett et al. 1999; Manson et al. 2004) or 
against other commodities, such as access to infants (e.g. Henzi & Barrett 2002; Fruteau et al. 
resubmitted), access to appetent food (e.g. Ventura et al. 2006; Fruteau et al. 2009) and even 
tolerance (e.g. Barrett et al. 1999; Payne et al. 2003; Gumert & Ho 2008). Barrett & Henzi (2001) 
predicted that grooming could also be exchanged against compliance of mates. They expected that 
males would be the ideal gender to exchange grooming with mating as sexual selection theory 
emphasizes  on  males’  aptitude  to  develop  costly  traits  and/or  skills  to  attract  mates.  More 
specifically, they argued that males could use grooming to bond with a female thereby enhancing 
their chances to mate with her afterwards. Following this lead, Gumert investigated the factors 
influencing sexual relationships in long-tailed macaques (2007b) and was the first to produce 
direct evidence that grooming could be exchanged against mating (see also for indirect evidences: 
e.g. Hemelrijk et al. 1992; Colmenares et al. 2002). He expected long-tailed macaques to be an 
ideal species to test market predictions on male’s grooming investments, as males seemed to 
usually initiate sexual relationships while females seemed to mainly select the appropriate partner. 
He found that males indeed groomed females in order to secure sexual relationships and that 
proximate economic factors such as the supply of receptive females or the value of a partner, 
affected males’ grooming investments. 
As  for  longtailed  macaques,  sooty  mangabey  (Cercocebus  atys)  females  present 
exaggerated anoperineal sexual swellings. In many species, females’ receptivity is not accurately  
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predicted by their swellings. However, in species with exaggerated swelling such as mangabeys, 
the maximum perineal tumescence (stage 4) usually corresponds with the periovulatory phase of 
their sexual cycle (Whitten & Russell 1996, Nunn 1999). Hence, the different stages of swelling 
constitute a convenient graded signal to estimate the period when females are sexually receptive 
and to accurately estimate the number of receptive females in the group at any time. Even though 
mangabeys have a clear reproductive season, in the year we performed this study, only up to six 
females  over  28  could  be  synchronously  receptive.  At  times,  up  to  12  adult  males  and  18 
adolescent  males  were  present  in  the  group.  This  set  up  makes  male  competition  a  strong 
possibility. It should allow to investigate whether males use grooming as a commodity to secure a 
mating  and  consequently  to  investigate  whether  market  rules  influence  males  grooming 
investments. However, in this species, if females remain in their natal group, males emigrate. 
Numerous non-resident males enter groups prior to and during the mating season and are usually 
aggressively  targeting  mother/young  infant  pairs.  As  a  consequence,  mangabey  females  use 
several anti-infanticidal strategies. Mothers of young infants notably gather around resident males, 
who are also the putative fathers of the infants, and benefit from their active protection during 
conflicts engaged by the non-resident males (Fruteau et al. 2010). However, the females actually 
start their anti-infanticide efforts during the mating season prior to infant birth by engaging in 
multi-male  mating  in  order  to  confuse  paternity  (Wolff  &  Macdonald  2004).  Therefore,  and 
contrary to classical sexual selection predictions, the sexual market may concern females rather 
than males and investigation on females’ grooming investments toward specific males should not 
be neglected.  
In this study we thus observed the grooming and sexual behaviours of both adult males 
and  females.  Similarly  to  Gumert  (2007b),  we  first  determined  how  much  of  male-to-female 
grooming  and  of  female-to  male  grooming  were  directly  related  to  sexual  activities  such  as 
inspection of the sexual parts and/or mounts. In a second step if such grooming sessions could be 
observed, we tested whether they were really traded for sexual opportunities. More specifically we  
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predicted the following. 
 
Male competition 
We expected that if grooming sessions were traded for sex, males would mainly groom receptive 
females and invest in longer bouts when the grooming is directly associated with sexual activities. 
We expected that the value of each partner would influence the grooming durations: as high-
ranking males usually get better access to females (e.g. Collishaw & Dunbar 1991; de Ruiter & 
van  Hoof  1993)  they  should  invest  in  shorter  bouts  than  their  lower-ranking  counterparts. 
Similarly,  high-ranking  females  and  females  displaying  maximum  tumescence  should  benefit 
from the market and be groomed longer than lower-ranked females or females displaying the first 
swelling stages. Furthermore, as in all grooming markets, we expect the OSR to influence the 
exchange rate. We predict that males grooming investment toward females would be negatively 
influenced by the value of the OSR, i.e. numerous males would have to groom receptive females 
longer in order to mate and males would groom longer when few receptive females are available. 
 
Female competition 
If female competition intervenes in the sexual market, we predict that females would initiate 
grooming sessions with males more often when they display sexual swellings that when they do 
not. Furthermore, when receptive females groom males, males should increase their chance to 
mate. Similarly to male competition, females grooming investments should be influenced by each 
partner’s value as well as the OSR. Finally, as females’ competition over male access may reflect 
an  anti-infanticidal  strategy,  we  could  expect  that  they  bias  their  grooming  efforts  toward 
immigrant males or low-ranking males in order to multiply the mating and confuse paternity 
(graded-signal hypothesis, Nunn 1999; Wolff & Macdonald 2004). 
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METHODS 
Research areas and subjects 
We conducted this study in the Taï National Park in south-western Ivory Coast (6°20'N to 5°10'N 
and 4°20'W to 6°50’W) between November 1, 2001 and August 20, 2002. The park is one of the 
last remaining major block of West Africa primary forest and covers approximately 454,000 ha. 
The forest is classified as “tropical moist forest” (Whitmore 1990) with a mean annual rainfall of 
1875 mm, a mean annual temperature of 24°C (Taï Monkey Project data, 1991-1999) and a 
distinct dry season from December to March. At least twelve primate species, including sooty 
mangabeys, Cercocebus atys, live within its boundaries. The study group's home range covered an 
area of about 7 km
2, near the western border of the park. 
Our study group was well habituated to human observers prior to the start of the study and 
was followed from dawn to dusk by at least one observer during the entire study period. The 
group was not provisioned and we recognised all adult, subadult and infant members by facial 
features. During the study we observed 7-14 adult males, 35 adult females, about 70 juveniles and 
sub-adults. Seven infants were born between December 10, 2001 and March 10, 2002. One died 
on February 2, 2002. Seven of the adult males (“residents”) were present in the group over the 
entire study period. Altogether, seven other adult males (“non-residents”) joined the group for 
various periods of time during this period. Five of those (“immigrants” males) entered the group 
in February, stayed until the end of the study and integrated the male hierarchy. The two other 
non-resident males remained in the group for very short periods (from a couple of hours to a 
couple of days at a time). 
Adult females display exaggerated sexual swellings when entering receptive cycles. 
Exaggerated swellings start at stage 1 with a light pinkish oedema around the clitoris area, reach 
their peaks at stage 4 (about one week later and for two to three days) with a huge and bright red 
oedema covering the entire anoperineal area and then start to decrease to disappear after three to  
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two days. The complete swelling cycle lasts about two weeks. Even if females’ receptivity is not 
accurately predicted by their swellings, the maximum perineal tumescence (stage 4) corresponds 




We focused the data collection on adult females. We used the “approach/retreat” and 
“threat/retreat” unidirectional interactions to determine the female dominance hierarchy. It 
remained stable throughout the study period (linearity of the female rank order: MatMan test: χ
2
41 
= 447.89, p < 0.0001, h = 0.97, K = 0.97). We used both ad libitum and focal sampling 
observation techniques (Altmann 1974) to collect data on grooming sessions occurring between 
males and females. When grooming sessions occurred between males and receptive females, we 
recorded whether the grooming interaction was directly preceded or followed with sexual 
activities such as the inspection of sexual parts or mounts. We use the term “grooming session” 
for an uninterrupted interaction between two individuals. Each session can consist of one or more 
“grooming bouts”, i.e. a period over which a single individual grooms another without 
interruption. The length of grooming bouts was rounded to the 30 nearest seconds. A new bout 
was assigned when the direction of grooming changed and a new session when there was a ≥ 30 
seconds break between bouts. We used 15-min focal sampling with at least 60 min between 
consecutive samples of the same individual and 3 min between samples of different individuals. 
However, for the analyses we also used the focal samples that were at least 9-min long (89 
samples over 2272) if they were truncated because of the observer loosing the subject after an 
obstacle. For each focal animal, we recorded each minute on the minute (instantaneous sampling, 
Altmann 1974): the infant’s presence / absence and distance and the nearest adult female and male 
within 5 meters. Social interactions were recorded continuously (detailed ethogram in Range & 
Noë 2002). Due to limited visibility in the early evening, we opted for a sampling schedule from  
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7:00 to 16:00. We collected a total of 568 hours of focal samples for all of the 35 adult females 
(ranging from 63 to 65 per female). All females were followed at least once every three days and 
we randomized each female’s sampling to account for the time of day. Ad libitum data were 
recorded all day long (even while doing focal sampling on a subject) as soon as a social 
interaction (aggression, grooming, mount, etc.) occurring between two identified individuals was 
observed. Sexual swellings stages, births, immigrations, disappearances and encounters were 
recorded on a daily basis. 
 
Data analysis and statistics 
During the study period, 29 out of 35 adult females displayed at least one incomplete swelling 
cycle (they did not reach either the stage 4 or the stages 3 and 4). We extracted all grooming 
sessions in which adult males and females interacted and we sorted these sessions according to the 
receptivity stage of the female and the fact that grooming was directly linked to a sexual activity. 
We also extracted all the sexual activities occurring between adult partners. Tests were performed 
using R (version 2.10.1). The alpha-level was set 0.05. 
In a first step, we investigate how adult males and females interacted when females were 
receptive. We used binomial tests to compare the proportion of sexual activities initiated by males 
and females and to compare the proportion of each activity (inspection of sexual parts and 
mounts). We assumed that either gender would have the same probability to seek sexual favours 
and that partners would engage in both sexual activities with the same probability. We used G 
tests to compare the rate of grooming initiation performed by each gender when females were 
receptive and when they were not. During the reproductive period, we also used a G test to 
investigate the occurrence of grooming - sexual activity interactions when females were receptive 
or not. We considered that grooming and sex were directly associated when less than one minute 
separated both events. As we recorded many such associations in which grooming could happen 
prior to or after the mount, we investigated whether the identity of the male or more precisely, its  
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rank in the hierarchy, could explain the sequence of events by using a logistic regression 
following a binomial law. 
To test the effects of both females’ receptivity and of the OSR on females’ grooming 
investment, we used a linear mixed-effect beyond optimal model. We used the duration of 
grooming (in seconds) given by the females as the dependant variable. For each grooming point, 
we used as fixed effects: the swelling stage of the female (ranging from 1 to 4) and the OSR 
value. For the OSR, we counted from 1 to 6 receptive females and from 10 to 12 males at times. 
We inserted the identity of the females as a random effect on the intercept to prevent 
pseudoreplication. Furthermore, we log-transformed the grooming durations so the model’s 
residuals were normally distributed, and in order to compare the respective impact of each effect, 
we standardised the data set. 
 
RESULTS 
Sexual activities and grooming patterns 
 
  Swelling stage 0  Swelling stages 1-3  Swelling stage 4 
Female initiated  0  376  86 
Male initiated  0  125  234 
Total    0  501  320 
Table 1. Sexual activities initiation according to the receptive stages of the adult females. 
  
During our study we recorded 821 sexual activities occurring between adult males and females 
(Table 1; Fig.1). When females were not fully receptive (stages 1 to 3), they initiated sexual 
activities  significantly  more  often  than  males  (Nfemales  =  376,  Nmales  =  125,  observed 
proportion for females: 0.75, theoretical proportion: 0.5, p < 0,001) and the activities mainly 
consisted in the presentation of their sexual parts so that males could inspect them (Ninspections = 
327, Nmounts = 174, observed proportion for inspections: 0.65, theoretical proportion: 0.5, p < 
0,001). However, when females presented maximum tumescence, males initiated sexual activities  
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more often than females (Nfemales = 86, Nmales = 234, observed proportion for males: 0.73, 
theoretical  proportion:  0.5,  p  <  0,001)  and  the  activities  mainly  switched  from  inspection  to 
mounts (Ninspections = 21, Nmounts = 299, observed proportion for mounts: 0.93, theoretical 
proportion: 0.5, p < 0,001). 
 
Pair  Initiator Female   Initiator Male  Total   Reciprocation 
RecF-ResM  110  17  124  4 
RecF-ImM  49  6  55  5 
NonRecF-ResM  33  3  36  32 
NonRecF-ImM  25  38  63  47 
Table 2. Number of grooming interactions initiated by both adult males and females during the mating 
period.  RecF  =  receptive  female;  NonRec  =  non  receptive  female;  ResM  =  resident  male;  ImM  = 
Immigrant male. 
 
During the mating season, we recorded 281 grooming sessions between adult males and 
females: 99 sessions occurred between males and non-receptive females and 182, between males 
and receptive females (Table 2). When females were receptive, grooming sessions with immigrant 
males were mainly initiated by females (49 of 55 sessions). This significantly changed from when 
they were not receptive as they initiated only 25 of 63 sessions (G = 7.134, df = 1, p = 0.0075). 
Conversely, for resident males no such effect of the females’ receptivity was apparent: when 
females were receptive they initiated 110 of 127 sessions and when they were not receptive, they 
initiated 33 of 36 sessions. Hence the proportion of grooming sessions initiated by females was 
comparable (G = 0.043, df = 1, p = 0.836). 
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Figure 1. A- Number of sexual activities initiated by each gender. B- Proportion of each sexual activities 
according to the females’ receptivity. ** represents a p < 0.001 (binomial tests). 
 
Females’ receptivity also affected grooming reciprocity within a session. Immigrant males 
groomed back females significantly more often when they were not receptive (47 of 63 sessions) 
than when they were receptive (5 of 55 sessions) (G = 24.783, df = 1, p < 0.001). We found 
similar effect with resident males: they reciprocated grooming more often when females were not 
receptive (32 of 36 sessions) than when they were receptive (4 of 127) (G = 58.339, df = 1, p < 
0.001) (Fig. 2A). 
Furthermore, the probability that a grooming session and a sexual activity were associated 
was P = 231/821 = 0.28. Only one of the 99 sessions with non-receptive females was followed by 
a  sexual  activity  while  theoretically  such  association  should  have  occurred  27.9  times.  With 
receptive females, 172 of the 182 sessions were either preceded or followed by a sexual activity, 
which contrasted with the 51.2 theoretical occurrences. Hence, grooming with receptive females 
secured significantly more sexual opportunities than grooming with non-receptive females (G = 
68.407, df = 1, p < 0.001). 
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Figure 2. A- Amount of grooming sessions reciprocated or not by males. Data were separated between 
immigrant and resident males and consist on the amount of grooming sessions that males reciprocated or 
not when females were receptive or when they were not receptive (G tests). B- Influence of male ranks on 
the  period  females  groomed  them  in  exchange  for  mating.  White  circles  represent  the  proportion  of 
grooming sessions taking place after the mating while black circles represent grooming sessions occurring 
prior  to  the  mating.  Circle  sizes  represent  each  male  contribution  for  both  cases  of  grooming.  *** 
represents a p < 0.0001 (logistic regression). 
 
Finally, for all males combined, 97 grooming sessions occurred directly before the sexual 
activity and 75 took place directly after. Females groomed higher-ranking males significantly 
more often after the mating while they groomed lower-ranking males significantly more often 
before (logistic regression: z = 5.561, p < 0.0001) (Fig. 2B). 
 
Grooming, sexual swelling and male availability 
During  the  mating  period,  of  the  182  grooming  sessions  occurring  between  adult  males  and 
receptive  females,  we  observed  36  sessions  taking  place  with  females  displaying  a  stage  4 
swelling,  54  sessions  with  females  in  stage  3  swelling,  50  sessions  with  females  in  stage  2 
swelling and 42 sessions with females in stage 1 swelling. When receptive females displayed a 
stage 1 or a stage 2 swelling, they groomed males significantly longer than when they were not 
receptive (respectively: U = 1066.000, p < 0.001 and U = 1974.000, p = 0.042). Conversely, when 
they displayed a stage 4 swelling, they groomed males significantly less than when they were not  
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receptive (U = 1374.000, p = 0.040). When they displayed stage 3 swellings, they groomed males 





Figure  3.  Comparison  of  average  grooming  bout  lengths  females  invested  into  males  during  the 
reproductive period. We compared their investment when they were receptive or not and according to their 
swelling stages. Average lengths are given in seconds. Swelling stages are from 4 to 1, 4 being the swelling 
climax surrounding ovulation and 1 the very first and very last steps of the sexual cycle. ** represents a p < 
0.001 and * represents a p < 0.05 (Mann Whitney U tests). 
 
Effects  Value  Std Error  DF  t-value  p-value 
Intercept (Residual: 0.3979922 
                 StdDev: 0.08006741)  0.0123985  0.03559655  143  0.348306  0.7281 
Swelling stage  -0.5541470  0.03161071  143  -17.530355  0.0000 
OSR  0.7844312  0.03110411  143  25.219534  0.0000 
Swelling stage & OSR  -0.1314553  0.03190534  143  -4.120165  0.0001 
 
Table 1. Summary of the linear mixed-effect beyond optimal model – significant effects are double-cycled 
and in bold. 
Fixed effects: log (grooming time) ~ Swelling stage * OSR | random effect on the intercept: Identity of 
Female – AIC: 205.233  
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From one to six receptive females and from 10 to 12 males were observed simultaneously 
in the group at any time. The grooming contributions of receptive females were highly influenced 
by both their swelling stage and the OSR (beyond optimal linear model: AIC; Table 1). Females 
groomed males significantly longer when they were in a stage 1 swelling than when they had a 
swelling of higher stage (value = -0.507, p < 0.0001). They also groomed significantly longer 
when the OSR was higher, i.e. when less males were available (value = 0.778, p < 0.0001). The 
combined effect of swelling and OSR revealed that when females displayed stage 4 swellings, 




Figure 4. Average in seconds of grooming length receptive females invested into males in exchange for 
mating and according to the OSR. Each OSR depends on the number of adult males (from 10 to 12) and on 
the number of receptive females (from 1 to 6) at times in the group. Each average grooming value is given 
according to the swelling stage the female was displaying. 
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DISCUSSION 
Females’ interest in seeking for sexual opportunities 
In sooty mangabeys, males and females sexual roles were not as classical as in other primate 
species  such  as  longtailed  macaques.  For  instance,  adult  males  were  eager  to  initiate  sexual 
relationships and consortships only when females presented maximum swellings. Then the sexual 
activities mainly consisted in mounts. When they were not fully receptive (stages 1 to 3), and in 
stark contrast with macaque females, mangabey females seemed to be the active gender seeking 
for sexual opportunities: they repeatedly presented their sexual parts to males so that males could 
inspect them, often masturbated after a male refusal to mate and produced loud copulation calls 
that attracted surrounding males (unpublished data). Furthermore females seemed to use grooming 
sessions as a strategy to promote some mating. First, they were shown to act differently toward 
immigrant males than toward resident males in term of grooming initiation. Indeed with resident 
males, they initiated grooming sessions about as often when they were receptive than when they 
were not. With immigrant males, they initiated the sessions more often when they were receptive. 
Second,  males,  both  residents  and  immigrants,  were  shown  to  hardly  reciprocate  grooming 
sessions when females were receptive, which contrasted with the classical grooming pattern we 
recorded when females were not displaying sexual swellings. In such case, males would also 
groom females. Third, receptive females’ grooming secured sexual activities prior to or after the 
grooming session while non-receptive females’ grooming did not lead to any sexual opportunity. 
The difference in how females reacted to resident and immigrant males may be explained 
by the different nature of their relationships. In a previous study, females and resident males were 
shown to actively cooperate to reduce infanticidal risks (Fruteau et al. 2010). Hence, females may 
use  grooming  to  keep  the  bond  with  certain  males  intact.  In  the  case  of  non-resident  males 
however, females may initiate grooming sessions when they are receptive in exchange for multi-
male  mating  (MMM:  Wolff  &  Macdonald  2004).  Multi-male  mating  is  thought  to  enhance 
paternity confusion and thereby deters infanticide risks. When females are not receptive however,  
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immigrant males may try to form bonds with females in order to be accepted in the group. In this 
case, they are the gender looking for the social contact. 
The MMM hypothesis may also explain for the moment receptive females chose to groom 
males: they groomed higher-ranked males more often after the mount but groomed lower-ranked 
males more often prior to the mating. Mangabey females give loud copulation calls directly after 
the mount, which attracts other males (unpublished data). We observed that when females were 
displaying  very  tumescent  swellings  (stages  3  and  4),  high-ranking  males  would  replace  the 
previous male and mate with the female (203 cases, unpublished data). Hence, low-ranking males 
were not able to stay close to receptive females after the call. 
 
Grooming-mating exchanges 
The  mating  period  was  particularly  interesting  as  the  number  of  males  present  and  females 
simultaneously receptive often fluctuated throughout the period. Hence the ratio available males 
per receptive females varied from day to day and it was possible to determine its influence on 
females’ grooming investments. Analyses revealed that receptive females groomed males longer 
when  there  were  fewer  available  males  in  the  group.  This  suggests  that  grooming-for-sex 
exchanges followed the market law of supply and demand and that the value of males could vary 
throughout  time  according  to  their  availability.  However,  the  multiple  factors  influencing 
grooming durations showed that not only supply and demand ratios determined the price of the 
exchange. Females also varied their grooming investment according to their receptive status. This 
seemed to contrast with previous results found in longtailed macaques in which swelling stages 
did  not  affect  the  way  males  valued  females.  In  mangabeys  however,  if  females  exchanged 
grooming for mating when they were receptive, they groomed males significantly longer when 
they  were  at  the  first  stages  of  their  sexual  cycles.  The  amount  of  grooming  they  gave  was 
definitely higher than when they were not receptive, showing that the value females attributed to 
mating was higher than the value they attributed to receiving grooming. However, when females  
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displayed stage 4 swellings, their grooming investments decreased noticeably. This may suggest 
that females were conscious of their intrinsic value. A second effect may have also interfered with 
females’ strategies to access males and multiply the mating: males’ competition for access to 
receptive females. Indeed, when females displayed stage 4 swellings they were close to ovulation. 
Contrary to longtailed macaques, mangabey adult males reacted to the maximum tumescence and 
were shown to initiate the sexual activities. They would also engage in mate guarding females, 
reducing the other males’ access. This males’ form of sexual coercion (Smuts & Smuts 1993) 
would counteract female mate choice and it may not be so effective for females to invest in much 
grooming during this period. 
Interestingly, from a situation in which competition for access to a partner is the norm to 
accomplish sex, grooming seems to facilitate the cooperative state of the partner. Indeed if males 
are not eager to engage in any sexual activities with females when they do not display maximum 
tumescence,  they  change  their  mind  if  grooming  is  part  of  the  foreplay.  Hence,  sexual 
relationships in mangabeys form an interesting market paradigm in which females’ strategies to 
multiple mating follow some of the biological market predictions. Females as well as males seem 
to accurately evaluate their immediate and fluctuating social environment and choose the amount 
of their investment on partners accordingly. Effects such as the availability of partners or their 
intrinsic  value  influence  the  way  the  exchanges  are  performed  either  in  terms  of  grooming 
durations or in terms of grooming-sex sequence.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
Animals  neither  negotiate  verbally  nor  conclude  binding  contracts,  but  nevertheless  regularly 
exchange goods and services without overt coercion and manage to arrive at agreements over 
exchange rates. Biological market theory predicts that such exchange rates fluctuate according to 
the  law  of  supply  and  demand.  Previous  studies  showed  that  primates  pay  more  when 
commodities become scarcer: subordinates groomed dominants longer before being tolerated at 
food sites in periods of shortage; females groomed mothers longer before obtaining permission to 
handle their infants when there were fewer newborns and males groomed fertile females longer 
before  obtaining  their  compliance  when  fewer  such  females  were  present.  We  further 
substantiated these results by conducting a two-step experiment in two groups of free-ranging 
vervet monkeys in the Loskop Dam Nature Reserve, South-Africa. We first allowed a single low-
ranking female to repeatedly provide food to her entire group by triggering the opening of a 
container and measured grooming bouts involving this female in the hour after she made the 
reward available. We then measured the shifts in grooming patterns after we added a second food 
container that could be opened by another low-ranking female, the second provider. All four 
providers received more grooming, relative to the amount of grooming they provided themselves. 
As biological market theory predicts, the initial gain of first providers was partially lost again after 
the introduction of a second provider in both groups. We conclude that grooming was fine-tuned 
to changes in the value of these females as social partners.  
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Trading in humans and cooperation in animals are part of a continuum in which both human and 
non-human agents usually have to take three crucial steps: (1) choose a partner, (2) determine how 
much to invest in order to obtain the desired commodities and (3) prevent being short-changed by 
the  chosen  partner.  While  research  in  economics  traditionally  concentrates  on  factors  that 
determine  the  price  of  commodities,  quantitative  aspects  have  gained  much  less  attention  in 
studies of non-human cooperation (Noë 2005). Over the past decades, cooperation research has 
mainly focused on the question of partner control rather than on the relative values of goods and 
services  exchanged.  By  contrast,  the  biological  market  paradigm (Noë  &  Hammerstein  1994, 
1995) focuses on the link between steps (1) and (2) and predicts that the law of supply and 
demand  affects  the  exchange  rates  in  non-human  'trading'  in  a  similar  fashion  as  in  human 
economic exchanges. Here we test this prediction in two wild vervet monkey groups by measuring 
changes in grooming patterns after experimentally changing the number of individuals that could 
provide food to their group. 
We envisage the exchange of commodities in primate groups as trading on a market with 
exchange rates fluctuating from day to day depending on supply and demand. Monkeys trading 
goods and services have to agree on exchange rates in order to avoid overt conflicts, but lack the 
option of negotiating verbally and concluding binding contracts. Not all commodities exchanged 
among non-human primates can be adapted in quantity or quality during each interaction, but one 
service, grooming, can be adjusted easily. Grooming can be exchanged against grooming itself, 
but also against other goods or services, lending it currency-like characteristics. Commodities 
bought with grooming include tolerance at food sites (de Waal 1997; Barrett et al 2002; Henzi et 
al. 2003; Ventura et al. 2006; Chancellor & Isbell 2008; Port et al. 2008), access to newborns 
(Henzi & Barrett 2002; Gumert 2007a), compliance of females (Gumert 2007b), and support in 
conflicts  (Hemelrijk  1994;  Watts  2002;  Koyama  et  al.  2006),  although  results  on  grooming-
support exchanges have been mixed (Hemelrijk 1991; Silk et al. 2004; Schino 2007). Monkeys do 
not necessarily track value fluctuations for each commodity on the market separately, however,  
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but they may change their general attitude towards group members (de Waal 2000) in accordance 
with  the  accumulated  value  of  the  different  commodities  each  one  of  them  has  on  offer. 
Mechanistically  the  value  attributed  to  a  partner  is  likely  to  be  expressed  in  physiological 
parameters such as titers of neurohormones and neurotransmitters implicated in trust and pair 
bonding (Keverne 1999; Kosfeld et al. 2005; Morhenn et al. 2008; Donalson & young 2008; 
Baumgartner 2008; Dunbar 2009). 
We created an artificial market in two groups of wild vervet monkeys in the Loskop Dam 
Nature Reserve (South-Africa) and caused sudden changes in the market value of a few animals in 
such a way that these affected all other group members and could easily be perceived by them. 
After an initial phase in which we gathered baseline data on grooming (phase 0), we allowed a 
single low ranking female in each study group to produce a bonanza of food for herself and her 
group members by triggering the opening of a container in 16 trials spread over a period of 9 
weeks (phase 1). These first two stages resemble a study previously done in captivity with long-
tailed macaques (Stammbach 1988). In that experiment, a single individual that could produce a 
small food reward and share it with up to two other animals experienced an increase in social 
status. We developed this paradigm further to show the quantitative effects of a shift in supply on 
grooming patterns. This requires either a manipulation of the amount of reward per provider or of 
the number of providers. We opted for the latter approach since it is very hard to control the 
amount of food each individual will obtain once the provider made it available. In phase 2 of the 
experiment we therefore introduced a second provider in each group, another low ranking female 
with a second food container that only she could open. The same amount of food (5 apples per 
trial sliced in small pieces) was now divided over the two containers that were made available 
simultaneously, but that were not necessarily opened simultaneously. In economic terms we thus 
replaced a monopoly by a duopoly. Agents enjoying a monopoly should obtain stronger leverage 
over their exchange partners than members of a competitive duopoly. This leads to our main 
prediction: grooming ratios should increase in favor of the provider in phase 1 and decrease again  
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with the introduction of a competitor in phase 2, as depicted in Fig. 1A. We used the ratio of 
grooming given relative to grooming received as our main parameter, because we expected that 
group members could pay the providers both by grooming them more and by demanding less 
grooming from them. 
There is considerable discussion about the function of grooming in primates. A first basic 
assumption is that grooming entails a net cost to the groomer and provides a net benefit to the 
groomee. In free-ranging groups, grooming is very likely to have an opportunity cost in the form 
of lost foraging time and lowered vigilance (Lehmann et al. 2007). Captive animals, in contrast, 
sometimes groom excessively, out of boredom, or in the form of a pathological stereotypy, thus 
removing the incentives to reduce grooming payments to a minimum. However, even in the wild 
primates groom each other much more than can be explained by its hygienic function, the most 
likely ultimate function of allo-grooming (Dunbar 2009). The proximate mechanisms that make 
monkeys  enjoy  being  groomed  include  the  release  of  several  neurotransmitters  and 
neurohormones  implicated  in  the  brain’s  reward  circuit,  analogous  to  the  reaction  of  human 
subjects to touch (Morhenn et al. 2008; Dunbar 2009). Enjoying being groomed is a bit like 
enjoying eating: the proximate mechanisms are such that the system easily overshoots the original 
ultimate goals. Additional functions may be served, such as building up fat reserves when eating, 
or strengthening the bonds between individuals when grooming. In primates the latter is now 
probably more important than the hygiene of the fur (Dunbar 2009). The crucial question here is 
not, however, what the exact function of grooming is, but whether grooming is sufficiently costly 
to underlie market forces, in the sense that animals prefer grooming another animal shorter rather 
than longer if the effect remains the same. We follow the tradition of estimating the amount of 
grooming by the length of time a grooming bout lasts. Although the value of a unit of grooming 
time may drop as the grooming bout progresses, it seems safe to assume that longer bouts have 
higher value than shorter ones within the same dyad. Expressing the value of grooming in time 
units also makes our results more easily comparable with a recently published formal market  
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model  that  used  time  units  to  express  the  value  of  services  (Lehmann  et  al.  2007).  We  felt 
confident that grooming patterns underlie market forces, since market effects had already been 
shown in several studies apart from our own (Henzi & Barrett 2002; Ventura et al. 2006; Gumert 
2007a, b; Chancellor & Isbell 2008; Port et al. 2008). 
We chose low ranking females as providers, since lower ranking individuals in primate 
species with clear dominance hierarchies tend to groom higher-ranking members of their group 
more than vice versa (among others Barrett et al 2002; Henzi et al. 2003; Barrett & henzi 2006; 
Chancellor & Isbell 2008; Port et al. 2008; Fruteau et al. in prep.). The reason behind this is that a 
dominant individual can offer several resources, apart from grooming, that the subordinate cannot 
match in value: support in agonistic conflicts, tolerance at resources or even simply restraint in 
aggression. We therefore expected to see much stronger effects in low ranking providers than in 
high-ranking ones.  
What  exactly  are  our  providers  offering  their  group  members?  Each  provider  opened  a 
container with enough pieces of apple to give every group member a good chance of getting hold 
of some food in a free-for-all determined mainly by dominance. At first sight, providers would not 
seem able to give food to some members more than to others. This means that partner control 
strategies, such as reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971) or tit-for-tat (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981) 
cannot play much of a role. Reciprocal altruism has been construed in a narrow and in a broad 
fashion. Models using the narrow interpretation, which are usually based on variations of the two-
player iterated prisoner’s dilemma, allow precise predictions about the behavioral contingencies 
of two partners in repeated interactions. The few studies in which these predictions have been 
tested in primates yielded negative results (Mellis et al. 2008; Brosnan et al. 2009). This narrow 
interpretation does not apply to our experiment, because a priori our providers cannot make a 
strategic choice that is simultaneously contingent on behavior of group members that treated them 
differently in the previous ‘round’.  
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In  a  much  broader  interpretation,  reciprocal  altruism  encompasses  all  forms  of  partner 
control mechanisms in which individuals reward or punish their partners on the basis of past 
behavior. One way in which our providers could give some group members an advantage over 
others is by making the timing of opening contingent on the past behavior of the group members 
near the container, assuming that being near gives a competitive advantage. This way the provider 
could, to a limited extent, individualize the commodity offered. This still does not mean that 
providers can play dyadic games with all their group members simultaneously, but they could 
exert  some  partner  choice  this  way.  Partner  choice  is  the  core  mechanism  driving  biological 
markets, but is not taken into account in reciprocal altruism and other partner control models.  
In summary, these considerations lead us to expect: (i) baseline grooming ratios to be 
skewed in favor of more dominant individuals; (ii) grooming patterns to change strongly in favor 
of  the  first  providers,  but  to  become  less  favorable  again  when  the  second  providers  are 
introduced; (iii) providers to open the containers preferably in the presence of those grooming 
them most.  
 
RESULTS 
The grooming ratio can shift in favor of a provider in several ways: either the provider can groom 
less or her group members can groom her more, or both. It is perhaps easier to adjust a grooming 
ratio to one's own advantage by grooming less than by persuading the other to groom longer, but 
this  does  not  warrant  strong  predictions  about  shifts  in  absolute  grooming  bout  lengths.  We 
therefore used grooming ratios per dyad, calculated as time-being-groomed minus time-spent-
grooming  divided  by  total-grooming-time,  which  yields  values  between  -1and  1.  In  the 
experimental phases, grooming data were recorded during one hour after the containers were 
opened. We had expected to see changes in grooming patterns before the containers were opened 
too, but in practice we could not measure this. Early in the series of trials the animals were too 
excited to sit down for a grooming session with food visible in the closed container and at a later  
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stage the providers often opened the containers almost immediately, leaving no time for grooming 
sessions (see table S1 in the supporting information). 
In the pre-experimental phase 0 we measured baseline grooming ratios, which were highly 
correlated with the relative rank difference of the corresponding dyads (Mantel Test (de Vries et 
al. 1993), combined probabilities (Sokal & Rohlf 1995): χ
2=25.69, p<0.001), i.e. the larger the 
rank difference, the more lopsided the grooming effort was in favor of the dominant. 
 
Figure 1. Mean estimates of the grooming ratios for the food provider. Expected effects (A). In phase 0 of 
the experiment each individual has a specific grooming ratio of grooming received versus grooming given. 
In  phase  1  (monopoly)  the  grooming  ratio  of  the  single  food  provider  should  increase  (reward  for 
providing). But, as soon as an additional provider is introduced in phase 2 (duopoly), the grooming ratio of 
the first provider should decrease again as a consequence of the increased supply of food providers (market 
effect). Schematic representation of the three experimental phases (B-D). Probability density (PD) function 
of mean estimates for grooming ratios of non-providers (blue), first provider (orange) and second provider 
(red) in phase 0 with no provider (E,H), phase 1 with one provider (F,I) and phase 2 with two providers 
(G,J) for the Donga Group (E-G) and Picnic Group (H-J). 
 
The  grooming  ratios  of  the  providers  differed  significantly  among  the  three  phases 
(Friedman  Test,  combined  probabilities,  first  provider:  χ
2=26.25,  p<0.001,  second  provider: 
χ
2=18.59, p<0.001). After showing that the overall experiment yielded a highly significant result, 
we proceeded with a number of post-hoc Sign tests. The grooming ratios for the first providers in  
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each group changed according to expectation (Fig. 1A): the ratio increased significantly in favor 
of the provider from the non-test phase 0 to test phase 1 (single provider; χ
2=15.25, p<0.01). 
Grooming ratios for the first provider dropped significantly again when the second provider was 
added in phase 2 (χ
2=15.25, p<0.01), but remained significantly above the control values of phase 
0 (χ
2=15.25, p<0.01). As expected, the grooming ratios for the second providers did not change 
significantly between phase 0 and 1 (χ
2=3.54, ns), but their ratios shot up when they became 
providers themselves in phase 2 (χ
2=15.25, p<0.01). The provider effect was so strong that it more 
than counterbalanced the dominance effect. The strongly negative grooming ratios of the low 
ranking females we measured in phase 0 turned into positive values once they became providers. 
To evaluate whether these changes for providers were indeed outside the range of fluctuations 
found  in  the  non-providers  (e.g.  as  due  to  seasonal  changes),  we  estimated  mean  changes  in 
grooming ratios for both providers and non-providers using a hierarchical bootstrap re-sampling 
procedure to deal with dependencies among dyads (Efron 1982) (Fig. 1 I-J). The differences in 
grooming ratios between the non-test phase 0 and phase 1 were significantly greater for the first 
providers than for the group of non-providers (Donga Group: p< 0.0001, Picnic Group: p=0.0005, 
combined  probabilities:  χ
2=54.65,  p<0.001).  Grooming  ratios  increased  significantly  for  both 
second providers compared to the non-providers in phase 2 (Donga: p<0.001, Picnic: p=0.040, 
combined probabilities: χ
2=102.72, p<0.001). Comparing grooming differences between the non-
test phase and phase 2 we found a significant difference between the first provider and the group 
of non-providers in the Donga Group, but not in the Picnic Group (Donga: p=0.0029, Picnic: 
p=0.91, combined probabilities: χ
2=11.90, p<0.025).  
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Figure 2. Changes in dyadic grooming ratios. Difference between phase 1 and phase 0 for Donga Group 
(A), and Picnic Group (C), and difference between phase 2 and phase 0 for Donga Group, (B), and Picnic 
Group  (D).  Individuals  are  ordered  by  rank;  1  =  highest  ranking  animal.  Rows:  groomers,  columns: 
groomees. Values were calculated by subtracting grooming ratios of phase 0 from those of phase 1 or 2 
respectively. As original ratios were ranging between -1 and 1, differences could range between -2 (blue; 
maximum shift in favor of groomer) and 2 (orange; maximum shift in favor of groomee). First providers 
are indicated by orange arrows and the second producers by red arrows. 
 
These changes in grooming ratios were not due to a change in behavior of a few individuals, 
but visible in a broad range of dyadic relationships (Fig. 2). In 13 out of 15 dyads the providers 
groomed less in an absolute sense, compared to the pre-experimental phase. In four dyads, two in 
each group, the non-providers groomed the providers more. Three of these four were among the 
13 in which the non-providers were groomed less. 
We also verified whether providers attempted to give specific individuals a head start by 
opening the container preferentially in their presence. They could be expected to do so for two 
classes of individuals: (1) long-term friends or kin with whom they had a positive relationship and 
(2) animals that groomed them specifically in the context of the trials. Providers did not open the 
containers  preferentially  when  their  preferred  grooming  partners  from  phase  0  were  nearby 
(Donga Group: Spearman Rank Correlation: 1
st provider: rs=0.31, N=9, n.s., 2
nd provider: rs=0.52, 
N=9,  n.s.;  Picnic  Group:  Spearman  Rank  Correlation:  1
st  provider:  rs=0.13,  N=6,  n.s.,  2
nd 
provider: rs=-0.25, N=6, n.s.), but in both groups we found, in phase 1, that an individual that 
happened to be the nearest neighbor at the moment of opening was significantly more likely to 
groom  the  provider  (single  provider;  Donga  Group:  χ
2=33.69,  df=9,  p<0.001;  Picnic  Group:  
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χ
2=13.5, df=6, p=0.036; combined probabilities: χ
2=25.06 df=4, p<0.001). During test phase 2, 
this effect was also found for the first providers (combined probabilities for the 1
st providers of 
both groups: χ
2=10.33, df=4, n.s.), but not for the 2
nd providers (combined probabilities for the 2
nd 
providers: χ
2=6.38 df=4, n.s.). Thus, the first providers were likely to be engaged in grooming 
sessions with individuals that were near the container when it opened and thus probably got more 
food than latecomers (see Supporting Information for details of statistical tests). 
 
DISCUSSION 
In agreement with an earlier study (Stammbach 1988), we found that grooming ratios shifted to 
the advantage of female vervets that produced food bonanzas. Our crucial result, however, lies in 
the quantitative shifts of the exchange rate between grooming and providing food: the positive 
effect on the grooming ratios of the first providers was roughly half as strong after we added a 
second provider in each study group, confirming a central tenet of biological market theory (Noë 
& Hammerstein 1994, 1995; Lehmann et al. 2007). Similar market effects have hitherto only been 
reported for primates exchanging grooming for access to naturally occurring commodities (Barrett 
et al 2002; Henzi & Barrett 2002; Henzi et al. 2003; Gumert 2007a, b; Chancellor & Isbell 2008; 
Port et al. 2008).  
Grooming ratios were adapted rather quickly to changing circumstances and we therefore 
assume that this reflects strategic behavior that forms part of the natural repertoire of vervets. 
Allowing some animals to produce food sources for themselves and their group members by 
opening a container is obviously rather artificial. However, it is not necessarily uncommon or 
unnatural for a primate group to gain access to a large food source thanks to a single group 
member. Two phenomena come to mind: animals giving a food call after finding a large resource 
(Dittus 1984; Elgar 1986; Chapman 1990; Calne et al. 1995) and experienced ‘leaders’ (King & 
Cowlishaw (2009) guiding their group to crucial resources (Rowell 1972;Norton 1986; Byrne 
2000).  Neither  phenomenon  is  found  in  all  primates,  or  unique  to  primates,  but  both  are  
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sufficiently common to make the existence of mechanisms encouraging food providers likely. Our 
providers might be comparable to leaders, which in primates can be high as well as low ranking 
females (RN pers. obs. in savannah baboons; Norton 1986; Byrne 2000), since in both cases the 
same individual produces a communal resource repeatedly, thus giving their group members time 
to recognize their special skills. In all three cases, food calls, leading and our experiment, the 
animal producing the resource may act on purely selfish motives. Leaders and providers may 
forage for themselves and produce food for others as a by-product and food calls might only be 
given  upon  finding  large  and  shareable  resources  to  protect  the  caller  against  predators  by 
improving the ‘safety-in-numbers’ (Elgar 1986; Mangel 1990; King & Cowlishaw 2009). 
A provider can be expected to open the food container sooner or later out of pure self-
interest, as long as she gets some food herself without experiencing unusual harassment. Why 
would group members pay for something they would obtain by simply waiting long enough? We 
assume that vervets, like many other animals, discount future benefits and value a reward more 
the  sooner  it  becomes  available  (Stevens  &  Stephens  2008).  In  addition  there  was  a  clear 
opportunity cost of waiting near the closed food container, because the group could not continue 
its normal foraging routine. 
It seems reasonable to assume that only a limited amount of grooming - irrespective of who 
provides it - is needed to induce the providers to open their containers. In that case, each of the 
non-providers would have been better off if others provided all the grooming needed. The non-
providers  would  thus  be  caught  in  collective  action  dilemma,  a  situation  that  resembles  the 
notoriously unstable n-players Prisoner’s Dilemma (Rankin et al. 2007). So why did the whole 
group change its grooming behavior to the advantage of the providers or, in other words, how 
could an individual willing to groom the provider do better than an animal that did not groom her?  
The provider could make the timing of opening dependent on the presence or absence of 
specific  group  members.  The  providers  were  indeed  reluctant  to  open  their  container  in  the 
presence of high-ranking animals (Fruteau et al. in prep.). Providers were also more likely to be  
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groomed by non-providers that were near the containers at the moment they were opened than by 
non-providers  that  were  further  away.  We  see  four,  not  necessarily  mutually  exclusive, 
interpretations of this phenomenon: (1) those that ate more during a trial were more inclined to 
groom;  (2)  grooming  improved  long  term  bonds  and  the  providers  preferably  opened  the 
containers in the presence of group members they trusted; (3) grooming and opening the container 
were exchanged in a reciprocal altruism-like fashion and (4) grooming ratios reflected the stress 
level of the providers rather than their market value.  
(1) Grooming sessions often follow longer periods of foraging. A simple explanation would 
therefore be that those with fuller bellies were inclined to groom more. This can explain more 
grooming by those that obtained most of the resource, such as the provider and others near the 
container at the moment of opening, but this cannot explain the shifts in grooming ratios we 
observed.  
(2) Non-providers could have groomed the provider in order to improve their affiliative bond 
with  her.  Candidate  neurobiological  mechanisms  are  those  usually  connected  to  trust,  pair-
bonding and friendship, such as increased titers of oxytocin, vasopressin and endorphins, which 
notably follow friendly forms of touching (reviewed in Baumgartner 2008; Donalson & Young 
2008). The attitude towards a group member can be improved by any good or service received 
from that individual, but grooming is the standard service every vervet has handy. 
Grooming  to  gain  trust  reminds  of  a  mechanism  De  Waal  (2000)  labeled  ‘attitudinal 
reciprocity’,  which  stands  for  a  generalized  bookkeeping  mechanism  based  on  multiple 
interactions in which the more recent interactions tend to weigh more than those from a more 
distant past. ‘Attitudinal partner choice’ would be more accurate term in the present case, but the 
idea remains the same: the animals are assumed to be driven by emotions reminiscent of those felt 
by humans towards friends.  
(3) Grooming the provider can also be interpreted as contingent on the provider’s behavior, in 
other words the provider is pre-paid in the expectation of returns during the next trial. This would  
  116 
imply a more accurate form of bookkeeping in the sense of De Waal’s ‘calculated reciprocity’ 
(2000) and would suggest cognition to be in the driver’s seat. For this reciprocal altruism-like 
mechanism to work the groomers must have been willing to invest in a future reward that could be 
reaped one or more days later. Investments in uncertain returns over such long periods could be 
beyond the cognitive capacities of monkeys, however (Barrett et al. 2003). Calculating providers 
should have been ready to take spiteful decisions: not opening the container would have punished 
individuals that were not willing to shift the grooming ratios in favor of the provider, at a cost of 
the provider herself and those who groomed her. Alternatively the provider could have punished 
specific individuals by waiting till they were at some distance from the container. It is highly 
unlikely that our providers used this rather complicated tactic, however, because they opened the 
container almost immediately in the later trials (Table S1 in online material). 
(4) An explanation for dynamic changes of primate grooming patterns that does not invoke the 
law of supply and demand (Henzi & Barrett 2002; Slater et al. 2007) is based on the idea that the 
proximity of group members causes stress to those controlling interesting commodities. More 
attention  would  cause  more  stress,  which  in  turn  would  require  more  grooming  to  calm  the 
provider.  This  stress  hypothesis  has  notably  been  suggested  for  ‘baby  markets’:  the  level  of 
anxiety  of  mothers  would  increase  with  the  number  of  females  vying  for  their  infants 
simultaneously  and  the  amount  of  grooming  needed  to  calm  her  would  increase  accordingly 
(Henzi & Barrett 2002; Slater et al. 2007). However, the stress hypothesis also predicts that high-
ranking handlers, who cause more stress (Sapolski 2005), would have to groom longer than low 
ranking ones. The opposite was found, however (Henzi & Barrett 2002; Gumert 2007a; Port et al. 
2008,  Barrett  &  Henzi  2006),  which  makes  sense  from  a  market  perspective:  high-ranking 
individuals  can  compensate  low  amounts  of  grooming  by  offering  tolerance,  restraint  and/or 
support, which all have higher value the higher-ranking the donor is. In our study higher-ranking 
individuals also groomed the commodity providers less than lower-ranking ones (Fruteau et al. in  
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prep.). Moreover, in the relaxed period after the consumption of the reward during which we 
measured grooming times, the providers were no longer under extraordinary attention. 
The question remains whether the grooming patterns observed after the containers were 
opened could indeed be interpreted as rewarding and/or pre-paying the providers. Not all group 
members groomed providers more; some also accepted shorter grooming bouts from the providers 
compared  to  the  pre-experimental  phase.  Again  this  makes  sense  if  one  thinks  in  terms  of 
mechanisms of price setting in a market: during a grooming session both partners can test their 
momentary  market  value  by  ending  a  grooming  bout  and  monitoring  their  partner’s  reaction. 
Providers were probably confronted with less dissatisfaction if they groomed others only briefly, 
while at the same time their own signs of dissatisfaction carried more weight. A price setting 
process is dynamic and grooming ratios can thus be adjusted in several ways: one party grooms 
less, or the other grooms more, or both. 
In  conclusion,  the  adjustment  of  grooming  ratios  can  be  understood  as  a  continuous 
bargaining process in which bargaining positions depend on the perception of the other's value as 
a partner in a long-term perspective. Grooming plays a dual role in this process: it functions both 
as a currency, because of its direct influence on the reward system of the groomee and as a 
commodity, because it can be traded directly for access to infants, tolerance and so forth too. 
Grooming  can  thus  be  used  to  balance  asymmetries  in  trades  of  other  commodities.  In  our 
experiment this balance shifted suddenly, and grooming patterns were quickly adjusted, when we 
experimentally  created  a  monopoly  and  shifted  again  when  we  turned  the  monopoly  into  a 
duopoly. Thus, free ranging monkeys can accurately adjust to shifting markets, although they 
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METHODS 
Observer team 
The observer team consisted of the first author and seven different assistants: E. van de Waal: 
09/2005 - 01/2006; S. Lemoine: 02 - 05/2006; V. Dufour and S. Aubel: 05 -06/2006; E. Hellard 
and A. Brotz: 06 - 08/2006; E. Hellard and D. Carter: 09/2006. 
 
Research area and subjects 
We used two free ranging vervet monkey groups, Chlorocebus aethiops, in the Loskop Dam 
Nature Reserve, Mpumalanga Province, South Africa. Loskop is located at 180 km north-east of 
Pretoria, covers approximately 25000 ha, is on average 1000 m above sea level and consist mainly 
of ‘bushveld’ (tall grasses and thick acacia bushes). Winters (May-October) are dry and cold and 
summers (November-April) are hot and humid. 
Both study groups were habituated to human observers prior to the start of the experiments. 
Their home ranges of approximately 3 km
2 each were about 3 km apart. The Donga Group had a 
period of fast turn-over of adult males prior to the study period but the total group size never 
exceeded 15. We observed three to five adult males, seven adult females, one to two sub adult 
individuals and one to two infants at a time. The Picnic Group had two to three adult males, four 
adult females, one juvenile and two to six infants at a time. The dominance hierarchies remained 
stable  throughout  the  study  period.  For  the  experiment,  we  selected  the  two  lowest-ranking 
females that would accept manipulating the containers as food providers.  
 
Experiment protocol 
The experiment had three phases: a period without a provider, (phase 0, September 2005 – April 
2006,  221  observational  sessions  for  Donga  Group  and  191  for  Picnic  Group,  of  which  we 
randomly chose 55 sessions per group for analysis), a period with 1 provider per group (phase 1, 
May to June 2006, 16 trials per group, always the same female as provider) and a period with 2  
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providers per group (phase 2, August-September 2006, 22 tests per group, the same first provider 
plus a second one). Both experimental phases were preceded by a period of training in which the 
providers learned to touch the lid of their specific food container.  
The groups were followed every second day during phase 0 and two days in a row every 
four days during the two testing phases 1 and 2. In phases 1 and 2 we waited until the animals 
reached a suitable area (open with big trees nearby for the vervet monkeys to rest safely) before 
positioning the food container. After a provider opened the container we recorded all grooming 
interactions within the following 60 minutes. Each approach and opening of the containers by the 
providers  was  recorded  with  digital  video  cameras  (Samsung  VP-D361i  and  Panasonic  NV-
GS11). One observer (CF) continuously followed the provider while two assistants recorded the 
interactions  of  the  rest  of  the  group.  All  agonistic  and  affiliative  interactions  were  recorded 
continuously (Altmann 1974) and the distance between every visible vervet and the experimental 
containers was recorded in 30 s intervals. Grooming bouts were timed to the nearest second. A 
bout was considered to have ended when either the direction of grooming changed or when there 
was a break of more than 20 seconds. A trial was aborted if one or both of the providers did not 
open her container during one hour, which happened five times in phase 2 for Donga Group and 
once in phase 2 for Picnic Group. The procedure for phase 2 was identical to the trials in phase 1, 
except that two containers were placed simultaneously at about 2 m distance from each other. The 
reward was the same as in phase 1 and evenly distributed over the two containers. Both providers 
were followed by one observer, each, while a third observer recorded the interactions between the 
remaining members of the group. 
Observations were distributed throughout the day but the majority of the data was taken 
from 6 a.m. to 1 p.m. and from 4 p.m. to 6 p.m. We used Pendragon Forms (professional edition 
4.0.00)  on  Palm  Zire  31  handheld  computers  for  all  behavioral  data.  Births,  immigrations, 
disappearances and intergroup encounters were recorded on a daily basis. 
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Food containers 
We worked with two containers (50 x 55 x 15 cm) with wooden frames that were both covered 
with a plastic mesh on all sides and reinforced with a metallic grid on top allowing the vervets to 
see and smell the food (Fig. S1A). The second container stood on 50 cm legs and had a split 
bottom, causing the food to drop to the ground (Fig. S1B).  The containers were filled with total of 
5 chopped apples per test. This was sufficient to ensure that most adults got a share. The obvious 
differences in form and color made it easy for both providers and non-providers to attribute a 
specific device to a specific provider. The containers were unlocked by remote control (a car door 
locking device) as soon as the provider touched the lid.  
 
Training of providers 
To habituate all animals to the food containers and to train the providers to operate them, we 
conducted a training phase with 24 trials per group from October 2005 to mid-January 2006 for 
the first providers and a training phase with 12 trials per group for the second providers in July 
2006. We provided five chopped apples per trial and we opened the container by remote control as 
soon as the selected provider touched it. The trials were not time restricted, i.e. we waited until the 
providers  dared  to  come  and  open  their  container.  During  the  first  training  phase,  dominant 
individuals tried to monopolize the food as soon as the container was opened, which lead to 
serious harassment of the low ranking providers. We placed two extra apples (also cut into pieces) 
outside the container as soon as the provider had opened the container to reduce this harassment. 
This additional food supply was not necessary for the second training phase, where harassment of 
the providers was much lower. It took only one trial for three of the providers to come to touch the 
container by chance. The 2
nd provider of the Donga Group touched the container for the first time 
in the 5
th trial. Throughout the training phases, the time required by the providers to open their 
container dropped quickly: First providers, Donga Group: from 35 minutes to less than 1 minute, 
Picnic Group: from 120 minutes to less than 10 minutes; second providers: Donga Group from 55  
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minutes to less than 2 minutes, Picnic Group: from 75 minutes to less than 10 minutes. None of 




We give only combined probabilities for both groups whenever the same effects were found in 
both. Raw data and separate probability estimates are given in the supporting tables S1- S5. Rank 
order and linearity indices were determined with the MATMAN software (de Vries et al. 1993, all 
other computations were made with MATHEMATICA 6.0 (Wolfram Research 2007). 
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Supplementary online information 
Videos showing examples of experiments are made available online. 
 
Training of the providers 
To habituate all animals to the food containers and to train the providers to operate them, we 
conducted a training phase with 24 trials per group from October 2005 to mid-January 2006 for 
the first providers and a training phase with 12 trials per group for the second providers in July 
2006. We provided five apples, each cut into 24 pieces, per trial and we opened the container by  
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remote control as soon as the selected provider would touch it by chance. The trials were not time 
restricted,  i.e.  we  waited  until  the  providers  touched  their  container.  During  the  first  training 
phase, high-ranking individuals tried to monopolize the food as soon as the container was opened, 
which lead to serious harassment of the low ranking providers. We placed two extra apples (also 
cut into 24 pieces) outside the container as soon as the provider had opened the container to 
reduce this harassment. This additional food supply was not necessary for the second training 
phase, because the dominant animals had learned to keep their distance by then (Fruteau et al. in 
prep.). It took only one trial for three of the providers to come to touch the container by chance. 
The 2
nd provider of the Donga group touched the container for the first time in the 5
th trial. 
Throughout the training phases, the time required by the providers to open their container dropped 
quickly: First providers, Donga group: from 35 minutes to less than 1 minute, Picnic group: from 
120 minutes to less than 10 minutes; second providers: Donga group from 55 minutes to less than 
2 minutes, Picnic group: from 75 minutes to less than 10 minutes. 
 
Comparison of food containers 
For the experiments we used food containers with different opening mechanisms (top opening and 
bottom opening, see Supporting Fig. 1). However, these different mechanisms did not seem to 
cause differences in the access to the reward in terms of numbers of individuals accessing it (mean 
± SE, N = 22: Donga first container: 2.5 ± 0.22 individuals; Donga second container: 2.4 ± 0.19; 
Picnic first container: 4.4 ± 0.33; Picnic second container: 4.6 ± 0.46) or the time each individual 
could forage (mean ± SE, N = 22: Donga first container: 132 ± 26.4 s; Donga second container: 
132 ± 24.6 s; Picnic first container: 102 ± 19.2 s; Picnic second container: 96 ± 17.4 s).  
 
Food competition test 
The natural frequency of interaction in small groups of vervet monkeys is very low. Hence, to 
evaluate the rank hierarchy of the adult animals we used dry maize (distributed widely to prevent  
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violent interactions) to conduct 20 food competition tests per group from September 2005 till May 
2006. The tests lasted until all adult animals came to feed (from 60 to 120 minutes). For the socio-
matrix we only used the recorded approach/retreat and threat/retreat unidirectional interactions to 
determine the subordinate individual of each dyad. In both groups the rank-order among adults 
was strictly linear (Kendall’s coefficient of linearity K=1 in both groups, combined probability: 
χ
2=30.75, p<0.001) and did not change in course of the experiment. 
 
Proximity to providers 
Those individuals that are closest to the container when the provider opens it and, hence, have the 
shortest latency to reach the container are likely to profit most. Such individuals could have paid 
more by grooming relatively more afterwards. Alternatively, the provider could have opened in 
the presence of individuals with whom she generally had a strong affiliative relationship. Thus, 
we performed two statistical tests: (1) comparing the grooming activity involving the providers in 
phase 0 (with no experimental manipulation) with proximity to the provider in the test phases, and 
(2) comparing whether individuals that were near the container at the moment it was opened were 
grooming the provider more often than when they were not nearby. In cases where two animals 
were approximately equally close to the provider, both were scored as nearest neighbours to avoid 
an unconscious observer bias. Comparing the total grooming times involving the providers in 
phase 0 with the frequencies of being nearest neighbour to the provider during opening we found 
no significant correlation for both providers of group Donga (Spearman Rank Correlation: 1
st 
provider: rs=0.31, N=9, n.s., 2
nd provider: rs=0.52, N=9, n.s.) nor for group Picnic (Spearman 
Rank Correlation: 1
st provider: rs=0.13, N=6, n.s., 2
nd provider: rs=-0.25, N=6, n.s.). Due to the 
low power of these tests the missing significances should be interpreted very carefully, but we can 
safely say that there was no strong relationship between grooming in the baseline condition and 
being nearest neighbour. To determine whether individuals that were near to the provider (and 
consequently also near to the container) during opening were grooming the provider more often  
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than when they were not near to her, we used a replicated goodness-of-fit test based on the G-
statistic (Sokal & Rohlf 1997). Individuals groomed the provider more often when they were 
nearest neighbours during the opening event than when they were not during test phase 1 (Donga: 
χ
2=33.69, df=9, p<0.001; Picnic: χ
2=13.5, df=6, p=0.036; combined probabilities: χ
2=25.06 df=4, 
p<0.001) but during test phase 2 this effect was also found for the first providers (combined 
probabilities  for  the  1
st  providers  of  both  groups:  χ
2=10.33,  df=4,  n.s.),  but  not  for  theh  2
nd 
providers (combined probabilities for the 2
nd providers: χ
2=6.38 df=4, n.s.). The significant results 
cannot be explained by simple proximity effects, because we measured grooming in the hour after 
a container was opened and thus after almost all animals had been close to it. The provider could 
in principle also have been groomed by animals interested in being close at the time of opening 
immediately before the trial started, i.e. after the experimenters handled the material. We were 
unable to measure grooming while preparing the trial, but the animals were generally exited and 
did not groom much. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
In the course of testing some of the law prevailing in the biological market theory, we performed 
food production experiments in two groups of free-ranging vervet monkeys. The experimental set 
up, allowing low-ranking females to become food-providers, was heavily disturbed by highest-
ranking  individuals  monopolising  the  closed  containers  and  preventing  the  providers  from 
opening them. However, highest-ranking individuals quickly learned to inhibit their aggressive 
monopolization by deliberately moving away from the containers hence, reducing the frequency 
of conflict occurrence toward the providers in the process. We found that the learning mechanisms 
were made over few trials. We demonstrated that high-ranking individuals used the outcome of 
the five previous trials to choose the adequate behaviour and each learnt in turn. This queuing 
process along with the fact that each next individual seemed to learn faster than the previous one, 
lead us to assume that the learning processes may be enhanced by sociality. We also found that 
the providers used their past experience to choose the best moment to open the container. Our 
overall impression was that the providers' group members behaved in such a way that tensions 
were lowered and containers opened more quickly. Although self-control has been the topic of 
several  studies  in  captivity  recently,  it  has  essentially  been  explored  in  term  of  individual 
cognitive capacities and not in term of social relationships. Hence, our study is the first to report 
self-control in both wild and social conditions and to give evidence of the learning mechanisms.  
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The fact that individuals gather together and form long lasting relationships is often explained in 
term of the advantages such social groups are providing. To name but a few, safety from predation 
through dilution effect (Bertram 1978) and increased foraging efficiency thanks to information 
sharing (Hamilton 1971; Ward & Zahavi 1973) both add to individuals’ survival and fitness. 
However  living  in  group  also  has  its  share  of  inconvenience  (Krause  &  Ruxton)  such  as 
competition for food and scrounging, i.e. ‘individuals usurping the resources found by others’ 
(e.g. Ranta et al. 1996). Within groups, public information as well as hierarchical relationships 
influence the way resources are exploited and individuals may usually differ in their investment 
for foraging activities. For instance, in most species high-ranking individuals can easily displace 
others  from  food  patches  and  are  thought  to  be  rather  good  candidates  for  learning  how  to 
recognise foraging success cues and for actively scrounging (Barnard & Silby 1981; Templeton & 
Girardeau 1995). 
In primates, high-ranking individuals often display both priority of access and aggressive 
resource protection behaviours (Pruetz & Isbell 2000; diBitetti & Janson 2001; Witting & Boesch 
2003), especially in food contexts. Hence, experiments relying on food production by low-ranking 
subjects (Stammbach 1988) may prove difficult to set up with free-ranging groups for which 
isolating individuals as it is done in captive conditions, is not an option. The recent development 
of the biological market theory (Noë & Hammerstein 1994, 1995) however, conducted many 
researchers  to  reconsider  cooperative  and  mutualistic  actions  nature  wide  (mycorrhiza 
associations: Schwartz & Hoeksema 1998; rhizobia associations: West et al. 2002; Denison 2003; 
obligate pollination mutualisms: Pellmyr & Huth 1994; Fleming & Holland 1998; cleaner fish - 
client reef fish associations: Bshary2002; Bshary & Grutter 2002, 2006) and in the course of 
testing some of the law prevailing in the biological market theory, we performed food production 
experiments in two groups of free-ranging vervet monkeys (Fruteau et al. 2009). We desired to 
investigate the currency functions of grooming when one and then two low-ranking females were 
giving the opportunity to open containers filled with apples, hence supplying the whole group  
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with appetent food. Since these food production experiments by subordinates required to be done 
with  wild  animals,  scrounging  and  aggressive  behaviours  represented  negative  parameters 
preventing low-ranking individuals to first access the food source and to be tolerated around it. 
The  relatively  easiness  in  the  performance  of  the  experiments  was  rather  unexpected  and 
reminded us of self-control behaviours. 
If self-control as well as patience have been tested in many primate species, experiments 
were done in captive conditions in which subjects were isolated from their social group during the 
course of the testing session. Reverse-reward contingency experiments, in which subjects were 
learning to choose the smaller of two rewards in order to obtain the biggest, simulated self-control 
conditions (chimpanzees: Boysen & Berntson 1995; Boysen et al. 1996; macaques: Tobin et al. 
1996; squirrel monkeys: Anderson 2000; orang-utans: Shumaker et al. 2001; tamarins: Kralik et 
al. 2002; lemurs: Genty et al. 2004). In a similar way, temporal discounting experiments in which 
individuals had to choose between an immediate but small reward and waiting a variable amount 
of time for a larger reward submitted subjects to patience (tamarins and marmosets: Stevens et al. 
2005 b; capuchins: Ramseyer et al. 2006; chimpanzees: Dufour et al. 2007). Self-control and 
patience were therefore explored through the scope of individual cognitive capacities but not 
really in term of social relationships among group members. In the wild, examples of both self-
control and patience are not so widely observed and even less tested. There are examples of males 
temporally inhibiting aggressive behaviours toward receptive females around food patches or the 
case  of  the  Japanese  macaque  female  that  learnt  to  momentarily  loose  dirty  wheat  seeds  by 
throwing them in water in order to clean them from their sandy crust (Kawai 1965). In this study 
however, some of the vervet monkeys’ behaviours seemed to provide first hand data on primates’ 
self-control  in  wild  conditions  as  well  as  on  the  likely  learning  mechanisms  permitting  the 
emergence of self-control. 
Learning mechanisms can usually be divided it two categories. One category operates 
when individuals experiment new food or situations in a solitary fashion, such as trial-and-error  
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learning (e.g. Thorpe 2008 for a review of learning capabilities recorded in wild birds). Trial-and-
error learning mechanisms (Thorndike 1911 reviewed in Pearce 2008) imply that animals would 
behave randomly until they do something in the direction of the solution, are rewarded and by bits 
and pieces perform the correct answer to solve the task. Then the effect of the reward would 
strengthen  the  accidental  answer  and  increase  its  occurrence  in  the  future  (Law  of  Effect, 
Thorndike 1911). However many researchers have argued that animals may be more sophisticated 
in their learning mechanisms that primarily suggested by the Law of Effect (e.g. Köhler 1925; 
Premack  1976;  Epstein  et  al.  1984).  They  suggested  that  animals  might  have  a  better 
understanding  of  the  causal  implications  of  a  behaviour  and  its  consecutive  outcome.  Some 
suggested  animals  also  had  insigh  (e.g.  Köhler  1965)  now  referred  to  as  causal  relationships 
understanding  (e.g.  in  primates:  Visalberghi  &  Trinca  1989;  Sabbatini  &  Visalberghi  2008), 
which would be identified by a brusque change in behaviour leading to the solving of a problem. 
The other category of learning mechanisms, social learning, requires a social environment, 
and  includes  observational  learning  (e.g.  Curio  1988;  Mineka  &  Cook  1988),  mimicry  (e.g. 
Goodall 1986; Russon & Galdikas 1993), emulation (Tomasello & Call, 1997 for a review) and 
imitation (e.g. Itani & Nishimura 1965, 1973; Boesch 1991; Ottoni et al. 2005; Perry 2009). The 
subject acquiring the proper behaviour needs to observe a demonstrator and choose to perform in 
similar  fashion  when  confronted  to  the  same  problem.  If  social  learning  is  thought  to  allow 
techniques (and subsequently, tradition) to spread in a group, it also leads to a conformism of the 
answers animals choose to solve a problem (e.g. Perry 2009; Price et al. 2009). 
As  the  set  up  of  the  experiment  we  performed  in  vervets  allowed  animals  to  gather 
together, it may be difficult to sort out whether the learning mechanisms are individual or social. 
However, we may have some insight on how quick they are leading to solving the task: allowing a 
low-ranking provider to open and feed from a large food resource.  
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METHODS 
Research area, subjects and data collection 
We conducted the study using two free ranging vervet monkeys groups, Chlorocebus aethiops, in 
Loskop Dam Nature Reserve in the Mpumalanga province in South Africa. The reserve is located 
at 180 km north/east of Pretoria and is characterised by a ‘bushveld’ (tall grasses and thick acacia 
bushes) type of habitat. It covers approximately 25000 ha, 1000 m above sea level. 
The studied groups’ home ranges covered about 3 km
2 and were disconnected, about three 
kilometres apart, one being located in a green valley (Donga group) and the other in a dry plain 
(Picnic  group).  Both  groups  were  habituated  to  human  observers  prior  to  the  start  of  the 
experiments. The Donga group was characterized by a fast male turn-over prior to the study 
period but the number of members never exceeded 15. We observed three to five adult males, 
seven adult females, one to two sub adult individuals and one to two infants at a time. Infant 
mortality was quite high as two infants out of three died during the study period. 
At the same time the Picnic group showed a higher infant survival rate as five infants out 
of six survived during the study period. This reproductive success almost doubled the size of the 
group in a very short time. Thus, we observed two to three adult males, four adult females, one 
juvenile and two to six infants at a time. Despite these demographic changes the adult members 
dominance hierarchy remained stable throughout the study period (MatMan test: Donga group: 
X
2
20 = 60.67, p < 0.0001, h = 1, K = 1 and Picnic group: X
2
23 = 48, p = 0.0021, h = 1, K = 1). 
Groups were followed every second day during the pre-experiment and training phases 
from September 2005 to the end of January 2006. Then it was followed two days in a row every 
four days during the experiment phase from May 2006 to the end of September 2006. The two 
first  authors  as  well  as  four  more  students  collected  data  using  every  ten  minutes  scans 
concentrating on the provider as well as continuous group focal samples (Altmann 1974) on all 
the group members. Observations were distributed throughout the day but the majority of the data  
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was taken from 6:00 to 13:00 and from 16:00 to 18:00 using Pendragon Forms (professional 
edition 4.0.00) on Palm Zire 31. 
A total of 605 hours of focal samples was recorded for the ten animals of the donga group 
and 422 hours for the seven animals of the picnic group. Additionally we collected 170 hours of 
ad libitum observations where we recorded agonistic or social interactions between identified 
individuals  continuously.  Location,  births,  immigrations,  disappearances  and  encounters  were 
recorded on a daily basis. For the experiment, we selected the lowest-ranking females who would 
accept to manipulate the container as food providers, which excluded jad and aga (Donga group) 




For the experiment, we worked with a wooden framed container (500x550x150mm; Fig.1A) kept 
closed  by  a  car  doors  locking  device  (Pict.1B)  with  a  remote  control  opening  that  we  could 
activate when the provider would touch the lid. Thus the only action the provider had to perform 
to gain access to the food source was to touch the lid. We opted for such a simple food-producing 
action, because we were rather interested in the socio-economic effects of food production and 
tried to avoid that manipulative limitations of the providers could hamper their success in opening 
the container. The container was covered with a plastic mesh on all sides and was reinforced with 
a metallic grid on top. The mesh allowed the vervets to see and smell the food in the container. 
 
A-         B-   
 
Picture 1: A- Container. B- Locking device.  
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Providers’ training 
To  habituate  the  animals  to  the  food  container  and  to  train  the  providers  to  operate  it  we 
conducted a training phase with 24 trials per group from October 2005 to mid-January 2006. We 
provided five apples per trial, each cut into 24 pieces and we opened the container by remote 
control  as  soon  as  the  selected  provider  would  touch  it  by  chance.  The  trials  were  not  time 
restricted, i.e. we waited until the providers dared to come and touch the container. During the 
training phase, high-ranking individuals tried to monopolise the food as soon as the container was 
opened, which led to serious harassment for the lower-ranking provider. In order to reduce the 
harassment and to positively enhance the provider into continuing to participate in the experiment, 
we placed two extra apples (also cut into 24 pieces) outside the container as soon as the provider 
opened it. This additional food supply was not necessary for the experimental phase. It took only 
one trial for the provider of each group to come to touch the container by chance. 
 
Experiment 
We ran the experiment phase from May to July 2006 and conducted 16 trials per group. We 
followed the groups until they were at a place that was suitable for the trials (open area for the 
container and big trees around for the vervets to rest). We then placed the container that we baited 
with  five  apples,  each  cut  in  24  pieces.  We  positioned  the  video  camera  and  indicated  the 
beginning of the trial with an acoustic signal. We waited until the provider opened the container 
within the one hour allotted time. From that moment on, one observer continuously followed the 
provider for one hour while the other observers recorded the interactions of the rest of the group. 
We chose this one hour control as primates are thought to require about 30 minutes after a meal to 
have a new sensation of hunger. No extra food was provided after the opening of the container 
and the test was aborted if the provider did not open the container in the allotted time. This never 
happened for neither groups. 
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Data collection 
During  the  experiment,  agonistic  and  affiliative  interactions  were  continuously  recorded.  The 
distances of every member of the group from the experimental container were recorded every 30 
seconds. Each approach and opening of the container by the providers was video recorded with a 
digital video camera (Samsung VP-D361i). 
 
Food competition test 
To evaluate the rank hierarchy of the adult animals we used dry maize distributed in large patches 
(to prevent rough interactions) to conduct 20 food competition tests per group from September 
2005 to May 2006. The tests lasted until all adult animals came to feed (from 60 to 120 minutes). 




We considered all individuals ranking above the providers and who participated in the experiment 
as high-ranking individuals. Hence for the Donga group we considered: Sa (alpha male), Los 
(alpha female), Pau (2
nd female), bob (3
rd female) and Oun (4
th female). For the Picnic group we 
considered: Gai (alpha female), Ro (alpha male) and Al (2
nd male). 
 
Throughout the training and experimental phases, the time required by the providers to 
open their container strongly dropped (Donga: from 35 minutes to less than 1 minute, Picnic: from 
120  minutes  to  less  than  10  minutes).  This  evolution  could  be  explained  by  interconnected 
parameters, the most obvious being: 0- learning to open the container by touching by the provider; 
1-  the  presence/absence  of  high-ranking  individuals  monopolising  the  container  and  2-  the 
occurrence  of  aggressive  behaviours  performed  by  these  high-ranking  individuals  while 
monopolising the container. Hence, we studied each effect chronologically from trial 1 to trial 40:  
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we transformed each variable into temporal series using R. Statistical tests were performed using 
R (version 2.10.1). The alpha-level was set 0.05. 
 
We firstly analyzed the influence of aggressiveness in general and the presence of high-
ranking  individuals  in  particular  on  the  opening  of  the  container  by  using  a  multiple  linear 
regression. Secondly, we searched for inflection points (breaking points hereafter) using R. The 
coding considered the temporal series as curves and it defined for which points of the curve there 
was an inflection point. This point meant that the part of the curve prior to the breakpoint was 
significantly different from the part after, indicating the moment that animals behaved differently. 
From the breaking points we could determine the latencies required for each individual to change 
its behaviour. We calculated the latency of the first individuals as: L1 = breakpoint1 – 0. All 
remaining latencies were calculated as: Li+1 = breakpointi+1 – breakpointi. Latencies permitted to 
distinguish whether all individuals learnt at the same pace. 
 
Throughout the training and testing sessions the time required by each provider to open the 
container was deeply influenced by highest-ranking individuals’ actions. Hence we investigate the 
way high-ranking individuals learned to leave the container during the trials. We compared their 
learning S-looking curves with theoretical ones following the formula y = min + ((max-min) / (1 + 
(x/S) ^P)) in which min and max respectively mean the lowest and highest values of the curve, S 
is the threshold of the curve and P the steepness of the slope. Concretely, S gives an indication on 
how fast individuals did learn anything: if S is small, then individuals learnt to leave the box in 
few trials. Similarly, P gives an idea of the cognitive mechanism behind the learning: if P is small, 
the slope is soft and tends to describe a long learning mechanism; if P is above 10, the slope is 
steep  and  describes  a  fast  all-or-nothing  learning  process.  We  compared  the  theoretical  and 
observational  curves  using  Spearman  correlations.  We  also  transformed  each  dominant’s  
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departure times into temporal series and we check for the breakpoints of each series. To verify the 
relevance of each individual S point, we compared it with the breakpoints. 
 
To complete the study, we used ACF (Auto-Correlation Functions) to investigate whether 
consecutive trials were autocorrelated. Concretely if two trials are auto-correlated, it means that 
the outcome of the previous trial influences the issue of the next one. Finally, we used L-jung-Box 
analyses to know how many fore trials influenced the outcome of a certain trial. 
 
RESULTS 
The presence of high-ranking individuals and aggressiveness influence the opening latency 
Both the time high-ranking individuals spent at less than 10m from the containers and the number 
of  conflicts  they  directed  at  providers  strongly  explained  the  container  opening  time  (linear 
regressions Donga: R
2 = 0.825, F = 138.849, dominants’ departure time: p < 0.0001, conflicts 
prior to opening: p < 0.001; Picnic: R
2 = 0.930, F = 409.283, dominants’ departure time: p < 
0.0001, conflicts prior to opening: p < 0.0001). 
 
In both groups, if we focus on the moment higher-ranking individuals left the container 
within at least a 10m range, this departure was significantly correlated with the elapsed time 
before the provider opened the container (Spearman correlations Donga: Rho = 0.830, p < 0.01; 
Picnic: Rho = 0.837, p < 0.01) (Fig.1). 
 
Furthermore, at the group level, the breakpoint revealed that the temporal series could be 
separated in two significantly different parts. For both groups, the breakpoint was found for the 
trial number 10. Prior to this point, both high-ranking individuals’ departure and opening times 
were on average significantly longer than after the point.  
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Figure 1. Plots of the moment all high-ranking individuals left the container (dominants’ departure time in 
black) and the moment the provider opened the container (opening time in red) for the two groups. Each 
group breakpoint appears as a black dotted line and is set at trial number 10. 
 
 
Evidences of learnt restraint at an individual level 
In the Donga group two waves of learning can be identified. The alpha male Sa and female Los 
who first monopolised the container moved away around the second trial (S = 2.5) and hardly ever 
stayed next to it in the remaining trials. However, the analysis at the temporal series level showed 
that their active departure only became consistent around the 6
th trial (breakpoint = 6). 
The three next high-ranked females (Pau: beta female, Bob: 3
rd female, Oun: 4
th female) 
could then all at once approach and monopolise the container. They, in turn, learnt to move away 
around the seventh trial (S = 7.5, breakpoint = 8). When we compare these observed curves with  
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theoretical ones using a Spearman correlation the fitting is best with a slope characterised by a P > 
15 (all the correlations here have been performed with a P = 20; Sa: Rho = 0.696, p < 0.01; Los: 
Rho = 0.697, p < 0.01; Pau: Rho = 0.686, p < 0.01; Bob: Rho = 0.771, p < 0.01; Oun: Rho = 
0.740, p < 0.01; average group curve: Rho = 0.763, p < 0.01) (Fig.2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Donga group: Plots of the observed high-ranking individuals’ departure curve (in grey) and the 
theoretical curve (in black). The rank of each individual is specified next to its name. Each individual 
breakpoint appears as a red dotted line. 
 
When we plotted the latencies of all individuals we found that Sa and Los needed 6 trials 
to behave differently, while Pau, Bob and Oun only required 2 trials (Fig. 3). These three females 
could only learn when the effect of the two alpha individuals was removed, leading to a queuing-
to-learn system. They also learnt faster than the two alpha individuals.  
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Figure  3.  Latencies  (number  of  trials)  required  by  the  high-ranking  individuals  to  learn  to  leave  the 
container after they could approach it. 
 
 
We found similar effects for the Picnic group than for the Donga group: high-ranking 
animals learnt in turn. The alpha female Gai left the container around the sixth trial (S = 6.5, 
breakpoint = 7), then the alpha male left around the 10
th trial (S = 10.5, breakpoint = 11) and the 
beta male around the 14
th trial (S = 14, second breakpoint = 14). For Al, the first breakpoint 
(breakpoint = 7) coincides with the first trial(s) during which he could approach the container after 
higher-ranking Gai learned to stay away from it. When we compare these observed curves with 
theoretical ones using a Spearman correlation, the fitting is best for a slope defined by P > 15 (all 
the correlations were performed with a P = 20; Gai: Rho = 0.840, p < 0.01; Ro: Rho = 0.827, p < 
0.01; Al: Rho = 0.694; average group curve: Rho = 0.918, p < 0.01) (Fig.4). 
 
When we plotted the latencies of all individuals we found that Gai needed 7 trials to 
behave differently, while Ro only required 4 trials and Al 3 trials (Fig. 5), which also led to a 
queuing-to-learn system in which the learning speed increased from an individual to the next. 
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Figure 4. Picnic group: Plots of the observed high-ranking individuals’ departure curve (in grey) and the 
theoretical curve (in black). The rank of each individual is specified next to its name. Each individual 




Figure  5.  Latencies  (number  of  trials)  required  by  the  high-ranking  individuals  to  learn  to  leave  the 
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Consequences of individual behaviours at the level of the group  
When we considered the auto-correlation functions (ACF) of the Donga group, almost all opening 
times depended on the outcome of the previous trial. Conversely, dominants’ departure times were 
random prior to the 11
th trial and correlated with the previous trial afterwards. This confirmed the 
breaking point result we found at the group level. The number of aggressive behaviours from the 
high-ranking individuals also appeared to be random up to the 9




Figure 6. Plots of the autocorrelated functions for the opening time, the dominants’ departure time, and the 
number of conflicts before the opening of the container for the Donga group. The lag between two lines 
represents 2 trials. Only the lines crossing the blue dotted lines held a non-significant result. All the others 
cannot be considered as different from 0 and mean that a trial is autocorrelated with the previous one. The 
first trial always has a p = 1 as it cannot be correlated with anything else than itself. 
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When we considered the ACFs of the Picnic group, we found similar results than for the 
Donga group. Almost all opening times depended on the outcome of the previous trial while 
dominants’ departure times were random prior to the 10
th trial and correlated with the previous 
trial afterwards. This also confirmed the breaking point result we found at the group level. The 
number of aggressive behaviours from the high-ranking individuals appeared to be random up to 
the 8
th trial and correlated after (Fig.7). 
 
 
Figure 7. Plots of the autocorrelated functions for the opening time, the dominants’ departure time, and the 
number of conflicts before the opening of the container for the Picnic group. The lag between two lines 
represents 1 trial. Only the lines crossing the blue dotted lines held a non-significant result. All the others 
cannot be considered as different from 0 and mean that a trial is autocorrelated with the previous one. The 
first trial always has a p = 1 as it cannot be correlated with anything else than itself. 
 
Finally, when we considered the L-jung-Box analyses, we found that most results became 
significant when at least 5 previous trials could influence the outcome of a certain trial. This result 
held for both groups (Fig.8).  
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Figure 8. Plots of the L-jung-Box analyses for the dominants’ departure time, the opening time, and the 
number of conflicts before the opening of the container. The lag between two lines represents 5 trials. Only 
the lines crossing the dotted line are non-significant. All the others cannot be considered as different from 0 
and mean that a trial is autocorrelated with the 5 previous ones. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The emergence of self-control 
In both vervet groups we found that the time required for a provider to come and open a container 
was seriously hampered by higher-ranking individuals’ behaviours. First, at the beginning of the 
trials, high-ranking individuals were particularly protective over the container and aggressively 
targeted the providers. Contrary to results observed by Stammbach (1988) in macaques, providers 
would not come to open the box when dominants would linger around it. They would wait that all 
higher-ranking individuals reach a safe distance above 10 m from the container and preferentially 
that they even climbed a tree (Fig. 9). However, if some of the first trials lasted from half an hour 
to two hours before a provider would dare to open the container, things eased around the 10
th trial 
as shown by the group level breaking points.  
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Figure  9.  Summary  of  the  animals’  behaviours  that  are  required  in  order  to  ease  the  opening  of  the 
container. 
 
When we investigated the behavioural changes at an individual level, we found that all 
high-ranking  individuals  learnt  to  quickly  and  actively  leave  the  container  soon  after  the 
beginning of a trial. Indeed, the learning curves of all individuals were characterised by a steep 
slope  (P  >  15),  which  suggested  a  fast  learning  mechanism.  Furthermore,  in  both  group  the 
learning  was  chronologically  correlated  with  the  rank:  higher-ranked  individuals  first 
monopolized  the  container,  then  learnt  to  leave,  then  lower-ranking  individuals  could  in  turn 
monopolize the box, then learnt to leave and so on. For the Donga group, the learning of the last 
(and fifth) higher-ranking individual was matching the group breakpoint, which means that all the 
five individuals in turn prevented the fast opening of the container. However, for the Picnic group,  
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the group breaking point was related to the consecutive learning of the two first dominants only. 
The third individual seemed to have little impact on the provider’s decision to open the container. 
The fact that all individuals seemed to learn in turn and needed to experience the container 
monopolisation before realizing that the opening was faster if they leave, could suggests that the 
learning mechanisms are individual rather than socially enhanced. However, the queuing-to-learn 
system was coupled with a learning pace that shortened from one individual to the next. This 
tends to suggest that individuals did observe one another and that social emulation may have 




In both groups we found that the opening times were hardly ever random. The ACFs results 
confirmed  that  provider’s  actions  over  the  container  were  strongly  influenced  by  others’ 
aggressive  behaviours  and  presence.  However,  besides  these  direct  effects,  the  L-jung-Box 
analyses showed that a certain opening time was correlated with the five previous trials. This 
suggests that the provider also used the positive or negative actions she experienced during the 
last five trials to decide the moment she could open the container. 
The ACFs also showed that high-ranking individuals’ departure behaviours were random 
during the first trials but became autocorrelated around each group breaking point. We found a 
similar result for the aggressiveness, except that for the Picnic group, the aggressiveness reduction 
seemed  to  start  as  soon  as  the  alpha  female  actively  left  the  vicinity  of  the  container.  The 
randomness  suggests  that  dominant  individuals  did  not  use  a  clear  set  of  strategies  but  tried 
different approaches at each trial. However, as soon as they found an effective strategy, they used 
the positive outcome as an incentive to act in similar fashion during the next trial. Furthermore, 
the L-jung-Box analyses showed that both the high-ranking individuals’ departure time and the  
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aggressiveness were auto-correlated up to the 5
th previous trial suggesting that dominants also 
used previous actions to choose the appropriate behaviour. 
 
Conclusion 
The consequences of each individual bit of self-control in terms of aggressiveness reduction and 
monopolisation inhibition resulted in the whole group benefit, as the container and the bonanza 
food within were more quickly available. The fact that they would also learn in very few trials 
suggests that adult individuals may still have a non-negligible behavioural plasticity when they are 
facing natural situations in which individual benefit can be reached via social consensus, here the 
consensus  being  the  temporarily  access  of  a  food  resource  by  a  low-ranking  individual.  The 
spontaneous learning to show restraint (i.e. without training by the experimenter) was achieved at 
the group level via a queuing-according-to-rank learning process. Individuals seemed to mainly 
use trial-and-error learning processes based on the outcomes they reached in the five previous 
trials.  The  learning  pace  however  seemed  to  indicate  that  individuals  also  used  social 
enhancement to learn the proper strategy. To our knowledge, this study is the first to give strong 
evidences of the emergence of self-control in wild conditions. It is also the first one to offer some 
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The  purpose  of  this  study  was  to  investigate  how  biological  market  laws  govern  reciprocal 
exchanges in two primate species: sooty mangabeys and vervet monkeys. Over all the chapters we 
considered the factors that determine the price of commodities such as young infants or potential 
mates, by largely investigating quantitative aspects rather than qualitative ones. We find that as 
human  markets,  primate  markets  are  characterized  by  fluctuating  exchange  rates  depending 
essentially on supply and demand ratios (Noë & Hammerstein 1994, 1995). Along with the law of 
supply and demand, we have investigated the effects of power asymmetries between partners and, 
in some cases, outbidding competition. 
 
Trading classes’ identification and reciprocal grooming exchanges 
In both mangabeys and vervets, we calculate that adult females spend about 15% of their daily 
budget to grooming, which represents around three to four hours of grooming per day. In the 
meantime, an average grooming session length is above five minutes, which means that females 
can have plenty of time to interact with as many partners as they see fit. However, and even in 
small groups like vervets, most females interacts with two to four preferred partners with which 
they spend a disproportional amount of their grooming time. Frequent partners groom each other 
for at least 10 min per day while on average, infrequent partners groom each other for less than 10 
min a month in mangabeys and less than 10 min a week in vervets. In females of adjacent ranks 
and outside any reproductive periods, grooming seems to be only given for grooming and no other 
commodity. Closely ranked females generally tend to give as much grooming as they get. While 
we do not have the genetic relatedness of the mangabey females, we find that in the Donga group, 
vervet females of adjacent rank belongs to the same matriline, while in the Picnic group, none of 
the  females  are  affiliated.  In  the  Donga  group  however,  affiliation  does  not  predict  whether 
females are frequent or infrequent groomers. 
For decades, many studies have reduced the complexity of the multiple factors prevailing 
in exchanges between individuals (and on a larger scale in cooperation) into simple repeated  
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dyadic interactions allowing partner control strategies (e.g. Axelrod 1980; Axelrod & Hamilton 
1981;  Dugatkin  &  Wilson  1991;  Enquist  &  Leimar  1993).  In  both  our  study  species,  most 
grooming sessions can be described as a succession of bouts during which the two partners groom 
each other in turn. This dyadic structure seems a perfect setting to investigate some of the partner 
control strategies such as parceling (Connors 1995) or raising the stakes (Roberts & Sherratt 
1998), but females fail to use any. Our results show that females invest in longer bouts at the 
beginning of the sessions, which is in contradiction to exploitation prevention (parcelling strategy) 
or trust building (raising the stake strategy). Some authors (Colmenares et al. 2002; Schino et al. 
2003; see also Gumert 2007b) emphasized that the difficulty to clearly identify trading classes can 
lead to erroneously reject market mechanisms. In grooming for grooming exchanges, there are 
typically two kinds of situations. In the first, females are of adjacent rank (and usually frequent 
groomers) and their exchanges are expected to remain more or less symmetric. In the second, 
females  are  not  of  adjacent  rank  (and  usually  infrequent  groomers)  and  their  exchanges  are 
expected to be biased toward the individual that cannot offer anything else but grooming (usually, 
the lower-ranking partner). Hence assuming that the dichotomy frequent/infrequent partners is 
relevant  for  our  study  species,  we  compared  the  grooming  sessions  occurring  in  both  cases. 
Interestingly, we find that infrequent groomers do not build trust. The first bout they give at the 
beginning of a session cannot predict the length of the session. In contrast, the first invested bout 
in frequent groomers predicts the length of the session. Its length is directly correlated to the 
length of the rest of the grooming session, long first bouts predicting long sessions. While this 
finding does not directly demonstrate trust building, it still suggests that females have a good 
knowledge of the quality of their relationships with others. It also gives some evidences for the 
biological market main control mechanism: switching partners. Indeed, the “playing off partners” 
predicts that animals base their preferences on past experiences with multiple partners. These 
experiences reach back deeper in the past than either parcelling or raising the stakes (e.g. de Wall  
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2000, Fruteau et al. 2009, Schino & Pellegrini 2009). This very first bout seems to give both 
partners an indication of the quality of the interaction that follows. 
 
Grooming secures the cooperative state of the partner 
While it proved difficult to define the trading classes in grooming-grooming exchanges, no such 
problem plagued grooming-infant handling exchanges. In this case, we distinguish easily between 
non-mother and mother of less than three months old infants. The former gives all the grooming 
while the latter hardly reciprocates and rather grants access to her infant. We find that females 
highly value infants as they give longer grooming bouts to be able to handle them rather than to 
receive reciprocated grooming. We also find that the interactions between mothers and handlers 
are incredibly complex and multi-layered. The amount of grooming non-mothers gives to get 
access to infants is influenced by the infants’ availability, their age and the rank distance existing 
between the handler and the mother. The length of grooming provided varies sufficiently to reflect 
many small changes such as the infants growing older. It also shows that females are able to 
adjust their grooming behaviours constantly. Interestingly, grooming bouts seem to secure the 
cooperative  state  of  the  mothers:  they  do  not  easily  give  access  to  their  infants  but  tolerate 
handling as soon as they receive the necessary amount of grooming. 
We find similar results when we study the grooming-sex interactions in mangabeys. The 
sex  market  is  one  of  the  oldest  paradigms  demonstrating  the  impact  of  competition  on  the 
selection of particular sexual traits and behaviours (see Andersonn 1994 for an extensive review). 
Accessing a mate and reproducing are two of the main drives directing adult animals lives, and 
primates  do  not  make  exception.  Hence  it  is  interesting  to  know  that  a  low-cost  action  like 
grooming can secure sexual activities. In sooty mangabeys, males and females sexual roles are not 
as classical as in other primate species. Indeed, females appear to be the most active gender 
seeking  for  sexual  opportunities.  Besides  repeatedly  presenting  their  sexual  parts  to  males, 
receptive females use grooming as a strategy to promote mating. In cases where males initially are  
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not eager to engage in any sexual activities when females do not display maximum tumescence, 
they change their mind when grooming is part of the foreplay. We observe that females also 
differentiate between 1) resident and immigrant males by initiating grooming-sex interactions 
more often with the latter, and between 2) high-ranking and low-ranking males by grooming the 
former after the mount and the latter before the mount. Females’ different behaviours towards 
males can be explained by the different nature of their relationships. We demonstrate that females 
and resident males actively cooperate to reduce infanticidal risks (Fruteau et al. 2010) and that 
females may use grooming to keep the bond with these males intact. In the case of immigrant or 
low-ranking males however, receptive females would initiate grooming sessions in exchange for 
multi-male  mating  (MMM:  Wolff  &  Macdonald  2004)  since  MMM  is  thought  to  enhance 
paternity confusion and thereby deter infanticide risks. Furthermore, the MMM hypothesis would 
also explain for the moment receptive females choose to groom males. In fact, females give loud 
copulation calls directly after the mount, which attracts other males. We observe that higher-
ranking males then replace the previous male and mate with the female. Hence, grooming low-
ranking males after a mount in order to secure sex opportunities would simply not work. 
 
A partner’s intrinsic value and the law of supply and demand 
Natural occurrences 
In all studies we find that grooming investments are affected by the rank difference existing 
between two partners. In grooming-grooming interactions and for both species, the subordinate 
female of a dyad has to groom her partner longer than she is groomed in return. Similarly, in 
grooming-infant handling exchanges, higher-ranking females groom mothers a lot less than do 
lower-ranking females in order to get access to the infant. This difference of leverage between 
females  has  been  explained  by  the  fact  that  dominants  may  have  additional  commodities 
(tolerance at food patches, restraint in dyadic conflicts with the subordinate, agonistic support in 
conflicts) to trade that subordinates cannot offer. The number of available infants per female has a  
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strong  effect  on  handler’s  grooming  investments.  When  infants  are  rare,  grooming  bouts  are 
longer. Similarly, non-mothers invest in longer bouts when infants are younger. These findings 
suggest that grooming-infant exchanges follow the market law of supply and demand: the value of 
infants varies through time according to their maturity and their fluctuating availability affects the 
outbidding competition among handlers who adapt their grooming investments accordingly. 
In  mangabeys,  we  show  that  during  the  mating  period,  females  vary  their  grooming 
investment  according  to  their  receptive  status.  This  contrasts  with  previous  results  found  in 
longtailed  macaques  in  which  swelling  stages  did  not  affect  the  way  males  valued  females 
(Gumert 2007b). In mangabeys however, females exchange grooming for mating when they are 
receptive and they groom males significantly longer when they are at the first stages of their 
sexual cycles. When they display maximum tumescence and are therefore close to ovulation, their 
grooming  investments  decrease  noticeably.  This  suggests  that  females  are  conscious  of  their 
intrinsic value. Since males still mates with them despite the smaller amount of grooming they 
receive, they seem to acknowledge females’ higher receptive value. 
We observe that the number of males present and females simultaneously receptive often 
fluctuate throughout the mating period: the ratio available males per receptive females varies from 
day to day. We show that receptive females groom males longer when there are fewer available 
males in the group. This suggests that grooming-for-sex exchanges follow the market law of 
supply and demand: the value of females varies through time according to their sexual receptivity 
and  males’  fluctuating  availability  affects  the  outbidding  competition  among  these  receptive 
females in terms of grooming duration. Hence the conclusions we draw from the sexual market 
hold many similarities with the conclusions for the infant market: females as well as males seem 
to accurately evaluate their immediate and fluctuating social environment and choose the amount 
of investment accordingly. 
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Testing the predictions derived from the law of supply and demand in vervets 
In vervets we performed the first field-experiment to investigate the law of supply and demand 
under more controlled conditions. We created an artificial market in our two study groups and 
caused sudden changes in the market value of two low-ranking females in such a way that these 
affected  all  other  group  members  and  could  easily  be  perceived  by  them. In  a  first  step,  we 
allowed, in each group, a single female to produce a bonanza of food for her and the rest of the 
group by triggering the opening of a container. In a second step, we introduced, in each of these 
groups, a second provider with a second food container that only she could open. The two boxes 
were  made  available  simultaneously,  but  were  not  necessarily  opened  simultaneously.  In 
economic terms we replaced a monopoly by a duopoly. We expected that if primates understand 
naturally  occurring  trades,  their  knowledge  would  be  a  sufficiently  inherent  part  of  their 
behavioural repertoire to be adapted to a completely new – and rather artificial - situation. In the 
first step, we find that grooming ratios shift to the advantage of the food providers, which is 
similar with the results of Stammbach (1988) study on captive long-tailed macaques. Our crucial 
result in terms of biological market expectations however, occurs during the second step when the 
positive effect on the grooming ratios of the first providers is roughly half as strong after we 
added the second provider. This gives strong evidence that primates are able to deal with supply 
and demand ratios accurately and rapidly. 
 
Proximate mechanisms allowing exchanges 
The  experiment  that  we  performed  in  vervets  raised  several  questions  on  the  necessary 
mechanisms allowing the performance of the market. The first one is motivated by the fact that 
group members are eager to exchange grooming for something they can have for free whenever 
they wait long enough: why do they not simply wait? Our explanation is that while large amount 
of food holds more value than a simple grooming-grooming interaction, this value decreases with  
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time. In other words, our conclusion is that vervets, like many other animals, discount future 
benefits and value a reward more the sooner it becomes available (Stevens & Stephens 2008). 
During  the  training  phase  of  the  experiment,  we  also  realized  that  the  providers  were 
reluctant to open the container in the presence of high-ranking animals. Indeed, in both groups, 
high-ranking individuals were particularly protective over the container and aggressively targeted 
the providers, hampering with the opening of the box. Contrary to results observed by Stammbach 
(1988), providers did not come to open the box when dominants lingered around it. They rather 
waited until these have left and were at a safe distance form the box (> 10m). Some of the first 
trials lasted from half an hour to two hours before a provider opened the box. However, all high-
ranking individuals learnt to quickly and actively leave the vicinity of the container soon after the 
beginning of a trial. All individuals learnt in turn, the higher-ranking individuals learning first. In 
other words, each individual needed to experience the container monopolisation before realizing 
that the opening was faster when it left. We conclude that the inhibition of the monopolisation is 
due to trial-and-error learning mechanisms. However, the consequences of each individual bit of 
self-control in terms of aggressiveness reduction and monopolisation inhibition resulted in the 
whole group benefit, as the container and the food within were more quickly available. 
The  quick  emergence  of  such  self-control  over  the  whole  population  of  high-ranking 
individuals also suggests that adult individuals still have a non-negligible behavioural plasticity. 
Many studies involving the emergence of elaborating foraging techniques using objects or tools 
often argued that adult individuals are less effective at acquiring a new technique than young 
individuals  (e.g.  Kawai  1965,  Byrne  &  Suomi  1996).  Our  results  suggest  that  when  adult 
individuals are facing situations in which individual benefit could be reached via social consensus 
(here, the momentarily allowance of the access of a food resource by a subordinate), the outcomes 
are  altogether  different.  Individuals  understand  the  situation  quickly  and  do  not  need  many 
repetitions to adapt their behaviours. Actually, we find that during the first trials, individuals do 
not use a clear set of strategies but try different approaches. However, as soon as they find an  
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effective strategy, they use the positive outcome as an incentive to act in similar fashion during 
the next trial. 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the adjustment of grooming investment can be understood as a process in which 
each individual’s offers depend on its perception of the other's value as a partner. Indeed, during a 
grooming session both partners can test their momentary market value by ending a grooming bout 
and monitoring their partner’s reaction. Grooming plays a dual role in this process: it functions 
both as a currency, because of its direct influence on the reward system of the groomed partner 
and as a commodity, because it can be traded directly for access to infants, sex and so forth. 
Grooming can thus be used to balance asymmetries in trades of other commodities. In our natural 
infant and sex markets as well as in our experiment this balance can shift suddenly. Grooming 
patterns  are  however  quickly  adjusted.  Thus,  free  ranging  monkeys  can  accurately  adjust  to 
changing market conditions, although they cannot rely on language for bargaining and have no 
obvious way of concluding binding contracts.  
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